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Obergefell’s Dreams 
MARC SPINDELMAN 
“[A]nalyses such as this are not published in order to produce conviction in the minds 
of those whose attitude has hitherto been recusant and sceptical.” 
-Sigmund Freud1 
 
“To no longer insist on being someone is to be free to be no one.” 
-Christina Feldman2 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s announcement in Obergefell v. Hodges—that 
the U.S. Constitution promises marriage equality for same-sex couples—has 
quickly and broadly swept the nation as a powerful symbol of social progress: 
of justice, of liberty and equality, of dignity, of freedom, delivered.3  
It is easy to see why. Three decades ago in Bowers v. Hardwick, the 
Supreme Court ridiculed the suggestion that homosexuality bore any 
relationship to the sacred precincts of marriage, family, and procreative life.4 
Approving homosexuality’s outlawry, Hardwick repudiated constitutional 
same-sex intimacy claims as “facetious” “at best.”5 After Hardwick’s own 
repudiation by Lawrence v. Texas,6 whose protections for same-sex intimacies 
were extended to the marriage setting in United States v. Windsor,7 whatever 
of Hardwick’s homophobic sensibilities persisted in constitutional law, 
Obergefell extirpates them. According to this new ruling, same-sex intimacies 
are not simply like marital intimacies, as Lawrence regarded them, but, as with 
Windsor, they are marital intimacies inside of the constitutionally protected, 
normative, American, multi-generational marital and family form. From 
“[o]utlaw to outcast,” after Obergefell, homosexuality and same-sex intimacies 
                                                                                                                     
 3 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598–99, 2604–05, 2608 (2015). 
On Obergefell’s positive symbolism, see, for example, Elizabeth B. Cooper, The Power of 
Dignity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 3, 5 (2015); Jeremiah A. Ho, Once We’re Done 
Honeymooning: Obergefell v. Hodges, Incrementalism, and Advances for Sexual 
Orientation Anti-Discrimination, 104 KY. L.J. 207, 207 (2016); Joseph Landau, Roberts, 
Kennedy, and the Subtle Differences that Matter in Obergefell, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 33 
(2015); Toni M. Massaro, The Lawfulness of the Same-Sex Marriage Decisions: Charles 
Black on Obergefell, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 321, 340–41 (2016); and Kenji 
Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 147 
(2015).  
 4 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 5 Id. at 194. 
 6 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 7 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013). 
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are constitutionally insiders of the first, indeed noble, rank.8 Thus is 
Obergefell seen as movement, worlds of distance from Hardwick and its rule 
of law’s reign.9 
Revolutionary in these ways, Obergefell is also revolutionary in a wholly 
different and far less salutary sense.10 Hardwick’s pro-homophobic 
sensibilities no longer normatively persist in law, but Obergefell is no singular 
triumph. The decision, rather, marks a return—a revolution—to a mode of 
thinking about lesbian and gay rights and same-sex intimacies on inglorious 
display in Hardwick. Troublingly, Hardwick refused to align its negation of 
                                                                                                                     
 8 The quoted language comes from Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. The notion of 
“nobility” appears in id. at 2594, 2599–600; cf. Mary Anne Case, Address at the Florida 
State University College of Law Symposium: After Marriage (Jan. 31, 2014) (transcript on 
file with author) (“[T]his notion that marriage is a dignity brings the No Titles of Nobility 
Clause into perspective in a way that . . . hasn’t yet been recognized. . . . I think that 
marriage has now been elevated to a title of nobility; and I would actually like to see no 
titles of nobility . . . .”). 
 9 Some thoughts on the larger transformation are in GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY 
MARRIAGE? THE HISTORY SHAPING TODAY’S DEBATE OVER GAY EQUALITY (2005); 
Michael Boucai, Glorious Precedents: When Gay Marriage Was Radical, 27 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 1 (2015); and Suzanne B. Goldberg, Obergefell at the Intersection of Civil Rights 
and Social Movements, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 157 (2015), https://californialawreview.org/o 
bergefell-intersection-civil-rights-social-movements/ [https://perma.cc/T8MP-GZ5E].  
 10 Other accounts of Obergefell, without missing the advances it makes, have 
explored its limitations. See, e.g., Elvia Rosales Arriola, Queer, Undocumented, and Sitting 
in an Immigration Detention Center: A Post-Obergefell Reflection, 84 UMKC L. REV. 617, 
637–38 (2016); Leonore F. Carpenter, The Next Phase: Positioning the Post-Obergefell 
LGBT Rights Movement to Bridge the Gap Between Formal and Lived Equality, 13 STAN. 
J. C.R. & C.L. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 19–20), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2766577 
[https://perma.cc/GMM2-DP9Z]; Mary Anne Case, Missing Sex Talk in the Supreme 
Court’s Same-Sex Marriage Cases, 84 UMKC L. REV. 675, 683, 684–91 (2016); Ruth 
Colker, The Freedom to Choose to Marry, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 383, 385–86 (2015); 
Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, 84 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 23, 23–27 (2015); Anthony C. Infanti, Victims of Our Own Success: The Perils of 
Obergefell and Windsor, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 79 (2015), 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2015/10/Vol.-76-79-85-Infanti-Essay.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/26YT-M47X]; Zachary A. Kramer, Before and After Obergefell, 84 
UMKC L. REV. 797, 801 (2016); Ethan J. Leib, Hail Marriage and Farewell, 84 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 41, 41–42 (2015); R.A. Lenhardt, Race, Dignity, and the Right to Marry, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 66 (2015); Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage 
Inequality, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1207, 1209–10, 1239–57 (2016); Peter Nicolas, 
Obergefell’s Squandered Potential, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 137, 138 (2015), 
https://www.californialawreview.org/squandered_potential/ [https://perma.cc/KG5Z-4WNM]; 
Catherine Powell, Up from Marriage: Freedom, Solitude, and Individual Autonomy in the 
Shadow of Marriage Equality, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 69, 69–70 (2015); Russell K. 
Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 156–57 (2016); Ruthann Robson, 
Justice Ginsburg’s Obergefell v. Hodges, 84 UMKC L. Rev. 837, 848–50 (2016); Kyle C. 
Velte, Obergefell’s Expressive Promise, 6 HLRE 157, 157–58 (2015), 
http://www.houstonlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Velte_Final.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/3KQX-UPDN]. 
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lesbian-and-gay rights with rule-of-law conditions like logic and reason. As its 
critics have long maintained, it manifested their eclipse.11 As doctrine, 
Hardwick has been defanged, but as method—defined by illogic and 
unreason—Hardwick’s law remains. In Obergefell, this method and its law 
carry the day. 
To say this is to face facts that Obergefell’s readers either already know or 
should. The opinions in the case, both in majority and in dissent, turn with 
emotion and twist with passion’s fevers. They trade accusations that, across 
marriage equality’s bottom line, are modes of thinking that have come 
unhinged from reason.12 This is no dispute in which only one side is right. As 
the Obergefell majority opinion seals the coffin on Hardwick’s distinctively 
homophobic, hence irrational, sensibilities, it joins with the dissenting 
opinions in the case to dredge up Hardwick’s dormant irrationality as an 
approach to decision, giving that approach a renewed lease on constitutional, 
hence legal, hence social, life. What follows in these pages is one part—the 
first part—of that account. It begins with a close reading focused on the lead 
Obergefell dissent written by Chief Justice John Roberts and joined by Justices 
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas.13 The second part, to be published as a 
separate article, will focus its attentions on the Obergefell majority opinion 
written by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. 
The discussion here proceeds as follows. First is background that situates 
the work in its intellectual context. Next is an engagement with Chief Justice 
John Roberts’s Obergefell dissent. Through a close reading of this opinion, 
one part of a larger case is made out: On Obergefell’s dissenting side at least is 
doctrinal machinery that rests atop, and may even be defined by, the complex 
and shifting soil of reason’s eclipse. 
                                                                                                                     
 11 The literature is legion. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 81–84 (1991); 
Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick, Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 648, 648 (1987); Kendall Thomas, Commentary, The Eclipse of Reason: A 
Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1805, 1805 (1993). Additional 
relevant sources are cited in Marc S. Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 
N.C. L. REV. 359, 367–70, 367–70 nn.11–23 (2001). 
 12 For relevant perspectives from the majority opinion, see, for example, Obergefell, 
135 S. Ct. at 2596–602, 2604, 2607. For relevant perspectives from the Chief Justice’s 
dissent, see infra notes 41–53 and accompanying text. For relevant perspectives from 
Justice Scalia’s dissent, see, for example, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626–31 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). For relevant perspectives from Justice Thomas’s dissent, see, for example, id. 
at 2631–32, 2632 n.1, 2636 n.5, 2637, 2639–40 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For relevant 
perspectives from Justice Alito’s dissent, see, for example, id. at 2642–43 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). Speaking generally, Louis Michael Seidman has noted “the vitriol and abuse 
dished out” in the Obergefell dissents. Louis Michael Seidman, The Triumph of Gay 
Marriage and the Failure of Constitutional Law, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 117. 
 13 The other dissents are engaged in different ways infra. For Justice Scalia’s dissent, 
see infra note 107, and notes 138–46, 230 and accompanying text. For Justice Thomas’s 
dissent, see infra note 142, and note 213 and accompanying text. For Justice Alito’s 
dissent, see note 129 and accompanying text, and note 282. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This work—and the close readings of the opinions from Obergefell that it 
offers—sits at the intersection of two traditions of legal academic thought and 
practice. From one—the law and literature movement—it draws an interest in 
the discursive operations of legal, including judicial, texts.14 It proceeds 
having accepted the law and literature insight that attending to the rhetoric of 
legal texts, including “what might loosely be termed [their] ‘figural’ or 
‘metaphorical’ elements,” is a means by which to register, if not strictly to 
produce, their complexly constituted meanings.15  
From the other tradition, which traces a genealogy to Jerome Frank’s 
efforts in psychoanalytic jurisprudence, the work draws an interest in the 
psychological dimensions of legal texts, including the irrationalities that, 
consciously or not, shape and define them, along with the imaginary worlds—
the dreams, fantasies, and nightmares—to and from which those irrationalities 
at times give rise.16 Interesting in its own right, exploring these legal vistas 
offers a way to ventilate elements of legal texts that are beyond the purview of 
standard rule-of-law protocols for interpreting them, which posit that the 
meanings of legal texts are to be discovered, if at all, on the terrain of 
                                                                                                                     
 14 Some prominent works in this tradition include STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT 
COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND 
LEGAL STUDIES (1989); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LOVE’S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON 
PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE (1990); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE (1988); 
JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (1986); ROBIN WEST, 
NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW (1993); JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE 
THEIR MEANING (1984); Robin West, Communities, Texts, and Law: Reflections on the 
Law and Literature Movement, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 129 (1988); and James Boyd White, 
What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 2014 (1989) (book 
review). Different offerings in and perspectives on the related law and narrative project are 
in DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 
(1987); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM (1992); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991); 
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER’S EGG (1995); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of 
Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 971 (1991); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists 
and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); and Angela P. Harris, 
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990). For a 
collection of additional sources, see WEST, supra, at 345 n.1.  
 15 Thomas, supra note 11, at 1812. 
 16 Jerome Frank’s classic effort in psychoanalytic jurisprudence is JEROME FRANK, 
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930). For genealogies of this tradition, see David S. 
Caudill, The Future of Freud in Law, in FREUD 2000, at 262, 264–69 (Anthony Elliot ed., 
Routledge 1999) (1998), and Anne C. Dailey, Striving for Rationality, 86 VA. L. REV. 349, 
350 n.8 (2000) (book review). Various lines of research make clear that this tradition has 
roots that precede Frank’s work. See, e.g., ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS 
REFORMER: JEROME FRANK’S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW 52–53 (1985); Mortimer J. Adler, 
Legal Certainty, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 91 (1931); K.N. Llewellyn, Legal Illusion, 31 
COLUM. L. REV. 82, 82–84 (1931).  
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objectivity, dispassion, logic, and reason.17 If, in some precincts, 
psychoanalysis is a dead letter, it nevertheless continues to supply resources 
for delivering fresh insights into how legal texts, however they may be 
described in theory, can, in practice, deviate from and call into question rule-
of-law ideals.18 
Of the numerous efforts in these two traditions, and the smaller number of 
works at their intersection, Kendall Thomas’s 1993 commentary The Eclipse 
of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick deserves special 
mention as work that undertakes a rhetorical and psychoanalytically inflected 
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s Bowers v. Hardwick decision.19 The 
                                                                                                                     
 17 Pierre Schlag puts it this way, neatly: 
While American legal thinkers have for the most part been very critical of specific 
cases, statutes, constitutional provisions, and the like, they have nonetheless been very 
critical in a very narrow way—a way that presumes and systematically reaffirms the 
essential rationality and essential value of American law. The discipline of American 
law, from its very beginnings (and without much critical reflection), has been 
committed to the rationalization of official government actions that are themselves not 
obviously the product of reason or rationality, but also an admixture of all sorts of 
forces, to wit: tradition, experience, power politics, rent seeking, utopian hopes, 
dystopian fears, expediency, practicality. 
PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 12 (1998); see also Thomas, supra note 
11, at 1811–12. 
 18 On some of the reasons for burying psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic approaches 
to social, including legal, questions, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN 
ARCHEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 373–87 (1970); JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA 
AND RECOVERY 7–20, 30 (1992); JULIET MITCHELL, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM, at xv 
(Vintage Books ed. 1975) (1974); Amy Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court 
Confronts the G-String, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1108, 1130–31 & nn.104–06 (2005); Jeremiah 
P. Conway, The Retreat from History: A Marxist Analysis of Freud, 25 STUD. SOVIET 
THOUGHT 101, 104–11 (1983); Hubert Dreyfus, Foreword to the California Edition of 
MICHEL FOUCAULT, MENTAL ILLNESS AND PSYCHOLOGY, at xiii–xviii (Alan Sheridan 
trans., Univ. of Cal. Press, 2d paperback prtg. 2008) (1954); and Michel Foucault, 
Confinement, Psychiatry, Prison, translated in POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, CULTURE 178 
(Lawrence D. Kritzman ed., Alan Sheridan et al. trans., 1988). See also generally MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF MADNESS (Jean Khalfa ed., Jonathan Murphy & Jean Khalfa 
trans., Routledge 2006) (1961); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Sex, Lies, and Psychotherapy, 
in WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 251 (Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed. 2007). Critiques 
notwithstanding, these approaches retain tremendous generative powers as tools of critical 
analysis. See generally, e.g., LEO BERSANI, HOMOS (1995) [hereinafter BERSANI, HOMOS]; 
LEO BERSANI & ADAM PHILLIPS, INTIMACIES (2008); LEO BERSANI, IS THE RECTUM A 
GRAVE? (2010); TIM DEAN, BEYOND SEXUALITY (2000); TIM DEAN, UNLIMITED INTIMACY: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE SUBCULTURE OF BAREBACKING (2009) [hereinafter DEAN, UNLIMITED 
INTIMACY]; HERBERT MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO 
FREUD (prtg. 1966); Christopher Lane, Freud on Group Psychology: Shattering the Dream 
of a Common Culture, in HOMOSEXUALITY & PSYCHOANALYSIS 147 (Tim Dean & 
Christopher Lane eds., 2001). For additional sources, see infra note 36. 
 19 See generally Thomas, supra note 11. Other works at this intersection include 
Adler, supra note 18; Amy Adler, Performance Anxiety: Medusa, Sex, and the First 
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essay’s stance—that Hardwick fails to satisfy ordinary rule-of-law conditions, 
its defining features being, as the essay details them, illogic and unreason, 
emotion and passion, fantasy and not fact—cannot now be gainsaid.20 
Part of the brilliance of Thomas’s commentary is in how it frames its 
analysis of Hardwick with reference to the writings of Dr. jur. Daniel Paul 
Schreber, “a German lawyer, judge, and Senatspräsident of the Dresden 
Appeal Court.”21 The writings by Judge Schreber that Thomas’s essay has in 
mind are not from a law case he decided but his autobiography, Memoirs of 
My Nervous Illness,22 which Sigmund Freud famously glossed in order “to 
develop a theory of the catalytic role played by repressed homosexual wish 
fantasies in the mechanism of paranoid psychosis.”23 
Thomas’s commentary prepares the ground for its reading of Hardwick by 
rehearsing important aspects of Schreber’s Memoirs as Freud’s study 
characterized them. Both for flavor and for content, this is a vital aspect of the 
picture that Thomas’s essay paints of Schreber’s case. Quotes in the passage 
are stacked because Thomas’s essay at this point is looking at Schreber’s 
Memoirs through the lens that Freud’s work trains on them: 
For Freud, the “salient feature” of the Memoirs is a “delusion of 
emasculation” or Judge Schreber’s belief that he was “being transformed into 
a woman.” Freud explains that Schreber’s psychotic fantasy is triggered one 
morning “between sleeping and waking” by the thought “ ‘that after all it 
really must be very nice to be a woman submitting to the act of copulation.’ ” 
“This idea,” writes Freud, “was one which [Schreber] would have rejected 
with the greatest indignation if he had been fully conscious.” Indeed, 
Schreber recounts in the Memoirs that he initially construed his 
transformative “unmanning” (Entmannung) as a conspiracy in which “ ‘God 
Himself had played the part of accomplice, if not of instigator.’ ” This 
divinely ordained scheme, Schreber notes paradoxically, was driven by 
purposes “ ‘contrary to the Order of Things’ ”: Schreber’s “ ‘soul was to be 
murdered’ ” and his transformed “ ‘body used like a strumpet.’ ” Over time, 
however, the judge decides that his “emasculation” is in fact part of a “divine 
miracle,” and is thus very much “ ‘in consonance with the Order of Things.’ ” 
Schreber is forced to realize that “ ‘the Order of Things imperatively 
                                                                                                                     
Amendment, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 227 (2009); and Allyson M. Lunny, ‘Look, a 
Faggot!’: The Scopic Economies of Cruising, Queer Bashing and Law, 22 SOC. & LEGAL 
STUD. 231 (2012). 
 20 See generally Thomas, supra note 11.  
 21 Id. at 1807. 
 22 DANIEL PAUL SCHREBER, MEMOIRS OF MY NERVOUS ILLNESS (Ida Macalpine & 
Richard A. Hunter eds. & trans., 1955). 
 23 Freud’s study of Schreber’s case appears in Sigmund Freud, Psycho-Analytic Notes 
on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides) (1911) 
[hereinafter Freud, Psycho-Analytic Notes], reprinted in 12 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE 
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 3 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 
1958). The quoted language describing Freud’s work comes from Thomas, supra note 11, 
at 1807–08. 
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demanded [his] emasculation, whether [he] personally liked it or no,’ ” 
because he had been chosen for “ ‘[s]omething . . . similar to the conception 
of Jesus Christ by the Immaculate Virgin.’ ” The judge comes to interpret his 
“unmanning” as a sign that God has called him to redeem the world: “ ‘The 
further consequence of my emasculation could, of course, only be my 
impregnation by divine rays to the end that a new race of men might be 
created.’ ” Schreber is eventually able to “ ‘reconcile [himself] to the thought 
of being transformed into a woman’ ” and reports in lavish detail the hours he 
spends before the mirror “ ‘with the upper portion of [his] body bared, and 
wearing sundry feminine adornments, such as ribbons, false necklaces, and 
the like.’ ” Having transposed his dissonant sexual fantasy into a more 
harmonious spiritual key, Schreber finally accepts his calling. Schreber 
confesses that he finds that “ ‘a little sensual pleasure falls to [his] share’ ” 
when he “ [‘]inscribe[s] upon [his] banner the cultivation of femaleness’ ” 
and evokes that “ ‘sensation of voluptuousness such as women experience,’ ” 
without which he cannot discharge his new maternal duty to keep God in a “ 
‘constant state of enjoyment.’ ” It is thus that the “ ‘unequal struggle between 
this one weak man and God himself’ ” is brought to a happy end. In Freud’s 
formulation, what begins as a “sexual delusion of persecution” is “converted 
in [Schreber’s] mind into a religious delusion of grandeur.”24 
Thus does Thomas’s portrayal of Schreber’s paranoid delusions highlight 
two of the themes that prominently define them: Schreber’s “sexual 
delusion[s] of persecution,” or, slightly differently, his delusions of sexual 
persecution, on the one hand, and the “delusion[s] of emasculation,” or 
“unmanning,” that are, at times, complexly and tightly bound up with them, on 
the other.25 These paired themes—of sexual persecution and unmanning—are 
indispensable reference points for the interpretation of Hardwick that 
Thomas’s commentary offers, which stakes out the position that the “bizarre 
                                                                                                                     
 24 Thomas, supra note 11, at 1808–09 (alterations in original, with the exception of 
“[‘]”) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Freud, Psycho-Analytic Notes, supra note 23, at 13–34, 
with the word “unmanning” derived from SCHREBER, supra note 22, at 361). 
 25 Id. (first quoting Freud, Psycho-Analytic Notes, supra note 23, at 18; then quoting 
id. at 20; and then quoting SCHREBER, supra note 22, at 361). See generally SCHREBER, 
supra note 22; Freud, Psycho-Analytic Notes, supra note 23. This way of articulating the 
point is a slight but intentional departure from Thomas’s reading of Freud’s reading of 
Schreber’s Memoirs. Within Thomas’s analysis, there is, at times, an operative identity 
between Schreber’s “delusion of persecution” and his “delusion of emasculation.” See, e.g., 
Thomas, supra note 11, at 1808–09. This approach is understandable, even warranted, in 
this setting, both as an account of Freud’s study of Schreber’s case and as a reading of 
Schreber’s Memoirs. For present purposes, however, Schreber’s delusions are approached 
with a more marked, if provisional, distinction between his delusions of persecution and 
his delusions of unmanning. The basis for this approach returns to Schreber’s Memoirs 
themselves, in which delusions of persecution do not invariably reduce to delusions of 
unmanning. See, e.g., SCHREBER, supra note 22, at 55, 69–72, 75–79, 79 n.35, 83–84, 86–
88, 87 n.39, 99–100, 121, 124, 130, 132–39, 171, 211–12. 
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figural logic[s]” found in Hardwick bear “uncanny continuities” with “the 
psychotic discourse of Judge Schreber’s Memoirs.”26 
                                                                                                                     
 26 Thomas, supra note 11, at 1809. Detailing the “uncanny continuities,” Thomas’s 
commentary ventures that, as a textual matter, the Court’s Hardwick opinion shows signs 
of Schreber-like psychosexual fantasies in which a heterosexually male-identified figure, 
apparently associated with the Supreme Court, is erotically persecuted and unmanned. Key 
evidence for the existence of these fantasies emerges through a Freudian reading of an 
important passage in Hardwick that dredges up Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
(1905), overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), and the “painful[]” 
“face-off” that it precipitated “between the Executive and the Court in the 1930s.” Id. at 
1814 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194–95 (1986)). If, doctrinally, the 
Court invokes Lochner to explain its felt imperative to reject what it takes to be a claimed 
right to homosexual sodomy, on a rhetorical level, summoning Lochner and its traumatic 
effects is a powerful clue that Hardwick is inflicting a trauma on the Court. Like Lochner, 
Hardwick involves a “painful[]” “face-off,” id. (quoting Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194)—not 
with the Executive, but with homosexuality itself, claims for which are being “pressed” 
upon the Court, id. at 1816 (quoting Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 195), and which must be met 
with “great resistance,” id. at 1814, 1816, 1821 (quoting Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 195). No 
mere reference to arguments the Court is being urged to adopt, this is a sexual “press” 
which, in Hardwick’s imagination, “represents an assault on the normative order of male 
heterosexuality,” id. at 1822, and thereby “provokes [within the Court’s opinion] nothing 
less than a crisis of institutional representation,” id. at 1823. 
This “crisis of institutional representation” surfaces in Hardwick in ways that are 
similar to Schreber’s own crisis of self-representation. Id. Sensing that Hardwick’s 
homosexual advances are “somehow not only” a threat that would “undermine the 
authority of the Court, but [a threat that would also] unman (to use Judge Schreber’s word) 
the patriarchal (hetero)sexual ideologies and identities on which that authority ultimately 
rests,” id. at 1818, Hardwick seeks to preserve the Court’s authority, rebuffing the would-
be unmanning in the case through an opinion that stages a deep and 
“radical . . . disidentification with the very figure of the male homosexual,” id. at 1824. 
This staged disidentification with the figure of the male homosexual is so radical and so 
insistent that it readily reads as an indication that something is hiding beneath it. Recalling 
Freud’s claim that “all human beings are capable of making a homosexual object-choice 
and have in fact made one in their unconscious,” id. at 1826 (quoting SIGMUND FREUD, 
THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY (1905) [hereinafter, FREUD, THREE ESSAYS], 
reprinted in 7 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF 
SIGMUND FREUD 125, 144 n.1 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1953)), Hardwick, considering 
the claims to homosexual sodomy at hand, has apparently faced its own capacity for 
making a homosexual object-choice and made that choice, if solely on an unconscious 
level, only to find itself feeling a surging need to insist emphatically that it never had, 
never did, and never would, by not merely rejecting but violently smashing Michael 
Hardwick’s claims in an opinion that “rages irrationally against [them],” id. at 1828. No 
sober second look at the constitutionality of Georgia’s sodomy statute, Hardwick is, if 
anything, a case of an anti-gay homosexual panic. 
Something curious happens as part of this anti-gay homosexual panic that is also like 
what happens in Schreber’s case. Formally, Hardwick repudiates the pro-lesbian-and-gay 
constitutional arguments in the case in a turn that ridicules them, see supra note 5 and 
accompanying text, but this repudiation comes through a decision that displaces its own 
homophobic aggressions by projecting them onto the figure of the male homosexual who is 
thereby reconfigured as an aggressor who would take a heterosexualized and male-
1048 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:5 
                                                                                                                     
identified Hardwick Court and reduce it to the status of a sexual victim. In doing so, 
Hardwick would place the heterosexual male-identified Court in a “‘vulnerable,’ unmanly, 
and perforce, enfeminized position,” Thomas, supra note 11, at 1824 (quoting Hardwick, 
478 U.S. at 194), not only as a matter of doctrine, but also, importantly, as a matter of sex. 
In its sexual dimensions, the Court’s homophobic imagination tracks “the regnant 
representation of the gay male homosexual” in the “homophobic American mind . . . of ‘a 
grown man, legs high in the air, unable to refuse the suicidal ecstasy of being a woman.’” 
Id. at 1822 (quoting Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, 43 OCTOBER 197, 212 (1987)). 
If, despite itself, Hardwick practically “confesse[s] with equal insistence the very interest 
in homosexuality that [it] has so insistently disavowed,” id. at 1828, the ultimate logic of 
the Court’s fantasy about Hardwick bespeaks an act the desires for which are not properly 
“fit to be named,” id. at 1823 (quoting Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, C.J., 
concurring) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215)). Nameless, they are 
not without comparison, as found in Chief Justice Warren Burger’s concurring opinion in 
the case. Following Blackstone, that opinion explains that Hardwick involves an act of 
“‘deeper malignity’ than rape.” Id. at 1822 (quoting Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, 
C.J., concurring) (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, supra, at *215)). These being the dark acts that 
Hardwick fantasizes about—and repudiates—it is no wonder that forces erupting from the 
depths like this have a traumatizing grip on the Court’s opinion. 
But, Thomas’s commentary carefully observes, Hardwick does not allow itself to 
succumb to these imaginary forces without a fight. Its text bears witness to an attempt by 
Hardwick to save itself from its own phantasmatic, worse-than-rape horrors. Paradoxically, 
Hardwick tries to preserve its heterosexual male identifications intact by abandoning them 
through what Thomas’s essay describes as a staged “reversal into [their] opposite.” Id. at 
1821 (quoting Sigmund Freud, Instincts and Their Vicissitudes (1915) [hereinafter, Freud, 
Instincts and Their Vicissitudes], reprinted in 14 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE 
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 109, 126–27 (James Strachey ed. 
& trans., 1957)). This reversal entails a “discursive transformation of the institutional 
image of the Supreme Court . . . from a subject-position of ‘masculine’ activity to 
‘feminine’ (aggressive) passivity.” Id. at 1821–22. This move is salvific because whatever 
the very figure of the male homosexual would presumably like to do sexually to 
heterosexual men as men, it would not like to do to them as women. 
Thus does Hardwick express itself in feminine registers, demonstrating an upright and 
ladylike stance of opposition to the homosexual sodomy claims being pressed upon the 
Court. This “discursive ‘sex-change,’” id. at 1825, in addition to exempting the Court from 
its erstwhile status as an object of homosexual sexual interest, also enables it to mount that 
great resistance to the homosexual sodomy claims, rebuffing them in a way that preserves 
the Court as a chaste and otherwise virtuous vessel for the Founding Fathers’ aims. 
“Fidelity to the ‘language [and] design’ of the ‘Law-of-the-(Founding)-Father(s)’ demands 
‘great resistance’ to Hardwick’s attempted seduction of the Court, and the ‘illegitimacy’ to 
which a betrayal of that law would lead.” Id. at 1821 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194–95). Judicial recognition of Hardwick’s claims, claims that lack 
any “readily identifiable” grounding in the Constitution’s text, id. (quoting Hardwick, 478 
U.S. at 191), “would represent an act of interpretive adultery, whose shameful outcome 
[could] only be the birth of a ‘bastard’ right with no legitimate textual ‘roots’ or claim to 
the ‘Name-of-the-(Founding)-Father(s).’” Id. Avoiding these forms of illegitimacy 
preserves the Court’s chastity and virtuousness, but at the price of its heterosexual male 
identification. In this sense, the figure of the homosexual who sexually persecutes the 
heterosexual male-identified Hardwick Court leads it through homosexual sexual advances 
to relinquish that identity. “[N]ot even the ‘Father-Judges’ of the Supreme Court can break 
[the] linguistic taboo” associated with “homosexual sodomy,” that “crime not fit to be 
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From that bid, there is another: In different ways than Hardwick, the 
“figural logic[s]” of the Obergefell opinions, both in majority and in dissent, 
bear affinities to the irrational “discourse of Judge Schreber’s Memoirs” as 
well.27  
A. A Note on Method—Depersonalization, Aesthetics 
Before turning to the first part of an elaboration of that point, which 
focuses on the text of Chief Justice Roberts’s Obergefell dissent, an important 
note on method is in order.  
It is no small matter to engage in a rhetorical reading of a Supreme Court 
opinion, particularly when it takes a psychologized, much less a 
psychoanalytic, turn.28 To be steeped in rule-of-law thinking and the 
conventional, “rationalist doctrinal analysis” to which it gives rise is to be 
imbued with a “situation sense” that finds something troubling, objectionable, 
disconcerting, even illegitimate, about this mode of interpretive pursuit.29 
There are many reasons for thinking this way, but significantly among them is 
a sense that rhetorical readings of judicial texts, particularly when 
psychologically inflected, participate in extra-legal and speculative 
engagements that have naught to do with doctrine, hence law, leading them 
readily to seem to reduce to ad hominem challenges against judicial authors 
whose works are the objects of scrutiny, read: interpretive attack.30 
                                                                                                                     
named,” “without first submitting to a discursive . . . ‘unmanning’ which removes them, 
like Judge Schreber, from ‘the category of men’ on whom the male homosexual preys.” Id. 
at 1825. 
And so it is that Hardwick, a case involving the claimed constitutional right to 
homosexual sodomy, triggers a fantasy of homosexual sodomitical attack, which the text 
desires, but is traumatized by, and so repudiates, while “transform[ing],” id. at 1821 
(quoting Freud, Psycho-Analytic Notes, supra note 23, at 20), or “transsexualiz[ing] [itself] 
into a woman,” id. at 1825. Fantasies of persecution and unmanning being part of the 
Hardwick Court’s rhetoric, Hardwick does, as Thomas’s commentary says, bear a 
“startling resemblance” to the delusions of sexual persecution and unmanning that 
importantly defined Daniel Schreber’s case. Id. at 1820–21. 
 27 See id. at 1809. 
 28 As Anne Dailey observes: “The study of irrationality is not a familiar topic in the 
law. Despite scattered references to psychoanalysis and the unconscious, the law has 
remained remarkably resistant to the methods and insights of psychoanalysis generally and 
the study of irrationality in particular.” Dailey, supra note 16, at 350.  
 29 The expression “rationalist doctrinal analysis” comes from Thomas, supra note 11, 
at 1812. The idea of “situation sense” is drawn from KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON 
LAW TRADITION 121 (1960). It itself has not gone uncritiqued. See generally, e.g., Charles 
E. Clark & David M. Trubeck, The Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in 
the Common Law Tradition, 71 YALE L.J. 255 (1961); Patrick J. Rohan, The Common Law 
Tradition: Situation Sense, Subjectivism or “Just-Result Jurisprudence”?, 32 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 51 (1963). 
 30 The fuller set of reasons for this skepticism deserves study in its own right. That 
effort would be aided by engaging the critiques of FRANK, supra note 16. For some 
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That being so, it bears noting that the rhetorical readings of the Obergefell 
opinions offered in this work explore these texts for their rational content, 
including their declarations of constitutional doctrine, as well as for their 
irrational dimensions, including their fevers and their conscious or 
unconscious dreams, their fantasies and nightmares both. The approach to the 
Obergefell opinions at work here regards them not as transparencies onto 
individual authorial psychology, but as complexly situated cultural artifacts 
that hold distinctive places “in the broader archive of cultural texts.”31 Within 
that archive, the Obergefell opinions are actively participating in the processes 
by which the cultural meanings of the topics that they treat—among them, 
prominently, marriage, family, sexuality (including sexual violence), and 
gender—are being negotiated. These processes of negotiation are not 
straightforward or always logical by standard measures, but being deep in the 
midst of them as they are, the Obergefell opinions cannot be pinned down as 
anything so simple as reflections of individualized judicial psychologies.32 To 
state the point somewhat differently, the psychologies that are in play in the 
texts are themselves, in excess of the psychologies of their nominal judicial 
                                                                                                                     
relevant discussion, see, for example, GLENNON, supra note 16, at 53–60, and JULIUS 
PAUL, THE LEGAL REALISM OF JEROME FRANK 66–67, 67 nn.1–3 (1959). 
 31 Thomas, supra note 11, at 1811. Some grounding for this approach may make its 
way back to Freud. See generally, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS (1930), reprinted in 21 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 59 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1961); 
SIGMUND FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO (1921), reprinted in 
18 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND 
FREUD 67 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1955); SIGMUND FREUD, MOSES AND MONOTHEISM 
(1939), reprinted in 23 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 3 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1964); SIGMUND FREUD, 
TOTEM AND TABOO (1913), reprinted in 13 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD, at ix (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1955). 
 32 If, it should be added, individualized judicial psychologies discovered via judicial 
opinions may even be thought to exist as proper objects of psychological investigation. 
Aside from recognizing that judicial opinions, like other outputs of legal institutions, are 
invariably the products of complexly situated, multi-party, institutional dynamics—
dynamics that are themselves complexly situated in complex cultural milieux—there are 
other reasons not to think of judicial opinions as glass windows onto individual judicial 
psychologies. These include how individuality may be thought to work in psychoanalysis, 
on which see, for example, JONATHAN LEAR, OPEN MINDED 134 (1998), and Dailey, supra 
note 16, at 371 n.80, along with the reasons offered elsewhere for rethinking conventional 
notions of authors and authorship, see, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, What is an Author?, in 
LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE 113 (Donald F. Bouchard ed., Donald F. 
Bouchard & Sherry Simon trans., 1977), which have yet to be spelled out in terms of 
judicial work product. All that having been said, viewed pragmatically, judicial opinions 
will obviously not always be wholly bereft of any serviceable clues about judicial 
psychologies, even as they cannot invariably be treated as transparent windows onto the 
psychic lives and worlds of their “authors.” Important aside: None of this focus on 
“authors” is to overlook the role or the problematics of the figure of “the reader.” 
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authors, manifestations of complex and large-scale cultural dynamics.33 These 
dynamics and the psychologies that they manifest in the opinions influence, as 
they are reworked by, the engagement with the marriage equality claims that 
Obergefell involves. In this sense and to this extent, the rhetorical and 
psychologically interested readings of the Obergefell opinions presented in 
this work understand these opinions to instantiate patterns of thought—rational 
and irrational alike—that are beyond anything that conventional notions of 
authorship, and judicial authorship in particular, allow. The meanings and 
ideas found in the rhetoric of these opinions thus surpass anything their 
“formal” authors could possibly consciously and specifically intend. This is 
why the readings offered in these pages make no claims about the 
psychologies of the individual judicial authors whose opinions are engaged. 
Indeed, for purposes of the present effort, what may have been in a judicial 
author’s mind when “writing” an opinion does not define, and so cannot 
circumscribe, its meanings. What matters is what a reading of the resulting text 
that has been produced will allow.34 
Departing from the idea that authorial intentions—or even authorial 
psychologies—govern the meanings of judicial texts, the readings of the 
Obergefell opinions that follow do not rest in the normative sweet spot of legal 
academic interpretive practice.35 But then neither are these ways of reading 
judicial opinions utterly foreign to this universe. If nothing else, the 
genealogies that these readings trace—to the law and literature movement and 
to the psychoanalytic jurisprudence that Jerome Frank inspired—assure as 
much.36  
                                                                                                                     
 33 Some of the complexities of this process are discussed in DUNCAN KENNEDY, 
LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY (N.Y. Univ. Press Critical ed. 
2004) (1983).  
 34 To say this is not to insist that a text exists before it is read, only to posit, however 
provisionally, some “work” (or work-like gesture or mark) that may be thought to be 
“there”—in the sense of marking the occasion for the production of a text and its meaning. 
See generally STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF 
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980). 
 35 Then again, considerable amounts of legal academic scholarship about Supreme 
Court decisions do, in a Realist vein, with nods to Holmes’s vision of law as “what the 
courts will do in fact,” O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 
(1897), imagine that the meaning of cases is what is in a judicial author’s mind, which 
leads, if in what are deemed doctrinally appropriate ways, to judicial opinions being treated 
as portals onto judicial psychology. But, as Michael Dorf observes, “[w]hatever expertise 
we law professors have in psychoanalyzing the justices we study at length (and I think we 
have quite a bit), that is hardly what we like to think we are doing.” Michael Dorf, Reading 
Justice X’s Mind, DORF ON L. (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.dorfonlaw.org/2016/08/reading-
justice-xs-mind.html [https://perma.cc/D6M4-6RPJ].  
 36 See supra notes 14, 16. Recent (or recentish) work in the Frankian tradition 
includes MARIA ARISTODEMOU, LAW, PSYCHOANALYSIS, SOCIETY: TAKING THE 
UNCONSCIOUS SERIOUSLY (2014); Adler, supra note 18; Adler, supra note 19; Paula Baron, 
The Web of Desire and the Narcissistic Trap: A Psychoanalytic Reading of Re Alex, 14 
GRIFFITH L. REV. 17 (2005); Matthew H. Birkhold, Freud on the Court: Re-Interpreting 
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Affirming and extending these traditions, this work constitutes a return to 
some hard and pressing questions that earlier efforts in psychoanalytic 
jurisprudence practically raised, but which have not to date been adequately 
addressed at the level of critical jurisprudence, much less its mainstream 
forms.37 Is irrationality constitutive of, rather than episodic within and 
excludable from, the rule-of-law regime?38 If the rule of law is continuous 
with—not autonomous from—culture and cultural processes, processes that 
are incredibly messy and at times highly irrational, could the rule of law ever 
reflect pure and neat forms of rationality and reason? What is to be made of 
how culture’s dark sides—including its deep, abiding, and roiling 
irrationalities—inevitably leech into legal decision-making, hence rule-of-law 
rules?39 If and when that happens, could normative opposition ever constitute 
an adequate corrective? If that opposition did the work that it might like to do, 
what rules would be left within the rule of law? How circumscribed would its 
operative forms be? 
For now, something in the direction of an aesthetic response to these 
questions—toward an aesthetic jurisprudence—is imagined.40 Without 
                                                                                                                     
Sexting & Child Pornography Laws, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 897 
(2013); Anthony Paul Farley, Lacan & Voting Rights, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 283 (2001) 
[hereinafter Farley, Lacan & Voting Rights]; Anthony Paul Farley, Law as Trauma & 
Repetition, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 613 (2007); Michael H. Hoffheimer, Justice 
Holmes: Law and the Search for Control, 1989 SUP. CT. HIST. SOC’Y Y.B. 98; Clare 
Huntington, Happy Families? Translating Positive Psychology into Family Law, 16 VA. J. 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 385 (2009); Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 Duke L.J. 1245 
(2008); Symposium, Law and the Postmodern Mind, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 699 (1995); 
Lunny, supra note 19; Sahand Shaibani, Psychodynamics of the Judicial Process, 1 STAN. 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1999), https://agora.stanford.edu/sjls/images/pdf/shaibani.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/D3B6-CXPZ]; Shiva Kumar Srinivasan, What is the Psychoanalysis of Law?, 20 
IOSR J. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 15 (2015); Gretchen S. Sween, Who’s Your Daddy? A 
Psychoanalytic Exegesis of the Supreme Court’s Recent Patent Jurisprudence, 7 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 204 (2009); Collin O’Connor Udell, Parading the Saurian Tail: 
Projection, Jung, and the Law, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 731 (2000); and Richard Cornes, Making 
Up the Judge’s Mind—A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Legal Reasoning and the Role of 
the Judge (June 6, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2446452 
[https://perma.cc/KK65-56XK]. See infra note 37 for additional sources. 
 37 Not that there is nothing to be found. Engaging examples include Jeanne L. 
Schroeder, His Master’s Voice: H.L.A. Hart and Lacanian Discourse Theory, 18 LAW & 
CRITIQUE 117 (2007), and Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Psychoanalysis as 
the Jurisprudence of Freedom, in ON PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICAN LAW 139 (Francis J. 
Mootz III ed., 2009). 
 38 Pierre Schlag’s work, which comes at these questions from a different angle, is an 
indispensable passage point. See generally, e.g., SCHLAG, supra note 17. 
 39 The tradition of legal academic study of the irrationalities of law as an endemic 
feature of it is underdeveloped even in the critical literature that sees law as pervaded with 
and by it. 
 40 With Adam Gearey, “aesthetic jurisprudence . . . must have some concern with 
revealing the beauty of law,” though that is also “a narrow interpretation of the possibilities 
offered by a thinking through of aesthetics. Aesthetics is much more than a theory of the 
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sketching all its details, in this approach, the irrationalities of judicial opinions 
are not obviously and imperatively only objects of judgment, critique, or 
condemnation but also objects of, well, beauty and wonder to catch sight of 
and to behold. Law itself being an impossibly human endeavor, why on this 
level condemn it for the fullness, the richness, the beauty, even in the ugliness, 
of its humanity? There are undoubtedly highly practical, non-aesthetic reasons 
to discover, but for now, what would happen if the search for them were to be 
deferred for a spell, maybe just so long as is required to see what the rhetoric 
of the opinions filed in Obergefell can be read to tell? What might yet be 
learned about the grounds of these decisions, and the grounds of their law and 
the rule-of-law system of which they are a part? 
                                                                                                                     
beautiful.” Adam Gearey, Love and Death in American Jurisprudence, in 33 STUDIES IN 
LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 3, 5 (Austin Sarat & Patricia Ewick eds., 2004); see also 
COSTAS DOUZINAS & ADAM GEAREY, Aesthetic Jurisprudence, in CRITICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JUSTICE 303 (2005); Adam Gearey, 
“Where the Law Touches Us, We May Affirm It”: Deconstruction as a Poetic Thinking of 
Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 767, 788–89 (2005). See generally ADAM GEAREY, LAW AND 
AESTHETICS (John Gardner ed., 2001). Very roughly, the idea of aesthetic jurisprudence as 
used here means to refer to a mode of reading law that sees it in fully aesthetic and 
nonprogrammatic terms, a way of viewing and reading law that is not simply about its 
beauty, nor its improvement, as by some moral metric, nor its reader’s improvement, as in 
political or moral terms, nor, for that matter, in terms of other human excellences, so much 
as how law may cause its readers to think about it, about themselves and about their 
worlds, without any programmatic normative overlay driving individual and collective 
senses of the thing. This vision does not mean to reduce to an analysis of law as (mere) 
object, nor (mere) power politics, although power and struggles involving power—
including dominance and subordination—may be (though they need not necessarily be) 
among its themes. For work to which this conception of aesthetic jurisprudence is related, 
and against which it would have to be elaborated and refined, see, inter alia, LIEF H. 
CARTER, CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ART OF POLITICS (1985); PETER FITZPATRICK, THE MYTHOLOGY OF MODERN LAW (1992); 
LAW AND ART: JUSTICE, ETHICS AND AESTHETICS (Oren Ben-Dor ed., 2011); ROBIN WEST, 
Jurisprudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, in 
NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW 345 (1993); WHITE, supra note 14; Susan Chaplin, 
Textual Properties: The Limit of Law and Literature—Towards a Gothic Jurisprudence, in 
43 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY, SPECIAL ISSUE: LAW AND LITERATURE 
RECONSIDERED 113 (Austin Sarat ed., 2008); Roberta Kevelson, Introduction: Dialectic, 
Conflicts in Cultural Norms, Laws and Legal Aesthetics to LAW AND AESTHETICS 1 
(Roberta Kevelson ed., 1992); Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 1047 (2002); and Olaf Tans, The Imaginary Foundation of Legal Systems: A 
Mimetic Perspective, 26 LAW & LITERATURE 127 (2014). 
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III. OBERGEFELL V. HODGES: THE RETURN OF THE REPRESSED 
A. Obergefell’s Visions of Persecution and Unmanning: Chief Justice 
Roberts’s Dissent 
There is no more authoritative dissent in Obergefell, and no more 
comprehensive reflection of the tendencies in the Obergefell dissents for 
Schreber-like visions of persecution and unmanning, than the opinion that 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts files in the case, joined by Justice Antonin 
Scalia and Justice Clarence Thomas.41 The dissent’s elegantly simple doctrinal 
conclusion—that the U.S. Constitution offers same-sex marriages no 
protections—arrives in an opinion whose rhetoric far exceeds it.42 This is an 
opinion bursting its seams with ideas and images involving fantastical forces 
that sexually target and ruin the heterosexuality and the manhood of 
heterosexual men. 
Well before any sexual elements of the opinion become apparent, the 
Chief Justice’s dissent departs from cool and calm legal reason.43 Only a page 
in, the dissent, in a cold, controlled rage, seething, is not so much disagreeing 
as attacking the majority opinion. Obergefell is not simply mistaken to 
recognize marriage equality as a constitutional guarantee. It is lawless to do 
so.44 Hinting that Obergefell may somehow be an act of “force,” it is plainly 
decried as an “act of will.”45 Through it, the Court has installed itself anti-
democratically over the nation’s governments, no longer governments of law, 
but ruled by the Court’s individual women and men.46 Without declaring this 
                                                                                                                     
 41 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The 
Chief Justice’s dissent has elsewhere been described as “the most extensive and carefully 
reasoned of the four dissents,” though not without noting that “[t]he opinion . . . overflows 
with ironies and contradictions.” Seidman, supra note 12, at 122. 
 42 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 2611–12. 
The reasoning of the Obergefell majority opinion has elsewhere been accounted for in 
terms of its own elegant simplicity. See Massaro, supra note 3, at 325–26.  
 43 For a description of Chief Justice Roberts’s delivery of his Obergefell dissent from 
the Bench, a “first . . . in his decade-long tenure,” Robin Fretwell Wilson, “Getting the 
Government Out of Marriage” Post Obergefell: The Ill-Considered Consequences of 
Transforming the State’s Relationship to Marriage, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1445, 1447, and 
the effect of this reading as a live performance, different than “on paper,” see Dahlia 
Lithwick, Amicus: The Term in Review, SLATE (July 4, 2015), https://www.slate.com/article 
s/podcasts/amicus/2015/07/same_sex_marriage_obamacare_and_the_rest_of_the_2014_15_s
upreme_court_term.html [https://perma.cc/BR47-2F43]. An alternative view of sexuality’s 
role in the Obergefell opinions is presented by Case, supra note 10. 
 44 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611–12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing id. at 2598, 
2605 (majority opinion)). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. The dissent returns to these themes elsewhere. See, e.g., id. at 2612, 2615–19, 
2622–24, 2626. Glen Staszewski, Obergefell and Democracy, 97 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2017) (manuscript at 3), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2763258 [https://perma.cc/ZT7S-TJ8K], sets 
out to “rebut[] the charge that Obergefell was undemocratic.” See also infra note 102. 
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usurpation an impeachable offense, Obergefell, not any kind of “good 
[judicial] [b]ehaviour” as the Constitution requires, is a criminal event.47 The 
Supreme Court has “stolen” the political decision on same-sex marriage “from 
the people” to whom it constitutionally belongs, a theft that results from 
nothing more than the Court’s arrogant and incautious “desire to remake 
society according to its own ‘new insight’ into the ‘nature of injustice,’” which 
serves to “transform[] . . . a social institution that has formed the basis of 
human society for millennia.”48 This turn of events is so disturbing to the 
dissent that, despite its air of self-possession, it gives itself over to a repetition 
compulsion. In the introduction alone, after multiple indications of 
Obergefell’s lawlessness, the dissent didactically states it this way again: “The 
majority’s decision is an act of will, not legal judgment” that has “no basis in 
the Constitution or this Court’s precedent.”49 
When the dissent’s angry, opening wave does finally break, its energies do 
not dissipate. Past the details of the dissent’s subsequent doctrinal 
maneuvering, its rhetoric, like its opening, is a sight to behold. Start to finish, 
the dissent fires on high heat, demonstrating a scorched-earth aim to set ablaze 
all the major (and a few minor) turns of the Court’s opinion. Practically, this 
strategy, which repeatedly condemns Obergefell for abandoning the 
Constitution and the Court’s precedents, points to the remarkable dangers that 
Obergefell courts. Some of these dangers, like the theft of the issue of same-
sex marriage from the people, manifest in Obergefell itself, while others, some 
already visible and others not yet clearly seen, remain in the offing—for 
now.50 The dissent does not pretend to know exactly where Obergefell will 
lead the Court, but it is certain this is not the end of the road.51 If a millennia-
old basic institution like marriage with its ages-old definition is not enough to 
stop the Court, what can or will?52 Unmoored from the Constitution and the 
                                                                                                                     
 47 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 48 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing id. at 2598, 2605 
(majority opinion)). The dissent’s precise language describing the theft is “[s]tealing.” Id. 
 49 Id. For repetition of these themes elsewhere in the dissent, see, for example, id. at 
2619–26.  
 50 As for the dangers of Obergefell that are plainly visible to the dissent, see, for 
example, id. at 2611 (“[F]or those who believe in a government of laws, not of men, the 
majority’s approach is deeply disheartening.”); id. at 2612 (“Stealing this issue from the 
people will . . . mak[e] a dramatic social change that much more difficult to accept.”); id. at 
2621 (“It is striking how much of the majority’s reasoning would apply with equal force to 
the claim of a fundamental right to plural marriage.”); and id. at 2626 (indicating that 
“[t]here is little doubt” that cases involving Obergefell’s conflict with religious freedoms 
“will soon be before this Court”). As for what is not yet clearly seen, but presently remains 
in the offing, see infra note 52 and accompanying text.  
 51 Obergefell in this sense is no Bush v. Gore. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 
(2000) (“Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances . . . .”). 
 52 In the dissent’s own formulation: “If an unvarying social institution enduring over 
all of recorded history cannot inhibit judicial policymaking, what can?” Obergefell, 135 
S. Ct. at 2622 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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Court’s precedents, Obergefell sets the Court free to roam at large, inventing 
new constitutional rules unconstrained by traditional methods of constitutional 
interpretation—text, history, tradition, structure, precedent—with nothing 
more than its “new insight” into justice’s nature, at times dressed up as 
“reasoned judgment,” as the basis for imposing itself on the nation as it will.53 
Surveyed this way, the Chief Justice’s dissent reads at times like a 
morality play in which an obviously ordinarily heroic Supreme Court has lost 
its way, allowing itself to be captured by desires that, when indulged, 
constitute the judicial equivalent of cardinal sins, including pride, lust, and 
greed. At the same time, the dissent presents itself for an even more engaging 
read as a psychological thriller, in which the Obergefell Court yields to forces 
of desire, long held in check, that bear impressive affinities to what Freud 
dubbed the id. Contrasted with the ego, which “represents what may be called 
reason and common sense,”54 and with the super-ego, which represents “that 
part of a person’s mind that acts as a self-critical conscience or censor, 
reflecting standards and behaviour learned from parents and society; the agent 
of self-criticism or self-observation that acts as a check on the id and the 
ego,”55 “the id falls to instinct”56 and “contains the passions.”57 It is “a chaos, 
a cauldron full of seething excitations,” “filled with energy reaching it from 
the instincts,” “a striving to bring about the satisfaction of the instinctual needs 
subject to the observance of the pleasure principle.”58 
By the Chief Justice’s dissent’s lights, Obergefell is notably id-like: 
willful, lawless, unprincipled, hubristic, disrespectful of the Constitution, the 
American people, and the history and tradition of their institutions, including 
democracy and marriage, drunk on its own stolen power to the degree of not 
caring about either the Court’s precedents or the effects this ruling will have, 
interested, finally, only in its visceral wants and their satisfactions, the Court’s 
                                                                                                                     
 53 The dissent draws the language of “new insight” and the “nature of injustice” from 
the majority opinion. See id. at 2612 (quoting id. at 2598, 2605 (majority opinion)); see 
also id. at 2621 (quoting id. at 2598 (majority opinion)). The same holds with the dissent’s 
invocation of “reasoned judgment.” Id. at 2621 (quoting id. at 2598 (majority opinion)). 
This perspective on the Obergefell majority opinion is reminiscent of Robert Bork’s 
observation that “[w]e would hardly revere a document that we knew to be no more than an 
open warrant for judges to do with us as they please.” ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA 16 (1990). 
 54 SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID (1923) [hereinafter FREUD, EGO AND THE ID], 
reprinted in 19 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF 
SIGMUND FREUD 3, 25 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1961). 
 55 Superego, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/194265 
?redirectedFrom=super+ego#eid [https://perma.cc/D9VY-FVYZ]. Some additional notes on 
the topic of the super-ego and developments in its conceptualization are in ANTHONY 
STORR, FREUD: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 60–64 (2001).  
 56 FREUD, EGO AND THE ID, supra note 54, at 25. 
 57 Id. 
 58 SIGMUND FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS (1933), 
reprinted in 22 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF 
SIGMUND FREUD 3, 73 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1964). 
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own pleasure principle.59 Possessed of the Court’s impressive institutional 
powers, including the powers to break from, hence make, world history, the 
Court’s id—eventually represented by the dissent as an unprecedented dark 
force, a heretofore unknown constitutional monster even—gives Obergefell its 
unwholesome energies of decision.60 The id-like force in play in the majority 
opinion stalks the Chief Justice’s dissent, which calls it out in order to rail 
against and annihilate it. Unfortunately, at some point in the struggle, the 
dissent loses its bearings only to find itself textually embroiled in a 
psychodrama entirely of its own creation. The opinion’s language and its 
rhetoric give public witness. 
B. Obergefell as Lochner, Obergefell as Dred Scott 
A “decisive moment” in the Chief Justice’s dissent’s psychodrama arrives 
as it is capturing important doctrinal ground.61 By this point in its argument, 
the dissent has proposed that Obergefell is unsupported by the Court’s right-
to-marry and its right-to-privacy decisions, leaving a discredited substantive 
due process ruling as the lone precedent it can muster as authority.62 
Temporarily abandoning its early stance, repeated later on, that nary one 
Supreme Court precedent authorizes Obergefell,63 the dissent defiantly 
declares: “Ultimately, only one precedent offers any support for the majority’s 
methodology: Lochner v. New York,” the anti-canonical decision that 
discovered an unwritten liberty to contract in the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.64 
                                                                                                                     
 59 There is, in addition to the dissent’s view of the majority opinion as an act of will, 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612, 2624 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), its 
invocations of notions of the majority’s opinion as bound up with desire and preference. 
See, e.g., id. at 2612 (“The majority . . . openly rel[ies] on its desire to remake society 
according to its own ‘new insight’ into the ‘nature of injustice.’” (quoting id. at 2598, 2605 
(majority opinion))); id. (“It can be tempting for judges to confuse our own preferences 
with the requirements of the law.”); id. at 2616 (noting the importance of judges not 
“subtly transform[ing]” due process liberty “into the policy preferences of the Members of 
this Court” (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997))); id. at 2618 
(discussing the need not to indulge “personal preferences”); id. at 2619 (“The majority’s 
driving themes are that marriage is desirable and petitioners desire it.”); id. at 2621 
(“[T]oday’s decision rests on nothing more than the majority’s own conviction that same-
sex couples should be allowed to marry because they want to . . . .”); id. (suggesting that 
Obergefell “has no more basis in the Constitution than did the naked policy preferences 
adopted in Lochner”); id. at 2626 (referring to “the achievement of a desired goal” that has 
“nothing to do with” the Constitution).  
 60 See infra Part III.H.  
 61 Thomas, supra note 11, at 1814. 
 62 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2619–21 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 63 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 64 Id. at 2621; accord Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905), overruled in 
part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
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While the dissent maintains that Lochner is the “only one precedent” 
supporting Obergefell’s methodology, the idea is unsustainable in this form.65 
The dissent does not really believe it. Its own earlier discussion of substantive 
due process’s doctrinal history places Lochner in a long, sordid line of contract 
liberty decisions, the existence of which means Lochner cannot be a unique 
precedential warrant for what Obergefell does.66 Far more significant is the 
dissent’s observation in the same larger historical tour that Lochner harkens 
back to the great illegitimate decision of illegitimate decisions, the opinion that 
launched the Supreme Court’s substantive due process line: Dred Scott v. 
Sanford.67 If so, it follows: As Obergefell is swelled and diminished by 
Lochner, it is simultaneously underwritten and delegitimated by Dred Scott.68 
The Chief Justice’s dissent makes it easy to make light of the analogy that 
it configures between Obergefell and Dred Scott. The opinion’s declaration 
that Lochner is the “only” case supporting Obergefell’s methodology 
practically recommends that the analogy be made light of, even that it be 
overlooked.69 Still, the dissent’s brief, direct engagement with Dred Scott—or 
its substantive due process analysis, anyway—indicates that what might seem 
like no more than a tacitly configured, not-very-significant likening actually 
                                                                                                                     
 65 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 66 Id. at 2617. As the dissent explains it, in part: “In the decades after Lochner, the 
Court struck down nearly 200 laws as violations of individual liberty . . . .” Id. 
 67 Id. at 2616–17; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded 
by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 68 There are certain resemblances between how the Chief Justice’s dissent aligns 
Obergefell with Dred Scott and how others have situated Roe v. Wade and its progeny in 
relation to Dred Scott. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 998, 1002 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); BORK, supra note 53, at 32; Lynn D. Wardle, The Quandary of Pro-
Life Free Speech: A Lesson from the Abolitionists, 62 ALB. L. REV. 853, 936–39 (1999). 
See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003); Charles E. Rice, The Dred Scott Case of the Twentieth 
Century, 10 HOUS. L. REV. 1059 (1973). Further perspective on the topic is in JUSTIN 
BUCKLEY DYER, SLAVERY, ABORTION, AND THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 3–
13 (2013). 
 69 Unremarkably, then, many have not commented upon it. For counter-examples, see, 
for example, Adam Lamparello, Justice Kennedy’s Decision in Obergefell: A Sad Day for 
the Judiciary, 6 HLRE 45, 53 & nn.62–63 (2015), https://www.houstonlawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/Lamparello-Justice-Kennedys-Decision_Final1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
B595-CNFR]; Adam J. MacLeod, Rights, Privileges, and the Future of Marriage Law, 28 
REGENT U. L. REV. 71, 107 & n.328 (2015); Massaro, supra note 3, at 338–39; Peter 
Nicolas, Fundamental Rights in a Post-Obergefell World, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 331, 
333 & n.8 (2016); Jane S. Schacter, Obergefell’s Audiences, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1011, 1019 
(2016); Seidman, supra note 12, at 122–24; and Yoshino, supra note 3, at 170–71. A 
sensitive treatment of the relationship between Obergefell and Dred Scott outside the law 
review literature is in Amy Davidson, What Does Marriage Equality Have to Do with Dred 
Scott?, NEW YORKER (July 8, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/what-
does-marriage-equality-have-to-do-with-dred-scott [https://www.perma.cc/2SSC-44A5]. 
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reflects a very different belief: Obergefell, as the dissent sees it, bears striking, 
deep, and alarming affinities to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Dred Scott.70 
Initially, the Chief Justice’s dissent characterizes Dred Scott abstractly as a 
case that taught the Supreme Court important lessons about “the strong 
medicine of substantive due process . . . the hard way.”71 Dred Scott is then 
summed up as the ruling that “invalidated the Missouri Compromise on the 
ground that legislation restricting the institution of slavery violated the implied 
rights of slaveholders.”72 Elaborating, the dissent explains that Dred Scott 
proceeded from an extra-constitutional sense that Fifth Amendment Due 
Process protections of “liberty and property” embraced the institution of 
slavery through the protection of slaveholders’ implied constitutional rights: 
Slaveholders’ constitutional liberty and property rights guaranteed them the 
right to own enslaved persons, a right that the Missouri Compromise could not 
deny.73 In saying this, the Chief Justice’s dissent illuminates Dred Scott’s 
substantive due process reasoning by plucking, and reproducing, a sentence 
from the decision that underscores ideas of “liberty” and “property,” while 
adding a third concept—“digni[ty],” related to due process of law—into the 
mix.74 Hence (the emphasis is added): Dred Scott “asserted that ‘an act of 
Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or 
property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a 
particular Territory of the United States . . . could hardly be dignified with the 
name of due process of law.’”75 
Quoting this sentence from Dred Scott this way in an opinion dissenting 
from Obergefell is highly revealing. Like Dred Scott, Obergefell relies on due 
process “liberty” as a centerpiece of its decision.76 Moreover, Obergefell’s 
notion of “liberty” practically builds on the version of it advanced in United 
                                                                                                                     
 70 Chief Justice Roberts’s Obergefell dissent does not engage vital aspects of Chief 
Justice Taney’s Dred Scott opinion, including—significantly—what it says about Dred 
Scott and constitutional personhood as a function of race. See, e.g., Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 
How.) at 403–27. These are not the interests of the Chief Justice’s Obergefell dissent. 
Thanks to Tucker Culbertson for conversation on the point.  
 71 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). This is not the only 
opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts to speak of “strong medicine.” See Shelby Cty. 
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013); see also Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
555 U.S. 7, 33 (2008) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 466 (1974)); supra 
notes 32–34 and accompanying text. 
 72 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. (quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 450). 
 75 Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 
at 450). The Chief Justice’s dissent’s use of ellipses to modify the original quotation from 
Dred Scott is a reminder that the language is being crafted to serve the dissent’s own ends. 
 76 Id. at 2593, 2597–605, 2607–08 (majority opinion). Indeed, it has been suggested 
that due process “liberty” may properly be thought of as the centerpiece of the Court’s 
Obergefell decision. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Obergefell’s Liberties, 77 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 919, 925 (2016). To put this point this way is to raise, but not to settle, important 
questions about the role of equality in the Court’s decision in the case.  
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States v. Windsor, which protected liberty while safeguarding a property 
inheritance from the taxman, hence protected both liberty and property as a 
matter of due process.77 Additionally, Windsor and Obergefell extend the 
Court’s earlier decision in Lawrence v. Texas,78 which, like them, emphasized 
notions of dignity associated with “the name of due process of law.”79 Aware 
of all these aspects of the doctrinal ground that Obergefell occupies, the 
dissent’s decision to selectively quote this substantive due process language 
from Dred Scott forges a textual bond between Dred Scott and the new 
marriage equality ruling.  
Strengthening and sealing that inter-textual bond is the critique that the 
Chief Justice’s Obergefell dissent draws from the dissenting opinion filed by 
Justice Benjamin R. Curtis in Dred Scott. According to the Chief Justice’s 
Obergefell opinion, Justice Curtis’s dissent took exception to the Court’s 
ruling in Dred Scott because of how it “abandoned” the “fixed rules which 
govern the interpretation of laws”80 in favor of “the theoretical opinions of 
individuals”81 that were thus “allowed to control” the Constitution’s 
meaning.82 Through their operation, these unfixed, theoretical opinions of 
                                                                                                                     
 77 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013). Of course, Windsor’s 
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause holding was by its own terms animated by 
constitutional equality guarantees. Id. 
 78 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 79 For relevant textual moments from Lawrence, see, for example, id. at 560, 567, 
575. The quoted language is from Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 450). 
 80 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2617 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Dred Scott, 60 
U.S. (19 How.) at 621 (Curtis, J., dissenting)). Compare id., with, e.g., id. at 2612 (“The 
majority today neglects [the] restrained conception of the judicial role. . . . And it answers 
that question based not on neutral principles of constitutional law, but on its own 
‘understanding of what freedom is and must become.’” (quoting id. at 2603 (majority 
opinion))), and id. at 2618 (discussing an approach to substantive due process 
interpretation that focuses on recognizing only those “implied fundamental rights [that are] 
‘objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’” (quoting Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997)), and then observing that “[t]he majority 
acknowledges none of this doctrinal background”). 
 81 Id. at 2617 (quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 621 (Curtis, J., dissenting)). 
Compare id., with, e.g., id. at 2612 (“The majority . . . openly rel[ies] on its desire to 
remake society according to its own ‘new insight’ into the ‘nature of injustice.’” (quoting 
id. at 2598, 2605 (majority opinion))), and id. (implying that the majority has “confuse[d] 
[its] own preferences with the requirements of the law”), and id. at 2616 (“Stripped of its 
shiny rhetorical gloss, the majority’s argument is that the Due Process Clause gives same-
sex couples a fundamental right to marry because it will be good for them and for 
society.”), and id. at 2618 (referring to the importance of not repeating Lochner’s “error of 
converting personal preferences into constitutional mandates”), and id. at 2619 (“The 
majority’s driving themes are that marriage is desirable and petitioners desire it.”). 
 82 Id. at 2617 (quoting Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 621 (Curtis, J., dissenting)). 
Compare id., with, e.g., id. at 2612 (“The right [the majority’s decision] announces has no 
basis in the Constitution or this Court’s precedent.”), and id. at 2621 (describing Obergefell 
as having “no more basis in the Constitution than did the naked policy preferences adopted 
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individuals transformed the Constitution’s meaning into what a majority of the 
Court would, and did, hold. This maneuver constituted an illicit suspension, if 
not a wholesale negation, of the Constitution itself. Hence, as the Chief Justice 
quotes Justice Curtis to report: With Dred Scott, “we have no longer a 
Constitution.”83 What obtained instead in Justice Curtis’s view was a country 
“under the government of individual men, who for the time being have power 
to declare what the Constitution is, according to their own views of what it 
ought to mean.”84 
To read this description of Justice Curtis’s critique of Dred Scott in Chief 
Justice Roberts’s dissent is inevitably to think about the Chief Justice’s 
dissent’s own critique of Obergefell.85 Like Justice Curtis’s opinion, the Chief 
Justice’s dissent repeatedly complains that the Obergefell majority erroneously 
abandons the fixed security of an historical and traditional approach to 
substantive due process decision-making.86 Instead, according to the Chief 
Justice’s dissent, the Court has put in its place an approach to interpretation 
that “convert[s] personal preferences into constitutional mandates,”87 resulting 
in the Constitution and nation being placed under a government not of laws 
but of men.88 In view of knocks like these, the Chief Justice’s dissent’s 
decision to ventriloquize yet another round of them by putting them in Justice 
Curtis’s mouth is an indication not only that the Chief Justice’s dissent sees 
itself following in Justice Curtis’s footsteps but also that it sees Obergefell 
following in Dred Scott’s.89 If Faulkner was right, as the Chief Justice’s 
dissent quotes him to say, that “[t]he past is never dead[;] [i]t’s not even 
past,”90 from the dissent emerges the thought that Dred Scott and its infamy 
                                                                                                                     
in Lochner”), and id. at 2626 (“If you . . . favor expanding same-sex marriage, by all means 
celebrate today’s decision. . . . But do not celebrate the Constitution. It had nothing to do 
with it.”). For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 183–84. 
 83 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2617 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Dred Scott, 60 
U.S. (19 How.) at 621 (Curtis, J., dissenting)). For the relevant comparisons, see supra note 
82.  
 84 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2617 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Dred Scott, 60 
U.S. (19 How.) at 621 (Curtis, J., dissenting)). For the relevant comparisons, see supra 
notes 81–82. 
 85 See supra notes 80–84. 
 86 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2615–23 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 87 Id. at 2618. 
 88 See id. at 2611–12. 
 89 Critical perspective on Justice Curtis’s Dred Scott dissent is provided by MARK A. 
GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 56, 77–78 (2006).  
 90 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623 (quoting WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 
92 (1951)). Or, as James Baldwin put it in the context of race inequality: “It is a 
sentimental error, therefore, to believe that the past is dead; it means nothing to say that it 
is all forgotten, that the Negro himself has forgotten it. It is not a question of memory.” 
JAMES BALDWIN, Many Thousands Gone, in NOTES OF A NATIVE SON 24, 29 (1955). For 
thoughts on memory and time in Freud, see Richard Terdiman, Memory in Freud, in 
MEMORY: HISTORIES, THEORIES, DEBATES 93, 94–97 (Susannah Radstone & Bill Schwarz 
eds., 2010).  
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live on in Obergefell, which is not so much merely analogically like Dred 
Scott as it itself is the “new” Dred Scott.91 
C. Dred Scott’s Lessons for and in Obergefell 
Obergefell being figured by the Chief Justice’s dissent as the “new” Dred 
Scott, a closer look at what the dissent makes of the “old” Dred Scott’s 
teachings is in order. Returning to them, the dissent’s language introducing 
Dred Scott is metaphorically rich: “The need for restraint in administering the 
strong medicine of substantive due process is a lesson this Court has learned 
the hard way” from Dred Scott.92 
The dissent’s key expressions about Dred Scott’s pedagogy—that it taught 
the Supreme Court about “the strong medicine of substantive due process” and 
that it did so “the hard way”—are overdetermined.93 High among their 
meanings is one that recognizes in the dissent’s description of Dred Scott two 
images regularly associated with punitive chastening. This is not the 
chastening that a naughty child (or adult) might suffer, with the “strong 
medicine” of, say, castor oil, rounded out with a spanking to impress upon its 
object the proper “lesson” being “hard” taught. Dred Scott’s teaching is dead 
serious, both larger and more severe. Indeed, judging from the dissent, Dred 
Scott’s teaching has been painfully seared into the Court’s institutional 
conscience and memory by the case’s aftermath.94 Condensing volumes of 
history, the dissent remarks: Dred Scott’s holding was ultimately “overruled 
on the battlefields of the Civil War and by constitutional amendment after 
Appomattox.”95 
The indirection and parsimony of this quickly turned phrase, with its 
affectless invocation of “the battlefields of the Civil War” and the processes of 
“constitutional amendment after Appomattox,” paper over a powerful 
underlying gesture.96 With great efficiency, the dissent evokes hard, bleak 
histories once lived and died in gruesome color and tragic dimension. To state 
the obvious, the color of Dred Scott’s pedagogy prominently includes the deep 
crimson of spilled human blood. Its tragedy includes the agonies of slavery-
                                                                                                                     
 91 See, e.g., Santorum Compares Supreme Court Ruling on Gay Marriage to Dred 
Scott, FOX NEWS (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/08/06/santorum-
compares-same-sex-marriage-decision-to-dred-scott-blasts-rogue-supreme.html [https://perma.c 
c/N77K-AGAT]; Bradley C.S. Watson, Reclaiming the Rule of Law After Obergefell, 
NAT’L REV. (July 9, 2015), https://www.nationalreview.com/article/420934/same-sex-
marriage-and-rule-law [https://perma.cc/2KP8-GQR5]; see also infra note 107. For further 
discussion of the Chief Justice’s dissent’s comparison of Obergefell to Dred Scott, see 
supra note 69. 
 92 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 93 Id. 
 94 The parallels here to the discussion of Lochner v. New York in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
as revealed in Thomas, supra note 11, at 1815, are apparent. 
 95 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2617 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 96 Id. 
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wounded and war-wounded human bodies and the human lives lost on 
slaveholding plantations and elsewhere, as well as “on the battlefields of the 
Civil War.”97 The war’s end—with Union success over Confederate forces—is 
represented by the dissent through an understatement that conjures a quiet 
scene of military surrender that, no matter how dignified and austere it may 
have been, could not hide or salve Southern humiliation. Defeat and shame, to 
say nothing of the material and political violence involved in enacting the 
Fourteenth Amendment, are also part of the lessons of Dred Scott. 
Something unusual to the point of extraordinary is thus revealed by the 
Chief Justice’s dissent’s brief formal engagement with Dred Scott. Beyond 
laying a degree of real institutional blame at the Court’s own doorstep for 
great American tragedies involving slavery and the Civil War, as well as more 
than a faint whiff of self-congratulation for the modes of national recuperation 
marked by constitutional amendment after the South’s defeat, the Chief 
Justice’s dissent, with its invocation of historical events that resulted in Dred 
Scott’s demise, presents a preparatory sketch for a larger and more expansive 
study filled with the full intensity and the range of trauma that the dissent 
actively associates with Dred Scott.98 In that larger picture are figures of 
turmoil, violence, disorder, pain, bloodshed, injury, humiliation, surrender, 
defeat, and death associated with the institution of slavery that Dred Scott 
sanctioned and what it took to overcome all that after Appomattox in order to 
repair the Constitution and to reunify the nation. 
As depersonalized and gestural as the dissent’s presentation of the range of 
traumas it associates with Dred Scott is, the qualities of the traumas it evokes 
are not. Articulated as elements of the dissent’s active resistance to Obergefell, 
the traumatic lessons that Dred Scott taught the Court “the hard way” are once 
again speaking an important truth that is unfolding in the dissent’s imagination 
in the present tense. While seemingly only recounting a memory of wounds of 
yore, the dissent’s text is giving evidence that Obergefell, the occasion for 
summoning Dred Scott’s traumas, is causing the dissent to experience those 
wounds—“never dead,” “not even past”—in a fully active sense.99 If so, the 
dissent is not only dreaming about the pains of the lessons that Obergefell 
teaches, but it is also imagining what must soon, again, unfold, at least on an 
imaginary—maybe on a political, hence material, level—in order to bring 
about the result that a decision like this calls for: Obergefell, like Dred Scott, 
being overturned.100 Ominously, prophetically, as with Dred Scott, so with 
Obergefell: visions of Civil War, its violence, its destruction, its death, and its 
                                                                                                                     
 97 Id. 
 98 A related view is in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 883, 1002 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting), which refers to Dred Scott and “its 
already apparent consequences for the Court and its soon-to-be-played-out consequences 
for the Nation.” 
 99 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 100 This is, from a certain point of view of dissent to Obergefell, part of a Kulturkampf, 
after all. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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profoundly negative effects on the nation, initially ripping the country apart 
before the process of constitutional restoration can begin. This is the bell 
Obergefell tolls.  
D. Obergefell as Dred Scott: Political Mastery of the Nation 
It is, by now, well established, if not universally accepted, that the 
experiences and inner worlds of trauma are not the standard precincts of 
rationality and proportion.101 Even recognizing this, the Chief Justice’s 
dissent’s reactions to Obergefell are striking. How does the dissent, 
understanding that Obergefell sees itself as a decision about the loving world 
of same-sex intimacy and love and a life-right to it under the Constitution, 
respond to the majority opinion with thoughts that run to Dred Scott and a 
nightmarish dreamscape in which Obergefell is the rebirth of a decision 
involving the detestable approval of master-slave relations that helped 
precipitate a Civil War that, in turn, violently ripped the nation apart, requiring 
monumental, concerted efforts to restore it? 
An anodyne account of the rhetorical stakes of the dissent’s representation 
of Obergefell as the new Dred Scott contains the seeds of a more 
comprehensive answer.  
Uncommonly among the Court’s precedents and uniquely among its 
substantive due process rulings, Dred Scott offers distinctive rhetorical 
resources useful for an opinion, like the Chief Justice’s, set on insisting that 
Obergefell is an attack on American democracy and freedom. Not 
unproblematic by any number of metrics, the equation of Obergefell to Dred 
Scott gives the dissent symbolic resources that it can draw on to capture, 
dramatize, and even melodramatize, the gravity of Obergefell’s anti-
democratic mala fides.102 
Implicitly at least, Obergefell’s anti-democratic un-credentials are situated 
by the Chief Justice’s dissent somewhere on a spectrum between two of Dred 
Scott’s anti-democratic extremes. At its furthest reaches, Dred Scott’s formal 
                                                                                                                     
 101 For relevant discussion, see generally HERMAN, supra note 18, and Siegfried Zepf 
& Florian D. Zepf, Trauma and Traumatic Neurosis: Freud’s Concepts Revisited, 89 INT’L 
J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 331 (2008). On trauma, more generally, see CATHY CARUTH, 
UNCLAIMED EXPERIENCE: TRAUMA, NARRATIVE, AND HISTORY (1996); SHOSHANA 
FELMAN, THE JURIDICAL UNCONSCIOUS: TRIALS AND TRAUMAS IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY (2002); and TRAUMA: EXPLORATIONS IN MEMORY (Cathy Caruth ed., 1995). But 
see RUTH LEYS, TRAUMA (2000). Thanks to Brookes Hammock for engagement on this 
point. 
 102 The standard riposte is in Obergefell. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (“[T]he 
Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change, so long as 
that process does not abridge fundamental rights.”); accord Transcript of Oral Argument at 
74, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556) (statement by Kagan, J.); Laurence H. Tribe, 
Response, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 25–26 (2015), 
https://harvardlawreview.org/2015/11/equal-dignity-speaking-its-name [https://perma.cc/JCQ7-
42H3]. 
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approval of institutionalized master-slave relations is the antithesis of 
democratic, indeed any kind of, political freedom.103 At less radical extremes 
are the master-slave-like constraints that Dred Scott practically imposed on the 
democratic right of political self-government, a right of individual and shared 
self-mastery, that was violated when Dred Scott invalidated the Missouri 
Compromise, one collective expression of that right. Situated on this spectrum, 
Dred Scott covers it entirely, both formally approving of institutionalized 
slavery for some who ought to have been free citizens, while simultaneously 
reducing the American people as a whole to slave-like conditions of servitude 
to the “theoretical opinions” of a majority of the Supreme Court.104 
Subjugated to these unlawful judicial powers, the American people lost the 
political liberty to shape their destinies and the destinies of those who were to 
be delivered freedom through the Missouri Compromise. 
In no way does the equation of Obergefell to Dred Scott in the Chief 
Justice’s dissent expressly indicate that Obergefell literally reprises Dred 
Scott’s formal approval of institutionalized master-slave relations. And how 
could it? Still, the dissent’s equation does neatly conduce to an understanding 
of Obergefell in which it recapitulates the general master-slave-like conditions 
that Dred Scott approved in the broad and still highly significant political 
sense. Equating Obergefell to Dred Scott allows the dissent to say, without 
ever actually saying, and to argue, without ever actually arguing, that 
Obergefell is Dred Scott redux—both in its exercise of “judicial supremacy” 
over American democratic political relations and in making the American 
people symbolically and practically slave-like in their subjugation to the 
Court’s, their new master’s, powers.105 This being the arc on which the Chief 
Justice’s dissent’s understanding of Obergefell as the new Dred Scott bends—
not toward justice, but toward unfreedom—Obergefell’s threat to American 
democracy and democratic self-mastery is every bit as urgent and high-stakes 
as the dissent maintains. At bottom, Obergefell is a case about what the 
political conditions of American freedom and unfreedom are and will be, and 
what basis the Court must have beyond its own shifting whims for lawfully 
displacing the metes and bounds the American people set for themselves 
through constitutional politics. 
Perhaps it goes without saying, but American political culture and public 
discourse, to say nothing of historical facts, have long been such that the Chief 
                                                                                                                     
 103 The agency of some “happy slaves” notwithstanding, on the topic of which, from 
different perspectives, see, for example, DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF 
CONSENT THEORY (1989), and Janet Halley, My Isaac Royall Legacy, 24 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER L.J. 117 (2008). On the inherent dignity of enslaved persons as unaffected 
by their political and institutional unfreedom, see Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2639 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
 104 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2617 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 621 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting)). 
 105 The dissent actually speaks of the Obergefell Court’s “extravagant conception of 
judicial supremacy.” Id. at 2624. 
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Justice’s dissent would not dare to say directly and aloud that Obergefell 
smacks of the production of master-slave-like political relations that Dred 
Scott once so dramatically performed.106 Then again (this is part of the 
opinion’s genius) it does not have to. The structure of the Chief Justice’s 
dissent and its account of Obergefell as the new Dred Scott brilliantly 
navigates the pitfalls of political culture, public discourse, and history. By 
making the point the way it does, the dissent avoids speaking the unspeakable 
that Obergefell is not only anti-democratic, but also pro-slavery in a 
metaphorical sense. It thus leverages the tremendous felt human and political 
significance of what must not be overtly said by invoking Dred Scott in a way 
that makes clear that Obergefell is at one with it. In that oneness, Obergefell is 
one of those hopefully-always-rare constitutional mistakes that must be 
reversed post haste. The question the Chief Justice’s dissent powerfully raises 
about Obergefell is, What lover of freedom could possibly applaud a decision 
that so readily sacrifices political freedom in the name of a right to choose to 
marry . . . except maybe those content to live political life as “happy slaves” 
whose existence in the political and the personal realms will always be 
basically conditioned, dictated even, by overlords on the Supreme Court?107  
                                                                                                                     
 106 An approximation of this thought is in Yoshino, supra note 3, at 170.  
 107 See supra note 103. Justice Scalia’s Obergefell dissent tracks these moves into the 
conceptual space that Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion clears, but without expressly 
invoking Dred Scott or talking about masters and slaves, in a move that achieves 
something of the same effect. Telling its readers why Obergefell constitutes a very real 
threat to American democracy, Justice Scalia’s opinion insists that it is not “of immense 
personal importance,” or “special importance,” what Obergefell concludes on the bottom 
line, marriage being subject to any sort of relational definition the people themselves might 
decide that they want. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting). What is of 
“immense,” indeed “of overwhelming importance,” Justice Scalia’s dissent says, is who 
decides the question of marriage’s meaning: “It is of overwhelming importance . . . who it 
is that rules me. Today’s decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million 
Americans coast-to-coast, is a majority of the nine lawyers on the Supreme Court.” Id. To 
speak of being ruled this way, or, as the dissent later puts it, to be “subordinate[d],” id. at 
2629, by Obergefell through an act of political domination, is not quite to speak of the 
Court as having announced that it is the American people’s master, though it may be taken 
as moving in that direction. Perspective on why is found in the dissent’s remark that what 
Obergefell achieves is not simply “the furthest extension in fact,” but “the furthest 
extension one can even imagine . . . of the Court’s claimed power to create ‘liberties’ that 
the Constitution and its Amendments neglect to mention.” Id. at 2627. Whatever exactly 
this means, it functions as a way by which the dissent can refer to the negation of political 
freedom—what is elsewhere referred to as a freedom of self-government, id. (“the freedom 
to govern themselves”)—with the Court-ruler deciding for the American people what their 
government, hence their lives, will be like. This is not master-slave relations, since the 
people, after all, retain the power of constitutional revision, but the relations do partake of 
some of slavery’s attributes, including hierarchy, and unequal and nonconsensual relations. 
If these relations are not without any limit, they are certainly deeply anti-democratic, id. at 
2629 (“A system of government that makes the [American] People subordinate to a 
committee of nine unelected lawyers does not deserve to be called a democracy.”), hence 
in important respects politically constrained to the point of being no longer properly 
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E. Beyond Political Master-Slave Relations: Obergefell’s Mastery of 
Marriage’s Masters 
To understand Chief Justice Roberts’s Obergefell dissent to be speaking 
through its equation of Obergefell to Dred Scott about conditions of political 
mastery and servitude is to be poised to watch this insight blossom into a set of 
concerns about a different, but hardly wholly unrelated, set of master-slave 
relations. To see what the concerns are and what those other master-slave 
relations look like, it is helpful to recall Obergefell’s central challenge, as seen 
from the historical and traditional perspective that the Chief Justice’s dissent 
wants. 
Following Lawrence v. Texas and United States v. Windsor, cases in 
which the Supreme Court declared same-sex intimacies and relationships to be 
just like their cross-sex counterparts for constitutional purposes, marriage 
equality advocates in Obergefell set out to eliminate—in the context of State 
bans on same-sex marriage—the residual legal normativity of heterosexual 
difference (meaning: the difference between heterosexuality and 
homosexuality) as it is grounded in sexual difference (meaning: the difference 
between men and women) and operates in the form of cross-sex sexual union 
and its procreative consequences.108 Hence did the pro-marriage equality 
stance in Obergefell seek to displace “natural” male-female heterosexuality 
and its procreative consequences as the distinctive element constitutionally 
justifying the continued definition of marriage as an exclusively cross-sex 
institution.109 
                                                                                                                     
democratically free. Interestingly, Justice Scalia’s dissent does not affirmatively say what 
the system of government that Obergefell propounds should be called, other than to say it 
“does not deserve to be called a democracy.” Id. This could be because it is too soon to tell 
what Obergefell and its rule may become. Then again, if, as the dissent maintains, 
Obergefell has already reached the constitutional limits that achieve the boundaries of what 
is imaginable, it could be that the dissent understands what the surpassing of those limits 
implies about the system of sovereign relations of ruler to ruled that Obergefell brings 
about, but simply declines to say just what they are. Perhaps it is significant in this 
regard—or perhaps not—that, after Obergefell was handed down, it was reported that 
Justice Scalia discussed Obergefell in ways that likened its conditions to Dred Scott’s. See 
Ramesh Ponnuru, Scalia on the Role of the Courts, NAT’L REV. (Nov. 16, 2015), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/427131/scalia-role-courts-ramesh-ponnuru [https://per 
ma.cc/DCG8-VMEP]; Richard A. Posner & Eric J. Segall, Opinion, Justice Scalia’s 
Majoritarian Theocracy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/ 
opinion/justice-scalias-majoritarian-theocracy.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9PVV-NSET]. 
 108 For an earlier iteration of at least part of this move, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting), which ventures: “Today’s opinion dismantles 
the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between 
heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is 
concerned.” 
 109 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 49, 55–58, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-
556); Brief for Petitioners at 16, 46–50, Bourke v. Beshear, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 
14-574); Brief for Petitioners at 35–38, DeBoer v. Snyder, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-
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For its part, the Chief Justice’s Obergefell dissent rejects this pro-marriage 
equality bid to (in the Obergefell majority opinion’s words) “sever[] the 
connection between natural procreation and marriage.”110 The dissent’s 
rejection of this stance arrives in significant part through a survey of 
marriage’s history and tradition, which leads the opinion to point out that the 
institution of marriage is (or before Obergefell, was) a response to the trans-
historical and trans-traditional felt need to organize heterosexual sexuality and 
its reproductive consequences in ways that ensure the interests of the 
biological offspring of heterosexual sexual unions both for their own “good” 
and “for the good of . . . society.”111 Filling out the point, the dissent observes 
that children of heterosexual unions “generally [having] better” prospects “if 
the mother and father stay together rather than going their separate ways,” the 
institution of marriage has been constructed to give kids the chance to grow up 
with both “mother and father” together in stable circumstances.112 
Heterosexual difference grounded in sexual difference as reflected in the 
biological distinctiveness of cross-sex procreation and its consequences—
children—thus continues to provide an adequate constitutional basis for 
limiting marriage to the union of one man and one woman as husband and 
wife.113 
Without arguing whether heterosexuality, sexual difference, and their 
procreative consequences operating inside of marriage have been designed to 
serve and, as the dissent intimates, have actually served the interests of 
children and of society at large, they have unquestionably served other ends as 
an historical and traditional matter.114 Among other things, heterosexuality, 
sexual difference, and their procreative consequences have been essential 
materials for the operation of various ideologies of male dominance that have 
                                                                                                                     
571); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 12, 25–28, 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574). In a related vein, 
Douglas NeJaime describes challenges to the marital presumption (which, traditionally, 
presumed the husband “to be the biological, and thus legal, father of a child born to his 
wife”) as applied to same-sex couples, “which have proliferated in Obergefell’s wake,” as 
“implicat[ing] not only sexual-orientation equality, but also the displacement of biological 
and gendered parentage principles.” Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New 
Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1190 (2016). 
 110 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2606–07. 
 111 Id. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 2613–15; accord DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 404–06 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(explaining that limiting marriage to cross-sexed unions is not “irrational,” but rather 
reflects an “awareness of the biological reality” that same-sex couples do not procreate as 
cross-sex couples do and “do not run the risk of unintended offspring”), rev’d sub nom. 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584. 
 114 Were the unmade argument to be made, DeShaney v. Winnebago County 
Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), and Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 
545 U.S. 748 (2005), might be invoked.  
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long governed marriage and family law and life, along with politics and 
society in a wider sense.115  
Perhaps predictably given the normative force that marriage and its history 
and tradition possess in the Chief Justice’s dissent, the opinion does not very 
critically engage marriage’s record as an institution of male dominance 
involving male control of heterosexual sexuality, sexual difference, and 
procreation. To its credit, the dissent does not ignore the underlying facts in 
their entirety. The Chief Justice’s dissent briefly invokes and remarks on the 
English and American law of coverture, a legal institution characterized by the 
Obergefell majority opinion as an exercise in “male[ ]domina[nce],” a 
description that, if not openly embraced by the Chief Justice’s dissent, is not 
openly disavowed by it either.116 For its part, the majority opinion’s account of 
coverture sits atop William Blackstone’s description of it in his Commentaries 
on the Laws of England,117 a source that the Chief Justice’s dissent 
affirmatively embraces as authority for what America’s Founding Fathers, as 
“[e]arly Americans,” thought about the institution of marriage.118 From a 
thoroughly modern point of view, Blackstone’s Commentaries are strikingly 
unselfconscious in their embrace of coverture as a practice of male dominance. 
This is Blackstone: 
                                                                                                                     
 115 See generally, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, WOMAN HATING (1974); ELEANOR BURKE 
LEACOCK, MYTHS OF MALE DOMINANCE pt. 3 (1981); GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF 
PATRIARCHY (1986); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Does Sexuality Have a History?, in 
WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS, supra note 18, at 269; JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION 
OF WOMEN (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1869); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, 
GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989); SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT (1979); CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988). For normatively and 
methodologically different accounts that land on some of the same perspectives, see, for 
example, Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141–42 (1873) (Bradley, J., 
concurring); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421–22 (1908); and STEVEN GOLDBERG, 
WHY MEN RULE: A THEORY OF MALE DOMINANCE (1993). 
 116 On the dissent’s references to coverture, see Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2614 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). On coverture, described by the Obergefell majority as 
“male[ ]domina[nce],” see id. at 2595 (majority opinion), and also Serena Mayeri, 
Marriage (In)Equality and the Historical Legacies of Feminism, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 126, 
129 (2015), https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079&context=clr 
circuit [https://perma.cc/K3YA-SLVD]. It has been suggested that the constitutional status of 
coverture (as opposed to its formal legal status, see Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2614 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting)), is a question that the Chief Justice’s dissent raises. Case, supra note 10, 
at 690. 
 117 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595 (citing 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *430). 
 118 Id. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at 
*410). Mary Anne Case has criticized the Chief Justice’s dissent’s invocation of 
“Blackstone’s ‘conception of marriage and family,’” on the grounds that, while “‘a given’ 
for the Framers, ‘its structure, its stability, roles, and values accepted by all;’ it is . . . the 
antithesis of a given under our current constitutional order; it is now unconstitutional.” 
Case, supra note 10, at 688 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting)). 
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 By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the 
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, 
or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under 
whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs every thing; and is therefore 
called in our law-french a feme-covert; is said to be covert-baron, or under 
the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her 
condition during her marriage is called her coverture.119 
Here is an associated truth: The lords and masters of women in marriage have 
also historically and traditionally been the lords and masters of the children 
born to it.120 All were under the husband-father’s protection, influence, 
control, and wing.121 
It is at precisely this point—armed with this Blackstonian perspective—
that the Chief Justice’s dissent’s thinking about Obergefell as an exercise of 
political mastery and its thinking about marriage as an institution whose 
constitutional meaning is historically and traditionally defined, converge in an 
illuminating respect. If Obergefell problematically involves political mastery 
in a diffuse and generalized way, it achieves that mastery through the 
dominion that is claimed then exercised over the institution of marriage, 
which, the dissent maintains, is properly constitutionally defined with 
reference to its history and tradition. Tracing out the sightline of this thought: 
As Obergefell masters marriage, the sting of its domination is distinctively 
lorded over marriage’s own historical and traditional rulers. In context, this 
cannot be a reference to married women, whose “legal existence[s]” were, 
according to Blackstone, “suspended during . . . marriage, or at 
least . . . incorporated and consolidated into that of the[ir] husband[s].”122 Nor, 
                                                                                                                     
 119 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *430 (footnote omitted) (spelling alterations to 
reflect modern usage). For related views on the “male-governed” and “patriarchal” aspects 
of marriage at common law, see Robin Bradley Kar, Against Marriage Essentialism: A 
Legal Grounding for Obergefell and Same-Sex Marriage, 2016 ILL. L. REV. 1581, 1586–
91, and for a description of the prerogatives of husbands “as master[s] of [their] 
household[s],” see Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and 
Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996). 
 120 See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *441 (“The legal power of a father (for 
a mother, as such, is entitled to no power, but only to reverence and respect) the power of a 
father, I say, over the persons of his children ceases at the age of twenty one: for they are 
then enfranchised by arriving at years of discretion, or that point which the law has 
established (as some must necessarily be established) when the empire of the father, or 
other guardian, gives place to the empire of reason.” (spelling alterations to reflect modern 
usage)). A description of children “[u]nder coverture” as “their fathers’ assets,” is in 
Colker, supra note 10, at 409 & n.131 (citing Amber Bailey, Redefining Marriage: How 
the Institution of Marriage Has Changed to Make Room for Same-Sex Couples, 27 WIS. 
J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 305, 317 (2012)). 
 121 For a discussion of the possible pay out of these ideas for originalist modes of 
constitutional interpretation, see Case, supra note 10, at 688–89. 
 122 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *430 (spelling alterations to reflect modern 
usage). 
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for that matter, could it be a reference to the children born into a marriage. 
What it is, of course, is a reference to the idea, consistent with the logic of the 
Chief Justice’s dissent, that Obergefell’s mastery of marriage involves the 
mastery of the institution’s historical and traditional masters: marriage’s 
barons, its lords, its little-k kings. Relaxing certain qualifications about the 
history of sexuality in order to gather and articulate the crucial point: The logic 
of positions that the Chief Justice’s dissent stakes out indicates that Obergefell 
seizes men’s historical and traditional authority in and over marriage, thus 
placing these men—in contemporary terms, presumptively heterosexual 
men—under the Supreme Court’s authority, hence its control.123 Heterosexual 
men’s authority in marriage having long been the basis for their authority not 
only in private, but also in public life and in politics, after Obergefell, their 
powers as governors in all these spheres of social existence now belong to 
their new masters up on the Supreme Court.124  
F. From Political to Sexual Mastery—Of Castration and Forced 
Sodomy 
The Chief Justice’s dissent, with its compulsion for repetition, returns to 
this impression of Obergefell as a decision that masters heterosexual men in 
different ways. Without exaggeration, the rhetoric through which the dissent 
presents various aspects of its doctrinal maneuverings offers a veritable 
treasure trove of imagery in which presumably heterosexual men are 
symbolically mastered by forces that Obergefell is taken to represent. 
Vitally, the mastery that Obergefell is seen to be foisting on heterosexual 
men is not limited to impersonal and highly structured modes of institutional 
or political control, as by the Court elevating itself over marriage and married 
men in marriage and public, political life. The mastery that Obergefell imposes 
on heterosexual men is also achieved instead through modes of domination 
that, at the level of metaphor, involve heterosexual men’s bodily subjection to 
erotic subordination. Obergefell sexually targets, hence persecutes, 
heterosexual men, compromising their own historical and traditional powers of 
sexual domination, with the immediate effect of unmanning them.125 
                                                                                                                     
 123 Presumptions of male heterosexuality, like heterosexuality itself, are, of course, 
historically conditioned. For histories on sexuality, including sexual identity, see generally, 
for example, JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF 
SEXUALITY IN AMERICA (Univ. of Chi. Press 2d ed. 1997) (1988); 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, 
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books ed. 
1990) (1978); and JONATHAN NED KATZ, THE INVENTION OF HETEROSEXUALITY (1995). 
Both the co-authored work by John D’Emilio and Estelle Freedman and the work by 
Jonathan Katz are cited in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568 (2003). 
 124 A different sense of whom Obergefell “victimize[s],” which focuses on “religious 
and cultural conservatives,” is in Seidman, supra note 12, at 136.  
 125 An alternative route to much the same conclusion passes through those traditions 
that critically view marriage as a form of hierarchy, master-servant relations, and 
domestication. See, e.g., EMMA GOLDMAN, Marriage and Love, in ANARCHISM AND OTHER 
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From one direction, the Chief Justice’s dissent’s rhetoric indicates 
Obergefell launches a frontal assault on heterosexual men’s phallic potency—
the powers associated with the “masculine member”—that zeroes in on 
marriage’s historical and traditional “roots.”126 References like this to “roots,” 
common enough in constitutional decisions, are readily overlooked in the 
dissent as stock, hence insignificant, tropes.127 Or they may be so overlooked 
until it is recognized that marriage’s history and tradition are so tightly bound 
up with male dominance that the dissent’s references to marriage’s roots 
function significantly as metonyms for male heteropatriarchal power. 
Seriously, then, but not without irony, notice how marriage’s roots are, for 
the dissent, a constitutional polestar that guide, govern, and point the way, 
arrow-like, for the dissent’s constitutional thought. Also, as suggested by the 
dissent, marriage’s roots are big, long, and plunge deep into the U.S 
Constitution’s soil. Not insignificantly, these roots are all-encompassing: They 
snake out to penetrate and govern all of known historical time and social 
space, which helps explain the dissent’s sense that these roots are venerable 
and venerated the world and its history and traditions over, hence deserving of 
the worship, including constitutional worship, that they have long, until 
Obergefell, received. No small aside, when the dissent traces marriage’s roots 
back to their own roots in the hazy foundations of human civilization and to a 
state of shared human existence prior to, hence unresponsive to, the “moving 
                                                                                                                     
ESSAYS 233, 241–44 (2d rev. ed. 1911). Seen in their light, Obergefell may appear to lock 
heterosexual men into marriage on equal terms with all women, now including lesbian 
women, as well as with homosexual men. Thanks to Robin West for conversation on this 
point. See infra text accompanying notes 269–70 for related thoughts. 
 126 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2611, 2614, 2616, 2618–19, 2621–22 
(2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). For a remarkable study on the metaphor of the “root,” 
from which the language of “masculine member” in the text is also drawn, see generally 
CHRISTY WAMPOLE, ROOTEDNESS: THE RAMIFICATIONS OF A METAPHOR (2016), which, 
among other things, following Werner Hamacher, notes that “Rute is the word for the 
radix, which stands in Latin not only for vegetable root, for origin, source, firm ground, 
and soil, but also, as in radix virilis for the masculine member.” Id. at 46 (quoting WERNER 
HAMACHER, The Second of Inversion: Movements of a Figure Through Celan’s Poetry, in 
PREMISES: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE FROM KANT TO CELAN 337, 367 (Peter 
Fenves trans., 1999)).  
 127 There are other opinions even in Obergefell that focus on marriage’s “roots” as the 
basis for its present day constitutional form. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2632 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2640, 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting). Related articulations are 
in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567–72 (2003); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 
702, 703, 716, 721–22, 727 (1997); and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191–94 
(1986), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. Nor are these the only root metaphors within 
the Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence. For some engagement, see Michael C. 
Dorf, Tainted Law, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 923, 925–30 (2012); Kim Forde-Mazrui, Learning 
Law Through the Lens of Race, 21 J.L. & POL. 1, 12 & n.38 (2005); and Russell Hittinger, 
A Crisis of Legitimacy: A Response to Critics, 44 LOY. L. REV. 83, 93 (1998). See also 
Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutions as “Living Trees”? Comparative Constitutional Law and 
Interpretive Metaphors, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 921, 948, 954 (2006). 
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force[s] of world history,” it suggests that marriage’s roots are manifestations 
of human nature and its biological substrate: cross-sex sex and its procreative 
consequences.128 In this sense, marriage’s roots have, and are references to, 
objective reality unto universal truth. 
Obergefell’s vision of marriage is none of this by contrast. Stated 
succinctly, it does not measure up. Justice Samuel Alito’s dissent takes the 
view that the Obergefell majority’s vision of marriage “lacks deep roots,” as 
opposed to reflecting the “long-established tradition” of cross-sex marriage,129 
with a palpable emphasis on the “long.” This comparison, however, may seem 
generous when it is set along side the Chief Justice’s dissent’s evaluation. By 
that opinion’s yardstick, the roots of the vision of marriage that Obergefell 
embraces are so small that they amount to practically nothing at all, having, as 
the dissent puts it at one point, “little or no cognizable roots in the language or 
even the design of the Constitution,”130 an exposition that echoes Justice 
Scalia’s sense of the Court’s earlier decision in Windsor, which his dissent in 
that case saw emerging from a “diseased root,” and whose justifications were 
both “rootless and shifting.”131 Whatever Obergefell can properly claim for 
itself about its constitutional endowments, the decision, being contrary to 
marriage’s objectivity and truth as they have for millennia been understood, 
Obergefell’s at-most nubby roots stab down into the insecure, “shifting,” 
subjective, extra-constitutional soil of “social policy and considerations of 
fairness.”132 This is not much.  
Just so, even a shifting and rootless decision with a vision of marriage like 
Obergefell embraces is not peril-free. It is, in fact, distinctively dangerous. The 
dominance that this ruling achieves comes precisely through an opinion that 
has upended what marriage has historically and traditionally meant. The 
relevant imagery that the Chief Justice’s dissent supplies here arrives in an 
abstract description of constitutional fact: “Expanding a right suddenly and 
dramatically is likely to require tearing it up from its roots.”133 This theoretical 
possibility is materialized by Obergefell: It “[e]xpand[s] [the] right [to marry] 
                                                                                                                     
 128 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 129 Id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 130 Id. at 2618 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)). Compare id., with Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 
194 (describing the right to engage in same-sex intimate relations as “having little or no 
cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution”).  
 131 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2698, 2705 (2013) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). A look at the “literary” dimensions of Justice Scalia’s Windsor dissent, which 
flags its references to “roots,” is in Micah Mattix, Scalia’s Literary Dissent, AM. 
SPECTATOR (July 1, 2013), https://spectator.org/55312_scalias-literary-dissent/ [https://perma.cc/ 
23C8-72VQ]. Repeated references to “roots” are also found in Justice Scalia’s dissenting 
opinion in Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588, 593–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 132 “Shifting” comes from Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The 
language of “social policy and considerations of fairness” is from Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 
2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 133 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2618 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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suddenly and dramatically” from what it was (a right of traditional, cross-sex 
marriage) to what it now is (a right to cross-sex and same-sex marriage).134 
According to the figural logic of the dissent, when Obergefell dilates the right 
to marry this way, it has “likely,” if not certainly, torn the historical and 
traditional right to marry “up from its roots.”135 To piece the symbolism 
together: Obergefell’s quick and bold expansion of the right to marry tears that 
right up from its roots—roots that are themselves metonymic references to the 
phallic power of heterosexual men. Obergefell thus symbolically performs 
heterosexual men’s castration.136 
Should the imagery somehow not be thought to extend that far, or should 
the idea otherwise prove too disquieting to accept, then there is, more 
modestly, the way in which the dissent unquestionably reflects a sense that 
Obergefell has engaged in a kind of castration in the limited sense of blunting 
the powers of marriage’s historical and traditional roots, hence the phallic 
power of heterosexual men, in ways that, if they do not render it non-existent 
as by tearing it out, anyway make it inert—heterosexual men being made if not 
into eunuchs then eunuch-like: ineffectual, no longer empowered to rule 
marriage or its institutional definition and meaning. Either way, 
metaphorically, heterosexual men are made actually or practically phallus-less 
by this decision.137 
A powerful second for this sentiment is found in vivid detail in Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s memorable, separate Obergefell dissent. Its angry, opening 
salvo fulminates about how the Supreme Court has made itself “my Ruler” 
(the “my” being intended as a reference to Justice Scalia, though it also covers 
Justice Thomas, who joins the opinion) as well as the “Ruler of 320 million 
Americans.”138 This concern about being “Ruled,” which is a concern about 
mastery by any other name, is expressly rearticulated later in the dissent as a 
problematic of subordination, which implies that Obergefell is an act of 
                                                                                                                     
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
 136 For other discussions of symbolic castration in constitutional doctrine, see, for 
example, Adler, supra note 18, at 1130–40; Adler, supra note 19, at 238–39, 243–47, 250; 
and Thomas, supra note 11, at 1818–19.  
 137 Symbolic castration is also achieved by Obergefell’s negation of the normativity of 
male-female sexual difference. If male heterosexuality’s phallic authority in marriage is 
traceable to male-female sexuality in coital two-in-one union, then Obergefell’s 
disaffirmation of that sexuality as the basis for the contemporary constitutional meaning of 
marriage implies the elimination of the grounds for male heterosexuality’s phallic 
authority, hence that authority itself. 
 138 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. President Barack Obama, 
Remarks by the President at the Democratic National Convention (July 27, 2016) 
(transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/28/remarks-
president-democratic-national-convention [https://perma.cc/PWY9-XX4K]) (offering that, 
within the U.S. political tradition, “[w]e don’t look to be ruled”). 
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domination.139 The hierarchy theme carries through the rhetorical stitch of 
Justice Scalia’s dissent until, finally, in its closing paragraph, the concern 
about being “Ruled” is inflected with an express reference to the Obergefell 
Court’s swelled, “o’erweening pride”—a pride that the dissent makes clear is 
one that “goeth before a fall.”140 The fall in this setting arrives abruptly, 
almost in the gesture of a chop, with Obergefell causing the deflation of the 
Court’s authority, which traces through an originalist methodology back to the 
patriarchal authority of the Founding Fathers.141 Seeing this authority in its 
male and phallic terms, Justice Scalia’s dissent expresses an outraged, and 
plainly uncomfortable, sense about where Obergefell’s falsely o’erswelled 
pride has pushed the Court: “one step closer to being reminded of”—here are 
the last two words of Justice Scalia’s dissent—“our impotence.”142 
Formally, the “impotence” of which Justice Scalia’s dissent speaks is 
produced by Obergefell, in which the Court has exceeded its proper bounds, 
requiring the Court’s powers to be cut back, while at the same time also 
merely being spotlighted by the decision, “impotence” being a state or 
condition that Obergefell is “remind[ing]” the dissent about.143 In both cases, 
the impotence referred to by Justice Scalia’s dissent arrives after and as a 
result of a fall that itself results from the Court’s “o’erweening pride”144—a 
pride that is evidently so humiliating that Justice Scalia’s dissent is driven to 
think to say in a self-referential way that “[i]f . . . I ever joined an opinion for 
the Court” like Obergefell, “I would hide my head in a bag.”145 Technically, 
the dissent is indicating the shame it would feel were it to join a ruling that 
starts out as Obergefell does, and is meant in this way to correct the Justices 
                                                                                                                     
 139 As the dissent comments: “A system of government that makes the People 
subordinate to a committee of nine unelected lawyers does not deserve to be called a 
democracy.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 140 Id. at 2631. 
 141 See id. at 2628, 2629–30. Additional, related discussion of originalism and its 
connection to the authority of the Founding Fathers is in Thomas, supra note 11, at 1820. 
 142 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Recalling that Justice Thomas 
joins Scalia’s Obergefell dissent, it may or may not be that a sense of impotence like this 
conditions Justice Thomas’s own Obergefell dissent, which Justice Scalia, for his part, 
joins. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). If it does, it might help make sense of Justice Thomas’s 
dissent’s performance, which unfolds a series of ideas about constitutional meaning that, in 
certain respects, whatever their supports in history or theory and however intelligible they 
may be, have about them a certain dream-like and otherworldly air. What, for instance, 
would it mean, if the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clauses were limited to 
procedural protections? Id. Were “interpreted to include [nothing] broader than freedom 
from physical restraint”? Id. at 2633. In such a case, what would happen to protections for 
marriage and family law and sexual intimacy and personal choice? What if human dignity 
and humanity itself were deemed unimplicated by governmental actions, including, at an 
extreme, slavery’s authorization? Id. at 2639. To press these points as matters of first 
principles in relation to Obergefell is to imagine its eradication in its entirety. 
 143 Id. at 2631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 2630 n.22. 
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who have joined it by indicating how they ought to feel about that choice. 
Revealingly, the affective state the dissent thus refers to is one that it indicates 
it has imagined and experienced, which is an equally apt way to understand the 
affect the dissent associates with Obergefell’s “reminde[r] of” “impotence” 
with which the opinion comes to its deflated, defeated end.146 
Returning, to the Chief Justice’s dissent: What Obergefell achieves as a 
decision that symbolically sexually masters heterosexual men is not only 
accomplished by, as it were, a frontal assault on heterosexual phallic authority. 
There is also a symbolically rearguard action that Obergefell mounts, which 
“gnaws at the roots of” male heteropatriarchal authority from within the 
heterosexual male body that the dissent imagines Obergefell places under 
sexual attack.147 
How Obergefell imposes this form of sexual mastery and how it functions, 
as in what it does to heterosexual men who are made to suffer it, initially come 
to light through the language that the dissent mobilizes to explain why the 
Constitution does not protect marriage equality for same-sex couples. 
Speaking generally, the Chief Justice’s dissent maps the terrain of judicial 
review that Obergefell, by its own lights, involves by noting that the claimed 
constitutional right to marriage equality presented in the case is special. The 
reason it is special, not ordinary, is, as the dissent explains, that it touches “the 
most sensitive category of constitutional adjudication.”148 This is the dissent’s 
way of indicating that Obergefell implicates substantive due process decision-
making impacting the Due Process Clause’s substantive liberty guarantee, 
which, in turn, requires some judgment about the meaning of this “most 
sensitive” and open-ended portion of constitutional text.149 According to the 
dissent, judges deciding cases touching on this constitutional soft spot must 
“‘exercise the utmost care’ in identifying implied fundamental rights,” 
particularly where text alone might indicate there are no substantive, only 
procedural, rights to be found.150 The risk of announcing rights in this 
situation is that “unelected federal judges” will use their institutional powers 
illegitimately to “strike down . . . laws on the basis of” their own pliable sense 
of what fundamental rights should be.151 An interpretive practice like this, 
which inserts meaning into the Constitution that does not belong there, rather 
than deriving meaning from it that does, is a prospect that, notes the dissent, 
                                                                                                                     
 146 See id. at 2631. 
 147 See Thomas, supra note 11, at 1823 (quoting JEFFREY WEEKS, SEXUALITY AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS 191 (1985)).  
 148 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 149 For affinities on this line between the Chief Justice’s dissent in Obergefell and the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), consider Thomas, 
supra note 11, at 1814–28. 
 150 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)). 
 151 Id. 
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“raises obvious concerns about the judicial role.”152 By making the 
Constitution reflect not the high meaning given to it by the Founding Fathers 
and the American people, but the degraded meaning of being reduced to a 
receptacle for “the policy preferences,”153 elsewhere, the “naked policy 
preferences,”154 of the “Members of this Court,”155 illicit movements in 
relation to the Constitution’s “most sensitive category of . . . adjudication,”156 
the Court threatens to “transform” the Constitution in ways that undermine the 
basic nature of the constitutional enterprise.157 When the Constitution’s nature 
is violated this way—when the Court has engaged in interpretive infidelity, as 
it has, at times, done, and vowed not to repeat—the consequences can be, as 
Dred Scott taught the Court “the hard way,” most severe.158 What Dred Scott 
taught when it made the Supreme Court the Constitution’s master was that 
judicial supremacy, achieved by inserting into the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment liberty and property rights to own and keep enslaved 
persons that the Charter did not contain, could divide the Court, transform the 
Constitution, and pave the way for the nation to be torn asunder by Civil War, 
the violence and bloodshed of which involved a decided loss of national well-
being, integrity, and even forced surrender and humiliation, to say nothing of, 
but not to forget, the loss of human life that came as a result.159 
                                                                                                                     
 152 Id.  
 153 Id. (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720). 
 154 Id. at 2621. The language of “naked policy preferences” is unique in Supreme 
Court opinions. While Chief Justice Roberts’s Obergefell dissent is the only one to use it, 
Justice Scalia’s Obergefell dissent rehearses the theme when describing the majority 
opinion in the case as “a naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, super-legislative—
power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of government.” Id. at 2629 (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). Other variations on the “naked” theme are not unheard of in Supreme Court 
decisions. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 615 (1990) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (“naked preferences”), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200 (1995); see also, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting 
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2678 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“naked appeals to 
public policy”); FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (“a naked 
intuition” (quoting Beach Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 1103, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1992) 
(per curiam))); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 296 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“mere 
naked power, rather than intrinsic right” (quoting Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 51 
(1849) (Woodbury, J., dissenting))); Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 51 (Woodbury, J., 
dissenting) (“the authority of naked majorities”); Jenkins v. Pye, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 241, 244 
(1838) (“the broad and naked principle”).  
 155 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Glucksberg, 521 
U.S. at 720). 
 156 Id. 
 157 The language of “transformation” reappears at multiple junctures in the Chief 
Justice’s dissent. Id. at 2612, 2614, 2616. It is also found in id. at 2594–95 (majority 
opinion), and id. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 158 Id. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 159 See id. at 2616–17. 
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By its own terms, the Chief Justice’s dissent’s account of substantive due 
process interpretation is intended to present propositional truths about this 
mode of constitutional adjudication, including its stakes, details of which are 
axiomatic constitutional facts that Obergefell spurns. At the same time, the 
observations convey an additional layer of meaning. Here, presented together, 
are the dissent’s references: decision-making by the Court’s “Members” that 
touches on “the most sensitive category of constitutional adjudication”—a 
demand for a delicate practice in this touchy area lest the Court’s role and the 
Constitution’s as well be transformed via naked judicial policy preferences 
inserted into the Constitution’s open-ended provisions, text from which 
meaning is supposed to emerge, not be put in—an insertion of meaning that is 
against the nature of the enterprise and can lead to a rending of the Court, the 
Constitution, and the nation in ways that have historically included bloodshed, 
loss of well-being and integrity, as well as surrender, humiliation, and even 
death.160 As certain as it is that all this involves abstract declarations about 
constitutional interpretive practice and constitutional history, it also constitutes 
a representational rendering that reveals the libidinal stakes of Obergefell’s 
rule-making. Constitutional review as a matter of substantive due process, at 
least as described in the Chief Justice’s dissent, sounds like nothing so much 
as talk, written from the perspective of an opinion that is an heir to the 
authority of the Founding Fathers, about sodomitical sexual relations, or to be 
exact about it, anal sex, that places male heteropatriarchal authority, the 
authority of heterosexual men, hence, representationally, them, on the 
receiving end of the Court’s stick. 
Clarifying the stakes of the imagery and the damage that Obergefell’s 
interpretive practices involve is the dissent’s sense, expressed elsewhere, that 
Obergefell is no mild or workaday substantive due process ruling, but an 
“aggressive application” of the doctrine that involves a “sharp” “break” from 
the past.161 As the opinion puts it: Obergefell’s “aggressive application of 
substantive due process breaks sharply with decades of precedent and returns 
the Court to the unprincipled approach of Lochner.”162 The reference to a 
“sharp” “break” that returns the Court to Lochner’s “unprincipled approach” to 
substantive due process decision-making, which itself harkens back to Dred 
Scott, indicates that Obergefell is being seen as a deviant substantive due 
process ruling, the method of which abandons the firm grounding of the 
teachings of history and tradition, reflected in the “decades of precedent” 
following that approach.163 This deviation is also a way of indicating that 
Obergefell’s “sharp” “break” from the past involves an “aggressive” and 
“unprincipled,” hence violent and unwarranted, insertion of meaning into the 
                                                                                                                     
 160 See id. 
 161 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2618 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also infra text 
accompanying note 162. 
 162 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2618–19 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 163 Id.  
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Constitution.164 On one level, this language sounds like a reference to action 
that forcefully snaps something in half, replicating the imagery of Obergefell 
as inflicting an externally castrating wound. The dissent’s emphasis on the 
sharpness of the break that Obergefell’s “aggressive application of substantive 
due process” works, is, however, equally in keeping with an act of aggressive 
insertion that, as with Obergefell’s “sudden[] and dramatic[]” expansion of the 
Constitution’s text, evokes an edge, something knife-like, hence sharp, where 
a “break” signifies something that, in view of the sharp insertion, is not 
rendered into parts but instead torn or shredded and broken in that sense from 
its previous unpierced, unpoked, and intact state.165 If castrating, it is an 
internally produced wound.166  
That this action happens in an “aggressive” manner marks a point of return 
to the curious line from the opening of the Chief Justice’s dissent,167 in which 
the opinion, seemingly in passing but really, ultimately, not, hints that 
Obergefell is an act of judicial will, of desire, of naked policy preferences 
being inserted into the Constitution through an act of “force” that ramifies 
them.168 Resituated in relation to the anal eroticism the dissent’s discussion of 
substantive due process practice surfaces, these ideas intimate that 
Obergefell’s interpretive buggery, which takes heteropatriarchal authority, 
hence heterosexual men, as its targets, as those whom it masters through acts 
of sodomitical anal sex, does not involve the kind of same-sex intimacies that 
the Obergefell majority has in mind—loving and consensual intimacies of a 
marital sort—so much as acts, indeed, given the repetition of the imagery in 
the dissent, multiply repeated acts, of aggressive, sharp, painful, “breaking,” 
forceful, tearing, and, recalling the equation to Dred Scott, bloody and wound-
producing, potentially way-of-life-and-world-destroying, not to mention 
potentially lethal, penile-anal sex. Not easygoing consensual same-sex love-
making on a lazy Sunday afternoon, the imagery that surfaces across the 
dissent stirs ideas of nightmarish and unwanted, even non-consensual, forcible 
sexual acts that resemble nothing so much as anal rape. When the dissent later 
explains that Obergefell exalts its “Members[’]”169 desires in an 
“accumulation of power [that] does not occur in a vacuum,” and says that this 
accumulation of power “comes at the expense of the people,”170 it is hard not 
                                                                                                                     
 164 See id.  
 165 See id. at 2618; cf. Farley, Lacan & Voting Rights, supra note 36, at 297–301 
(discussing phallic aggression and race inequality).  
 166 A relation between male-male anal sodomy—and, for that matter, even 
heterosexual, male-female penetrative sex—and castration is established, among other 
sources, in Freud, Wolf Man, supra note 1, at 41–47, 78. 
 167 See supra text accompanying note 45. 
 168 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); see also id. at 2631 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 522–23 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
 169 Id. at 2622 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 170 Id. at 2624. 
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to see that, significantly among the people at whose expense Obergefell 
comes, are marriage’s historical and traditional masters: heterosexual men. 
Nor is that the entire picture the Chief Justice’s dissent offers. Obergefell’s 
“accumulation of power,” coming at heterosexual men’s expense through sex 
acts that they are ultimately powerless to resist, as the dissent is powerless to 
stop the Obergefell Court from doing what it does, Obergefell’s sexual 
mastery of heterosexual men is consonant with the thirst for power that 
Obergefell demonstrates.171 This is a thirst that is not easily slaked. To the 
dissent’s evident chagrin, Obergefell manifests its appetites in a way that, once 
indulged, seems to generate a desire for more.172 Hence the dissent’s 
insistence that Obergefell is the start of something that can only but leave the 
Court “free to roam where unguided speculation might take” it, peripatetically 
imposing its desires on the nation.173 Against the backdrop of the erotic tale 
the Chief Justice’s dissent’s rhetoric unfolds, this is a reckoning of Obergefell 
as manifesting and materializing a sexual beast that, if a millennia-old 
institution like marriage cannot stop, nothing can.174 This beast, with its 
desires for mastery, let loose and on the prowl, is reminiscent of old and 
hateful stereotypes of homosexual men, with symbolic fangs out and dripping, 
on an unstoppable “sexhunt.”175 In this instance, it is Obergefell and 
Obergefell alone that decides where and how and against whom “the sexual 
                                                                                                                     
 171 See id. 
 172 There’s a cross-reference to be noted here to Justice Scalia’s Windsor dissent, 
where it focuses on the Windsor Court’s hunger: “The Court is eager—hungry—to tell 
everyone its view of the legal question at the heart of this case.” United States v. Windsor, 
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2698 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Along related lines, Robert Bork 
spoke of “the habit of legislating policy from the bench, once acquired,” as “addictive and 
hence by no means confined to constitutional cases.” BORK, supra note 53, at 16. 
 173 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 
367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 174 See id. at 2622.  
 175 The term is John Rechy’s. JOHN RECHY, THE SEXUAL OUTLAW 28, 71, 163, 245, 
247, 284–85, 299 (1977); see also JOHN RECHY, CITY OF NIGHT (1963). Recognizing this is 
a homophobic stereotype does not mean that this is the only way the image can work. 
Transvalued accounts are not only in Rechy’s work, but also in DENNIS COOPER, CLOSER 
(1989); DENNIS COOPER, FRISK (1991); DENNIS COOPER, GUIDE (1997); DENNIS COOPER, 
PERIOD (2000); DENNIS COOPER, THE TENDERNESS OF THE WOLVES (1982); DENNIS 
COOPER, TRY (1994); JEAN GENET, MIRACLE OF THE ROSE (Bernard Frechtman trans., 
Grove Press, Inc. 1966) (1951) [hereinafter GENET, MIRACLE OF THE ROSE]; JEAN GENET, 
THE THIEF’S JOURNAL (Bernard Frechtman trans., Grove Press, Inc. 1964) (1949) 
[hereinafter GENET, THIEF’S JOURNAL]; GARY INDIANA, HORSE CRAZY (1989); and OSCAR 
WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY (Michael Patrick Gillespie ed., W.W. Norton & 
Co., Inc. 2d ed. 2007) (1890). Other sources in this tradition can be found in Marc 
Spindelman, Sexual Freedom’s Shadows, 23 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 179, 190–206 (2011) 
(review essay). 
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powers” of marriage—powers that Obergefell usurps and reverses to target 
heterosexual men—“may [and will] be used.”176 
Any lingering skepticism that the rhetoric of the Chief Justice’s Obergefell 
dissent is suffused with imagery that represents Obergefell as involved in acts 
of sexual mastery targeting heteropatriarchal male authority, hence 
heterosexual men, accomplished by forced sodomy, ought to be put to rest no 
later than when the dissent reaches its own substantive end. Drawing to a 
close, immediately before adding a coda, almost in paroxysm, the dissent 
reaches a certain crescendo of metaphor and tone.  
The dissent affirms its appreciation that the powers Obergefell exercises to 
redefine marriage may be “tantalizing” to future “Members of this Court.”177 
In saying this, the dissent formally disclaims the experience of these powers 
for itself, though, in order to disavow it this way, it must have had the 
experience, tasting, however fleetingly, what is “tantalizing”178 about 
Obergefell’s deployments of power, before rejecting it. Armed this way with 
an experience and understanding of the pleasures of wielding the powers of 
mastery as Obergefell does, or perhaps it is the pleasures of having those 
powers lorded over it, the dissent immediately distances itself from these 
sensations. The indication is that is has settled into an experience of Obergefell 
that is the opposite of “tantalizing”179: by turns, dizzying, vertiginous, 
consistent with boundaries having been violated, which they imaginarily have 
been on multiple occasions by this point in the dissent. Whatever else it is, this 
is not the same experience of delight the opinion describes others potentially 
having.180 
Lacking the security of history and tradition and the Court’s pre-
Obergefell identification with the Founding Fathers to supply it protections 
against Obergefell’s naked preferences and erotic predations, the dissent 
indicates an intense sense of unease, of wooziness even, in the face of the 
present tense Obergefell has hurled it, along with the Court, into. Hence the 
dissent’s reference to the crushing weight of “the heady days of the here and 
now” that Obergefell has placed it under.181 What the Court and the pro-same-
sex-marriage forces it has aligned itself with may feel as exhilarating 
“headiness”—a phenomenology of freedom itself—the dissent experiences 
                                                                                                                     
 176 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Poe, 367 U.S. at 
546 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). For a bit of context on Justice Harlan’s view, see Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978), and Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex 
Bureaucracy, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 881, 887 (2016). 
 177 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2622 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 See id. 
 181 Id. at 2623. It may be worth recalling in this setting, see infra text accompanying 
notes 182–84, that freedom can be a vertiginous and even a nauseating experience. See, 
e.g., JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, NAUSEA (Lloyd Alexander trans., New Directions Publ’g Corp. 
1964) (1959); see also DREAD: THE DIZZINESS OF FREEDOM (Juha van ʼt Zelfde ed., 2013). 
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painfully and melancholically in the register of dread about the so-called 
freedom the majority and its supporters are celebrating.182 While the dissent 
repeatedly claims it does not begrudge the celebrations it knows Obergefell 
will inspire, it most certainly does, saying more than once that they have 
nothing whatsoever to do with the Constitution as Obergefell purports is the 
case.183 The logic of the dissent’s rhetoric at the end of its opinion illuminates 
the reasons for this ironic stance of pretending to countenance celebrations of 
Obergefell with equanimity while clearly resenting them: The revelry it 
expects to follow in Obergefell’s wake is the celebration of unconstitutional, 
lawless domination in a decision that claims to respect freedom but is about its 
elimination, performing, hence endorsing, political, as well as sexual, 
conditions of slave-like servitude.184 To understand this point of view makes 
sense of the language and tone of this portion of the opinion, which, at times, 
somehow evokes shifting sensations of vulnerability, adriftness, lostness, 
violation, in the spirit of a feeling of being naked, violated, and wounded, 
curled up in a ball of agony after being sexually mastered, the Obergefellian 
victim in silenced humiliation, surrender, and defeat, driven to the ground like 
the once-proud forces of Southern “Rebellion” at Appomattox. So far from 
being tantalized, the dissent at this point evokes an experience of traumatic, or 
post-traumatic, shock. 
Clearly resentful about what Obergefell has done, the dissent beats a 
retreat amidst this dizzying confusion produced by violation to an interior 
space of clarity from which it can and does rise above the abject woundedness 
of its situation to explain that it need not and should not have been brought 
about. Writing as though it has hit upon—or been driven to a point where it 
has discovered—an inner reservoir of dignity from which to reimagine its 
predicament, the dissent explains that what Obergefell has wrought need not 
have happened and must not be repeated in the future. In an unusually 
optimistic and wistful rush, situated in an opinion otherwise rife with images 
of chaos and violence and Cassandra-like talk of doom, the dissent 
momentarily abandons visions of Obergefell’s violent predations in order to 
reach for a vision of the Court in which it is released from the need to speak in 
                                                                                                                     
 182 This dissent’s position could be understood as a reflection of a yearning for what 
Peter Gabel has referred to as “the pact of the withdrawn selves.” See generally Peter 
Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 
62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984). But see generally Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: 
Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987). 
 183 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611–12, 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Observations 
on Obergefell’s lack of proper constitutional ground are also found in id. at 2616–24. 
 184 The expectation of revelry finds expression in id. at 2626. Toni Massaro describes 
the Chief Justice’s dissent’s ironic stance in relation to celebrations over Obergefell as 
“clenched-teeth sarcasm.” Massaro, supra note 3, at 338–39. For a different treatment, see 
Seidman, supra note 12, at 143.  
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the erstwhile voice of heteropatriarchal authority that might be associated with 
the Founding Fathers.185  
At just this juncture, the dissent begins to speak in more qualitatively 
feminine registers. Paralleling the “ricochet[ing]” between paternal and 
maternal metaphors that Kendall Thomas saw at work in Bowers v. Hardwick, 
the Chief Justice’s Obergefell dissent adopts a maternal and highly moralistic 
stance.186 From it, the dissent decries the majority opinion as “both prideful 
and unwise,” having already bemoaned its capacity to “sully” people of faith 
who would resist it, attempting, like the dissent, to defend marriage’s historical 
and traditional meanings in the present day.187 At the very same instant, the 
dissent, breaking from the present, vaults itself into an imagined future in 
which Obergefell’s mastery has itself been overcome. In that situation, the 
Court appears in the dissent’s language to be a prim and proper ladylike vessel 
of the Constitution, which uses the Court’s powers in ways that are “more 
modest and restrained” than Obergefell, “more sensitive,” “more attuned” to 
the “proper bounds” of judicial power than Obergefell, “less pretentious” than 
the majority, and showing greater respect for “the bonds of . . . history and 
tradition,” which exist to guard against the perversions of the Constitution by 
the Court.188 In this future condition, the Court is ready to hold tight to the 
judicial vows of interpretive fidelity, interpretive chastity, to the Constitution 
and to the prelapsarian past. In this dreamed-of future, the Court, dedicated to 
not repeating Obergefell’s mistakes of self-indulgent vow-breaking and 
interpretive excess—excess that, in this setting, remains erotically charged—is 
a Court that is fully dedicated to respecting “the bonds of . . . history and 
tradition.”189 
This dreaming looks to be incredibly hopeful, but the dissent harmonizes 
its vision by setting it in the key of a lament. This is, after all, a restoration 
after Obergefell’s devastation. This is, after all, a situation that follows a ruling 
that masters the Constitution through an opinion the “driving themes” of 
which are what the Court desires and what same-sex desiring petitioners 
want.190 This is, after all, a future that comes after a ruling in Obergefell that 
                                                                                                                     
 185 Of course, this might not actually be an optimistic and wistful rush at all, only 
another form of denial of the intensity of the negative experiences it has registered in 
relation to the majority’s text. 
 186 Thomas, supra note 11, at 1823. Alternatively, it might be possible to follow 
Thomas’s account of a seemingly similar gender reversal in the context of Bowers v. 
Hardwick, and thus to say that the Chief Justice’s Obergefell dissent is staging a gender 
“reversal into its opposite,” id. at 1821 (quoting Freud, Instincts and Their Vicissitudes, 
supra note 26, at 126–27), in order to excuse or exempt itself from the sexual attentions of 
what in this setting initially appears to be a homosexualized force of male-male sexual 
predation. See supra note 26. 
 187 The language of “both prideful and unwise” is from Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting), and “sully” from id. at 2626. 
 188 See id. 
 189 See id. 
 190 See id. at 2618–19. 
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has, as the dissent characterizes it, “burst” the bonds of history and tradition, 
though the dissent does not say it: wide open.191  
And so it is that with this image of historical and traditional bonds, once 
held to tightly, as part of the Court’s project of keeping faith with the 
Constitution and maintaining its text intact, bonds that Obergefell’s 
illegitimate privations have ruptured, that the dissent’s substantive argument 
against comes to a halt.192 The dissent’s own final formal visual 
representation, its final picture of Obergefell, is as a decision that, through its 
aggressive application of substantive due process doctrine resulting from the 
indulgence of the naked policy preferences of its “Members,” produces a 
gaping hole in the Constitution’s text.  
In view of the dissent’s erotic imagery, of forced sodomy in particular, this 
reference to the bonds of history and tradition being burst like this, resulting in 
the production of a hole in the Constitution, is readily suited to interpretation 
as an indication—a manifestation—of a sexual trauma that involves something 
“most sensitive”193 previously held tight that has now been forced open and 
wrecked. The dissent’s metaphors of apparent scenes of sexual predation 
involving repeated acts of anal sodomy targeting heterosexual men are such 
that no real leap of imagination is required to appreciate what this hole is in a 
symbolic sense. Whether this state of affairs, in which heteropatriarchal phallic 
power has been exploded from within, can be repaired, less recovered from, 
the dissent, not at all hopeful about the future under Obergefell, refuses to 
accept it with total resignation in the register of utter despair. The dream it 
thus dreams aloud is of a future in which the ruined Constitution and the Court 
that has ruined it have been elevated to a state of presently lost grace. In it, the 
Court will have returned to interpretive practices, less sexual than chaste: 
“modest and restrained,” “sensitive,” “attuned” to the “proper bounds” of 
judicial authority, and faithful to the teachings and the authority of the past as 
the guide on its path.194 Obergefell wantonly sacrifices all this, but however 
dim the future is, it may not be completely irretrievable, even if it is the case, 
as the dissent’s maternal metaphors suggest, that the heteropatriarchal 
authority of the Founding Fathers and subsequent generations has been 
sacrificed in ways that leave it open to the Court to serve, at most, as a 
                                                                                                                     
 191 See id. at 2626. “[U]nder the heading ‘imagos of the fragmented body,’” Jacques 
Lacan “group[s] together” “images of castration, emasculation, mutilation, 
dismemberment, dislocation, evisceration, devouring, and bursting open of the body.” 
JACQUES LACAN, Aggressiveness in Psychoanalysis, in ÉCRITS: A SELECTION 10, 13 (Bruce 
Fink trans., W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 2002) (1966). 
 192 This locution accounts for the final coda in the dissent. 
 193 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 194 See id. at 2626. 
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“maternal vessel” for the Constitution.195 Even in that unmanned capacity, 
very great things may result.196 
G. Persecution, Unmanning, Panics: An Initial Look 
These are the dreams of Obergefell that are found in the Chief Justice’s 
dissent’s text. What is to be made of them?  
One hypothesis for understanding begins by returning to Freud’s account 
of Daniel Schreber’s case. According to Freud, Schreber’s erotic delusions of 
persecution and unmanning were attendant upon and resulted from a certain 
breakthrough of previously repressed homosexual desires that had long 
coexisted with his conscious and acted-upon heterosexual sexual object 
choices.197 If this was true of Schreber’s case, might it not also be true of the 
Chief Justice’s dissent’s dreams of Obergefell’s sexually mastering—both 
persecuting and unmanning—heterosexual men? Might these dreams not be 
taken as indications that homosexual sexual investments, if only on an 
unconscious level, function along with an active heterosexuality as psychic 
drivers within the text of the dissent?198 
Posed this way, the answer must be in the negative: There are no pure, 
unadulterated homosexual desires to be found in the dissent’s fantasies of the 
sexual mastery of heterosexual men. Not that those desires are totally absent, 
only that matters are more complicated than that. 
Closer to the mark, without falling out of step with Schreber’s sexual 
delusions of persecution and of unmanning, is a hypothesis holding that the 
dissent’s fantasies of heterosexual men’s sexual mastery, considered with the 
opinion’s larger rhetorical structure, give evidence of a textbook case of an 
anti-gay homosexual sexual panic. In it, homosexual desires are complexly 
and ambivalently felt, and ultimately denied through an impassioned refutation 
that would decimate Obergefell, figured as the external source and 
embodiment of those desires.  
To bring these dynamics into sharper focus, the dissent’s fantasies about 
Obergefell’s sexual mastery of heterosexual men generally record psychic 
experiences of the perfect substitutability of same-sex for cross-sex sex, a 
substitution that is fully in keeping with Obergefell’s declaration of the basic 
normative equivalence of the sexual forms.199 In the imaginary realm figured 
                                                                                                                     
 195 See Thomas, supra note 11, at 1821 (describing “the dominant figural self-
representation” of the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick as that of the “maternal vessel of the 
Constitution”); see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613–15, 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 196 This is differently demonstrated by the majority opinion in the case. 
 197 See, e.g., Freud, Psycho-Analytic Notes, supra note 23, at 59–61.  
 198 This might help explain why, within the dissent, Obergefell’s imaginary sexual 
predations have discernibly homosexual sexual dimensions.  
 199 For Obergefell’s account of the normative equivalence, see Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2598–605. As a general proposition, it remains the case that “[g]ay and straight 
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by the dissent, heterosexual men are sexually treated by Obergefell, a pro-
homosexual opinion that looks to be a deeply homosexualized force, the way 
that heterosexual women are more often treated by heterosexual men: phallus-
less and subject to sexual subordination by a phallus through penetration. 
Although the dissent’s rhetoric characterizes Obergefell’s acts of sexual 
mastery as involving force and as being against heterosexual male victims’ 
wills, these imaginary acts can in fact be neither. On the psychic plane, no 
material action, hence no real non-consent to it, can be found. This is why the 
dissent’s fantasies of heterosexual men being sexually mastered by Obergefell 
are properly understood as fantasies: manifestations of desires that are on 
some textual level affirmatively felt.200 That these desires are intensely 
erotically charged is suggested in context by the dissent’s multiplication of 
them through repetition.201 In this sense, when Obergefell sexually masters 
heterosexual men, whether by castration or forced sodomy undertaken 
violently and non-consensually, or both, it delivers to the dissent exactly what 
its dreaming indicates it sexually wants. Then again, it couldn’t not. The acts 
of sexual mastery that Obergefell performs, reflecting the dissent’s own 
fantasies, are onanistic means by which the dissent dreams and practically 
satisfies itself.202 
The presence of these affirmative desires, though, is not unchecked in the 
Chief Justice’s dissent, its desires themselves are not unambivalently felt. 
Eventually, perhaps at just that moment when the fantasies reach their fevered 
pitch of violence and destruction (though, really, the precise dynamics remain 
elusive), the thought has evidently dawned on the dissent that its desires for 
the homosexualized sexual mastery of heterosexual men that Obergefell 
entails constitute a traumatic loss.203 To realize and to manifest these desires is 
                                                                                                                     
marriages are both alike and unalike along an infinite number of dimensions,” Seidman, 
supra note 12, at 127, a point that holds both across and within identitarian lines. 
 200 On fantasy as desire affirmatively felt, consider Freud’s observation: “No other 
kind of ‘Yes’ can be extracted from the unconscious; there is no such thing at all as an 
unconscious ‘No’.” Sigmund Freud, Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (1905), 
reprinted in 7 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF 
SIGMUND FREUD, supra note 26, at 3, 57.  
 201 As Roland Barthes elaborates, “repetition itself creates bliss.” ROLAND BARTHES, 
THE PLEASURE OF THE TEXT 41 (Richard Miller trans., Hill & Wang 1975) (1973). For a 
recent engagement with “repetition” in Freud’s work, see generally M. Andrew Holowchak 
& Michael Lavin, Beyond the Death Drive: The Future of “Repetition” and “Compulsion 
to Repeat” in Psychopathology, 32 PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCH. 645 (2015). 
 202 As Freud offers in The Interpretation of Dreams: “[A] dream is the fulfillment of a 
wish.” SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS (FIRST PART) (1900), reprinted 
in 4 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND 
FREUD at xi, 121 (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1953) (emphasis omitted). Discussion of 
refinements can be found in in PETER GAY, FREUD: A LIFE FOR OUR TIME 107–09 (1988). 
 203 The dynamic relationship between fantasy and trauma—wherein fantasy is 
identified as a possible source of trauma—is not unproblematically rendered in Freud’s 
work. One flashpoint has circled around Freud’s “seduction theory,” see generally 
Sigmund Freud, The Aetiology of Hysteria (1896), reprinted in 3 The STANDARD EDITION 
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to achieve the forfeiture of the status, authority, and psychic satisfactions that 
come with being a heterosexual male sexual subject who takes his own 
heterosexual sexual objects—females—in sex.204 At some point in this 
progression, this psychic experience of loss overcomes and displaces dream-
level desires for homosexualized sexual subordination. As that happens, a 
transvaluation of the dissent’s fantasies takes place. They are reconfigured 
from dreams into nightmares to be avoided by any means. While this process 
of transformation ultimately drives the dissent to deny any desires for 
homosexualized sexual mastery, the desires that were, to a certain point, the 
dissent’s own, do not disappear. They are externalized, projected onto others, 
like those who are said to find Obergefell’s deployments of power 
“tantalizing.” Those who delight over, even celebrate, the traumatic suffering 
of the now heterosexual victims of Obergefell’s homosexualized sexual 
mastery are subject to the intense critical and resentful heat of the dissent, 
energies that manifest in the opinion’s deployment of the tools available to 
it—chiefly, tools of doctrine and tools of rhetoric—to attempt to take down 
Obergefell, the projected external source of the dissent’s own phantasmatic 
trauma, figured as a force of sexual mastery that targets and ruins heterosexual 
men.205 If it is standard to think of an anti-gay homosexual panic as a psychic 
                                                                                                                     
OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 189 (James Strachey ed. & 
trans., 1962), which Freud held to for a time before abandoning it, as recounted in Sigmund 
Freud, An Autobiographical Study (1925), reprinted in 20 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE 
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 3, 33–35 (James Strachey ed. & 
trans., 1959). For reconsideration of the abandonment of the seduction theory, see JEFFREY 
MOUSSAIEFF MASSON, THE ASSAULT ON TRUTH: FREUD’S SUPPRESSION OF THE SEDUCTION 
THEORY 107–44 (1984). Additional engagement with the reconsideration effort is in JANET 
MALCOLM, IN THE FREUD ARCHIVES (1983). For the view that “no one is ever made sick by 
his fantasies,” because “[o]nly traumatic memories in repression can cause the neurosis,” 
see 3 ROBERT FLIESS, SYMBOL, DREAM, AND PSYCHOSIS 212 (1973) (emphasis omitted). 
 204 Without missing its historical specificities across space and time, aspects of this 
grammar of gender are old. For some discussion, see 2 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY 
OF SEXUALITY: THE USE OF PLEASURE 46–49, 125–30, 162–63, 176–82, 215–25 (Robert 
Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1986) (1984). The modern locution that puts the conventional 
grammar of gender in bold is Catharine MacKinnon’s: “Man fucks woman; subject verb 
object.” Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda 
for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 541 (1982). There is a return to this theme infra notes 208–09 and 
accompanying text. 
 205 If, as in some standard Gestalt dream-work, see FREDERICK L. COOLIDGE, DREAM 
INTERPRETATION AS A PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC TECHNIQUE 85–86 (2006) (discussing 
FREDERICK S. PERLS, GESTALT THERAPY VERBATIM 67 (1969)), the dreamer occupies all 
the subject positions in a dream, the dissent might be thought to occupy all the subject 
positions that its account of sexual mastery involves. If this is right, in the fantasy-
nightmare of the dissent, it is both object and subject, victim and victimizer, cause of pain 
and pleasure, all, which, if true, reveals something utterly solitary and self-referential in the 
account, perhaps marking the ultimate kind of emasculation, but anyway of narcissism, one 
mode of eroticism’s expression. See generally Sigmund Freud, On Narcissism: An 
Introduction (1914), reprinted in 14 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE 
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event in which someone seeks to “punish[] someone else for [same-sex] 
desires that are properly [that person’s] own,” the dissent shows signs of being 
in the midst of one such event.206 Conjuring Obergefell as a dream of 
homosexual sexual mastery involving castration and forced sodomy, the 
dissent, having made Obergefell into a sexual fantasy-turned-nightmare, does 
everything it can to wipe it out, lashing out at it for doing to heterosexual men 
what it itself wants done to them, hence itself. 
If the hypothesis that the Chief Justice’s dissent is in the midst of an anti-
gay homosexual panic is correct, so is a corollary: The Chief Justice’s 
dissent’s anti-gay homosexual panic implies a related panic about gender. The 
dissent’s fantasies about Obergefell’s sexual mastery of heterosexual men 
affects them, after all, not only as heterosexuals but also as heterosexual men. 
Within the historical and traditional world of male dominance and the male-
female gender binary that has been a part of it—a world that the dissent 
approves of as the basis for marriage’s constitutional form—the castration and 
forced sodomy of heterosexual men are necessarily emasculating in their 
effects.207 Both these acts invert a conventional grammar of gender—in one 
famous locution, “[m]an fucks woman; subject verb object”208—in a way that 
turns heterosexual men as sexuality’s objects into not-men, which is to say 
into women, a gender conversion whose success is demonstrated by the dissent 
no later than that moment in its closing breaths when it undertakes its own 
“sex-change” to speak in decidedly feminine registers.209  
To telescope the idea here just a bit, the dissent’s fantasies of heterosexual 
men losing their gender status as men by virtue of Obergefell’s acts of 
castration and forced sodomy are experienced, like the loss of heterosexual 
sexual status, with ambivalence. It is easy to appreciate why the dissent’s 
fantasies would generate aversion to the point of dread. What is being dreamed 
about are acts of castration and forced sodomy, right? The real wonder in this 
setting is how such fantasizing could be imagined not to produce aversion unto 
dread rising to the level of a trauma. More mystifying still is how there could 
be affirmative desire for the sexualized attacks that the dissent dreams up on 
the other side of its ambivalence. What could possibly explain a desire for 
                                                                                                                     
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD, supra note 26, at 67. Some of what this may 
be taken to suggest becomes clearer infra notes 254–65 and accompanying text. 
 206 The description of what is entailed by an anti-gay homosexual panic comes from 
Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 182, 195 
(Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004). Engagement with Halley’s work, 
though not on this point, is in Marc Spindelman, Sex Equality Panic, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER 
& L. 1 (2004). 
 207 For the dissent’s approval of the male-female gender binary as the basis for 
marriage’s constitutional form, see, for example, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2613–15, 2619 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting), and also id. at 2594 (majority opinion), 
describing, as a view that it will ultimately reject, the idea that “[m]arriage . . . is by its 
nature a gender-differentiated union of man and woman.” 
 208 MacKinnon, supra note 204, at 541. 
 209 See supra notes 186–96 and accompanying text.  
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castration’s pain or the sharp agony of anal rupture that tears heterosexual 
men’s phantasmatic anuses, like Dred Scott tore the nation, apart?210 What 
could be desirable about the idea of heterosexual men, after Obergefell’s 
sexual attacks, being forced into the unmanly position of being bloodied, 
wounded, and humiliated, in surrender and sexual defeat? 
Horrific as these forms of sexual violence and injury are to contemplate, 
even on a psychic level, they function within the dissent as forms of abjection, 
usefully understood in this context not as referring to a purely negative 
experience or affective state of total domination, but rather to a complex and 
highly contingent terrain of (by turns and all at once) violence, delight, injury, 
and pleasure, which spotlights, as the dissent itself does, the ecstatic possibility 
of a transcendent redemption, a rebirth of sorts, that occurs when it does 
precisely through and as a result of the most horrific forms of sexual 
debasement and wounding.211 Within the dissent itself, it is the sexual mastery 
unto emasculated ruin that Obergefell is imagined to perform that drives 
heterosexual men onto this unmanned, feminine ground.212 It is the sexual 
mastery resulting in emasculated ruin which Obergefell is imagined to perform 
that places these no-longer-men face-to-face at last with an untouchable 
feminine dignitary core—a dignitary core that manifests the kind of dignitary 
essence described by Justice Clarence Thomas’s dissent, according to which 
dignity inheres in the person and cannot be affected by material acts of State or 
practices of human slavery.213 Much less imaginary slavery of an erotic kind. 
The moment when the fires of Obergefell’s phantasmatic sexual predations 
burn brightest is when they crystallize to leave in their ashes something rock 
                                                                                                                     
 210 See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text. 
 211 Illustrations of abjection’s transcendent dimensions functioning this way are found, 
for example, in SCHREBER, supra note 22, at 117, 126, 129, 211–15, as well as in GENET, 
MIRACLE OF THE ROSE, supra note 175; GENET, THIEF’S JOURNAL, supra note 175; and 
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, SAINT GENET: ACTOR AND MARTYR (Bernard Frechtman trans., 
George Braziller, Inc. 1963) (1952). More recent academic engagements with the theme 
are in DEAN, UNLIMITED INTIMACY, supra note 18; DIDIER ERIBON, INSULT AND THE 
MAKING OF THE GAY SELF (Michael Lucey trans., Duke Univ. Press 2004) (1999); DAVID 
M. HALPERIN, WHAT DO GAY MEN WANT? AN ESSAY ON SEX, RISK, AND SUBJECTIVITY 
(2007); and GAY SHAME (David M. Halperin & Valerie Traub eds., 2009). For critical 
reactions (beyond those found in GAY SHAME, supra), see, for example, Judith Halberstam, 
Shame and White Gay Masculinity, 23 SOC. TEXT 219 (2005), and Hiram Perez, You Can 
Have My Brown Body and Eat It, Too!, 23 SOC. TEXT 171 (2005).  
 212 See supra text accompanying notes 193–96. 
 213 As Justice Thomas’s dissent remarks: “[H]uman dignity cannot be taken away by 
the government. Slaves did not lose their dignity (any more than they lost their humanity) 
because the government allowed them to be enslaved. Those held in internment camps did 
not lose their dignity because the government confined them.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 
S. Ct. 2584, 2639 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). This line of thought is engaged by 
Seidman, supra note 12, at 120–21.  
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solid, powerful, upright, untouchable, unreachable, and, in their own way, a 
pure experience of transcendent pleasure.214  
Beyond the castration and the forced sodomy that Obergefell’s sexual 
mastery of heterosexual men involves, and exactly in virtue of them, a new 
spirit is found and rises in the rhetoric of the Chief Justice’s dissent. Imagining 
itself achieving perfect, almost saint-like institutional conditions, and speaking 
in a pure, feminine voice, the dissent is in full contact with the idea of the 
Supreme Court assuming and undertaking its responsibilities as a chaste, 
“maternal vessel” for the Constitution—if not for the first time, then once 
again.215 As the dissent temporarily relinquishes all the violence of its own 
desire to savage Obergefell at precisely this moment, it suggests an experience 
of a majestic, even mythic, feminine power.216 This power is utterly confident 
and self-possessed in a way that reveals the dissent dreamily inhabiting a mode 
of feminine gendered existence that recognizes and affirms the pleasures of 
never being touched, much less sexually mastered, again, achieved, 
paradoxically, through phantasmatic sexual mastery that is emasculating, 
hence traumatizing.217 If the pleasures attendant upon this trauma are formally 
suppressed in the structure of an argument that neglects to mention them, they 
are nevertheless hidden in plain sight in rhetoric that signals a clear impulse to 
destroy Obergefell, their source, treated by the dissent as the proper object of 
punishment for gender-based fantasies that are really all of the dissent’s own 
devising.  
H. Deeper Grounds: A Picture Emerges 
One reason for venturing these explanations of the Chief Justice’s 
dissent’s fantasies about Obergefell’s sexual mastery of heterosexual men as 
                                                                                                                     
 214 Reflections on queerness and “untouchability,” in the register of “Christ’s words to 
Mary Magdalene after his resurrection: ‘Noli me tangere’ (Don’t touch me),” or Leslie 
Feinberg’s line from Stone Butch Blues that, “Touch is something I could never take for 
granted,” appear in Heather K. Love, Emotional Rescue, in GAY SHAME, supra note 211, at 
256, 264–65. Love comments: “Untouchability runs deep in queer experience.” Id. at 264. 
Continuing: 
“Noli me tangere” is . . . an apt motto for queer historical experience, but its effects 
are unpredictable. While it serves as protection against the blows of normal life, the 
family, and homophobic violence, it also works against other forms of community and 
affiliation, including, of course, queer community. 
Id. at 265. The idea in the text imagines other versions of the experience, queer or not, 
gendered in particular ways, along these general lines. 
 215 See Thomas, supra note 11, at 1821. 
 216 For discussion of the majestic feminine, see generally, for example, JOSEPH 
CAMPBELL, GODDESSES: MYSTERIES OF THE FEMININE DIVINE (Safron Rossi ed., 2013). 
Further discussion is in ORIT KAMIR, EVERY BREATH YOU TAKE: STALKING NARRATIVES 
AND THE LAW 19–42 (2001). 
 217 See supra note 214. 
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hypotheses for understanding is that, however accurate they are, they present 
at most only part of a picture. Fundamentally, the dissent’s anti-gay and 
gender panics unfold on a larger panic-ridden field. On which, heterosexual 
men’s sexual undoing as heterosexuals and as men is nothing less than a 
precondition for an active process by which heterosexual men are 
“transformed” into sexual subjects of a wholly different sort.218 Reconstituted 
by Obergefell, heterosexual men’s sexual mastery involves their reconstitution 
as erotic beings who, no longer exclusively heterosexually- or male-identified, 
are defined by a broad and fluid array of sexual subject positions that speak to 
an eroticism that is polymorphously perverse.219 
The crucial sign of these possibilities emerges in the Chief Justice’s 
dissent as it subtly supplies a perspective on Obergefell in which it appears as 
an embodied force that performs the sexual mastery—both the castration and 
the forced sodomy—that the dissent fantasizes about. Delivering its bottom-
line reasons for concluding that the Supreme Court’s right-to-privacy case law, 
including Lawrence v. Texas, offers marriage equality no constitutional 
protections, the dissent observes that privacy doctrine is unavailing in 
Obergefell because marriage equality advocates “do not seek privacy” but 
something “[q]uite the opposite” of it.220 What that opposite is, according to 
the dissent, is “public recognition of their relationships, along with 
corresponding government benefits.”221 
This account of the pro-marriage-equality aims behind the Obergefell 
litigation exposes privacy doctrine’s alignment with the Constitution’s deepest 
fault lines.222 Privacy doctrine will not give marriage equality advocates what 
they want, the dissent explains, because the right to privacy is a “right to be let 
                                                                                                                     
 218 The language of “transformation” is found in Freud’s study on Schreber, see, e.g., 
Freud, Psycho-Analytic Notes, supra note 23, at 16–17, 20–21, in Schreber’s 
autobiography, see, e.g., SCHREBER, supra note 22, at 73, and—repeatedly—in the Chief 
Justice’s dissent, see supra note 157. 
 219 See Polymorphous, adj., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/E 
ntry/147248?redirectedFrom=polymorphous#eid [https://perma.cc/2CLK-ACQG] (defining the 
term “polymorphous perverse,” a “[s]pecial use[]” of “polymorphous,” as “designating or 
characterized by sexuality that can be excited and gratified in many ways, and is regarded 
as normal in young children but abnormal in adults”); see also id. (“The constitutional 
sexual predisposition of the child is more irregularly multifarious than one would expect, 
that it deserves to be called ‘polymorphous-perverse’, and that from this predisposition the 
so-called normal behavior of the sexual functions results through a repression of certain 
components.” (quoting SIGMUND FREUD, SELECT PAPERS ON HYSTERIA AND OTHER 
PSYCHONEUROSIS 191 (A.A. Brill trans., 1909))). Another sense of the term in Freud’s 
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, as noted by id., makes clear that “under the 
influence of seduction children can become polymorphously perverse.” FREUD, THREE 
ESSAYS, supra note 26, at 191; see also id. at 232–33. The use of the term in the text 
follows the initial definition without losing sight of the other. 
 220 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2620 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 221 Id. 
 222 See id. at 2619–20; see also infra notes 224–25 and accompanying text.  
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alone.”223 Being a freedom from governmental action, the right to privacy 
entails no positive entitlements to State action, which is what marriage 
equality advocates seek.  
In saying this, the dissent brings to mind the obvious point that the Court’s 
right-to-privacy case law, like all constitutional doctrine on some level, has 
developed in the shadow of the Constitution’s basic orientation as a charter of 
negative, not positive, rights.224 This idea, or one very much like it, is what the 
dissent has in mind when it observes, in the sentence that is key for 
introducing some colorful and ultimately telling imagery, that: The Supreme 
Court has “consistently refused to allow litigants to convert the shield 
provided by constitutional liberties into a sword to demand positive 
entitlements from the State.”225 Doctrinally, it follows from this that marriage 
equality, amounting to a demand for State action, is inconsistent with the right 
to privacy, as it is inconsistent with the precepts of the constitutional order. No 
constitutional doctrine could, therefore, properly support it. 
Bracketing what Obergefell recognizes—that discriminatory line drawing 
by the State in defining marriage is state action that the State, consistent with 
the negative Constitution, can be required not to undertake—from the 
perspective of the dissent, Obergefell’s recognition of constitutional marriage 
equality, partly building on the Court’s right-to-privacy doctrine, achieves 
what “consistent” past practice by the Court never has allowed.226 Obergefell, 
to use the dissent’s expression, lets “litigants . . . convert the shield provided 
by constitutional liberties into a sword to demand positive entitlements from 
the State.”227 Naturally, in order for the Court to give these constitutional 
                                                                                                                     
 223 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 n.10 (1972)). 
 224 There are other treatments of the point in the Obergefell dissents. See, e.g., id. at 
2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Since well before 1787, liberty has been understood as 
freedom from government action, not entitlement to government benefits.”); id. at 2634 
(“In the American legal tradition, liberty has long been understood as individual freedom 
from governmental action, not as a right to a particular governmental entitlement.”); id. at 
2637 (“[O]ur Constitution is a ‘collection of “Thou shalt nots,” not “Thou shalt 
provides.”’” (citation omitted) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 9 (1957) (plurality 
opinion))); see also id. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“These cases ask us to decide 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment contains a limitation that requires the States to license 
and recognize marriages between two people of the same sex.” (emphasis added)); cf. id. at 
2640 n.1 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing the dissent’s use of “the phrase ‘recognize 
marriage’ as shorthand for issuing marriage licenses and conferring those special benefits 
and obligations provided under state law for married persons”). 
 225 Id. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). For commentary on positive and negative 
rights in the literature on Obergefell, see, for example, Appleton, supra note 76, at 929–31, 
933–41, 942 n.143, 949–53; Kari E. Hong, Obergefell’s Sword: The Liberal State Interest 
in Marriage, 2016 ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1438–39; Powell, supra note 10, at 72–73, 76; 
Seidman, supra note 12, at 139–41; and Yoshino, supra note 3, at 159–62, 167–69. 
 226 The precise term the dissent uses is “consistently.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2620 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 227 Id.; see also supra note 225. 
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powers to lesbians, gay men, and same-sex couples, it must have them in hand 
itself. Possession by the Court in this setting, though, is scarcely nine-tenths of 
the law. It is constitutional mischief. More than theft, the Court steals a 
constitutional power that does not belong to it. Nor could it. Properly, no 
constitutional sword even exists.228 
It is scarcely possible to overstate the significance of this general point. 
The dissent’s reasoning indicates that, in delivering marriage equality rights, 
Obergefell undertakes a radical transformation of the Constitution in ways that 
no Supreme Court decision before it ever has.229 Before Obergefell, the 
Supreme Court’s powers of judicial review encompassed the tremendous, but 
limited, power to review State action for its conformity with a basically 
negative Constitution. After Obergefell, the Court possesses this tremendous 
power plus the heretofore unheard of, unthinkable, and limitless general power 
to demand State action in order to vindicate positive constitutional rights. This 
may help explain the observation in Justice Scalia’s separate dissent that 
Obergefell “is the furthest extension in fact—and the furthest extension one 
can even imagine—of the Court’s claimed power to create ‘liberties’ that the 
Constitution and its Amendments neglect to mention.”230 Not even Lochner 
nor Dred Scott, the most extreme and illegitimate examples of the traditional 
powers of judicial review, went as far as Obergefell does.231 From this 
perspective, it is as the Chief Justice’s dissent says: Obergefell finds no 
bearing in either the Constitution or any of the Court’s precedents.232 
However colorful the dissent’s imagery of constitutional shield and sword 
may generally be, as a doctrinal matter it is bloodless and unexceptional. It 
serves jurisprudentially as a mere means by which the dissent recounts 
constitutional axioms that, in its estimation, the Obergefell Court has 
renounced. 
As it happens, the ideas of negative and positive constitutional rights 
underlying the imagery of shield and sword do not surface in Obergefell for 
the first time in the Chief Justice’s dissent.233 In addition to being traceable to 
                                                                                                                     
 228 At least not as a weapon that the courts wield. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair 
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 
1212, 1220–28 (1978); see also LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A 
THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004). These remarks, of course, are in 
the context of domestic U.S. constitutional law. 
 229 Some, differently sympathetic to Obergefell, have noted the possibility with a 
different sensibility. See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 76, at 950–53; Yoshino, supra note 3, 
at 168–69.  
 230 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 231 See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled in part by 
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 
(1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 232 See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). This perspective 
should be taken into account when criticizing the Chief Justice’s dissent for announcing 
that the Constitution “ha[s] nothing to do with it.” Id. 
 233 See id. at 2620. 
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arguments made by State defenders of traditional marriage, the invocation of 
these images in the dissent echoes symbolic associations that are found of all 
places in the Obergefell Court’s own majority opinion.234  
Like United States v. Windsor, and Lawrence v. Texas before it, 
Obergefell cloaks itself in the mantle of justice, the great symbol of which, it 
hardly needs saying, is Lady Justice: a blindfolded but fearsome woman who, 
in one hand, holds disc-like shields that serve as the great balance she 
impartially measures, and who, in the other, brandishes the great sword that 
she wields as the balance requires.235 Obergefell thus portrays itself as a 
justice-delivering ruling that invites others to see it in these terms. When the 
Chief Justice’s dissent accepts this invitation, it recognizes Obergefell’s self-
presentation, noting the way the ruling is based on the majority’s evolved 
sense of the “nature of injustice.”236 But seeing this picture, the dissent 
expresses the view that Obergefell’s self-portrait as a justice-delivering ruling 
less honors than discredits it. For the Court to do justice this way is not for it to 
do constitutional law as it should. Nor could it, to the extent that doing justice 
like this involves wielding both a constitutional shield and sword. 
Recalling that within the Chief Justice’s dissent Obergefell’s lawless 
mastery operates on a sexual plane, it is sexually significant for the dissent to 
configure Obergefell as bearing both a shield and a sword.237 In this setting, 
                                                                                                                     
 234 For relevant arguments about positive and negative constitutional rights in the State 
briefs defending state bans on same-sex marriage, see Brief for Respondent at 24, 27, 
DeBoer v. Snyder, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-571) [hereinafter DeBoer Respondent 
Brief]; Brief for Respondent at 14, 20, 39, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556); Brief 
of Respondents at 26, Tanco v. Haslam, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-562). Indeed, the 
Michigan brief in DeBoer v. Snyder invokes the language of constitutional “shield” and 
“sword,” observing: “The petitioners request a transformation of the substantive-due-
process doctrine from one that protects negative rights as a shield into one that guarantees 
positive rights as a sword—a change that would have far-reaching impacts in areas of the 
law that have nothing to do with marriage.” DeBoer Respondent Brief, supra, at 27. On the 
symbolic associations in Obergefell, see infra notes 235–36 and accompanying text. 
 235 For examples of how, certainly from Lawrence on, the Supreme Court’s lesbian 
and gay rights rulings have proudly been presented as justice-delivering rulings, see 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675, 2689, 2695–96 (2013); and Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. The now-classic image of 
justice as blindfolded was not always thus. Costas Douzinas, A Legal Phenomenology of 
Images, in LAW AND ART: JUSTICE, ETHICS AND AESTHETICS, supra note 40, at 247, 252–
53. An engaging study on the iconography of justice is in JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS 
CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES 
AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011). 
 236 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612, 2621, 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 
2598 (majority opinion)). 
 237 Along these lines, it may be worth noting that Obergefell on this level replicates a 
move that can be seen to be operating in slightly different terms in Windsor, a decision in 
which the Court’s opinion aligns itself with the evolution of thinking on same-sex marriage 
as reflected in the laws of the State of New York. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689. In the 
course of protecting New York’s laws, hence identifying with the State, Windsor brings 
itself into a relation with its symbolic representation: the Statue of Liberty. Perhaps 
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shield and sword are not simply symbols that Obergefell somehow holds in 
hand, but references to bodily configurations. Within the standard Western 
archive of sexual and gender imagery, the shield, with its power of negation, 
along with the sword, with its power to undertake and to command action, are, 
respectively, references to (can you guess?) feminine and masculine energies 
that themselves signify sexualized and gendered body parts: female and male 
genitalia. Hidden beneath its robes, Obergefell, this armed creature lawlessly 
doing justice, this figure that imposes its “naked . . . preferences” on the 
nation, mastering democracy, mastering marriage, including marriage’s 
historical and traditional masters—heterosexual men—has two sex organs: a 
vagina/shield and penis/sword.238 Seen this way, within the dissent Obergefell 
is a hermaphroditic power, a he-she-they being, Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite, 
a kind of monster that undertakes the sexual mastery of heterosexual men.239 
Nor is this the only appearance of a hermaphroditic force in the Chief 
Justice’s dissent. Key to the dissent’s explanation of why the Constitution 
protects only cross-sex marriage is a human figure that, like Obergefell-the-
hermaphrodite, combines man-woman and male-female attributes, including 
male and female sexual body parts, while representing something more than its 
elements in its distinctive combination of them. To say this is loosely to refer 
to marriage as the institutional manifestation of the male-female union as 
husband and wife, but it is even more exactly a means of invoking the 
biological combination—“the first bond of union”240—that, in species-typical 
functioning, “naturally” produces the children whom marriage, according to 
                                                                                                                     
coincidentally or perhaps not, this Lady Liberty sports on her head a shield-like crown-
wreath out of which jut what appear to be multiple sword-like spikes. 
 238 The quoted language “naked . . . preferences” is, in the original, “naked policy 
preferences.” Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 239 Important work on intersexuality and the law, which underscores the history of 
discrimination against intersex persons, is undertaken by JULIE A. GREENBERG, 
INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW (2012). An important perspective on intersex issues and 
trauma is offered by Moonhawk River Stone, Approaching Critical Mass: An Exploration 
of the Role of Intersex Allies in Creating Positive Education, Advocacy and Change, 12 
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 353, 354–57 (2005). Bearing in mind the mapping of intersex 
and trans identities that Stone sketches, id. at 359–61, and without overlooking how “many 
in the intersex movement have shifted away from an identity politics model,” Julie 
Greenberg et al., Beyond the Binary: What Can Feminists Learn from Intersex and 
Transgender Jurisprudence?, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13, 14 (2010) (quoting 
Greenberg’s remarks), and that a critical trans politics does, as well, see generally DEAN 
SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, AND THE 
LIMITS OF LAW (2011), it should be recognized that this is not the only reading of the figure 
of Obergefell in the Chief Justice’s dissent that might be offered.  
 240 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“For since the 
reproductive instinct is by nature’s gift the common possession of all living creatures, the 
first bond of union is that between husband and wife . . . .” (quoting MARCUS TULLIUS 
CICERO, DE OFFICIIS bk.1, at 57 (E.H. Warmington ed., Walter Miller trans., Harvard Univ. 
Press 1913) (c. 44 B.C.E.))). 
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the dissent, centrally exists to protect.241 Although the dissent does not 
anywhere depict cross-sex sexual union, its account of what marriage is 
about—and for—presupposes “natural” male-female sexual intercourse.242 
Within the dissent’s mindset, heterosexual coitus is an essential, maybe the 
most essential, feature of what marriage symbolizes and secularly 
sacralizes.243 A vision of the two-in-one-flesh union of man and woman that 
operates through their sexual conjunction as a single reproductive force that, 
for so long as it lasts, is made up of them both, is imbedded in the dissent’s 
normative structure. The conjugal couple at marriage’s core is, like Obergefell, 
a man-woman, male-female, but also greater than the sum of its parts.244 Think 
here of the lines from Ovid’s Metamorphoses, in which “a lovestruck water 
nymph named Salmacis attempts to seduce Hermaphroditus, the son of 
Hermes and Aphrodite, at the edge of her fountain,”245 and who, when 
Hermaphroditus “rejects her advances, . . . asks the gods to join them forever,” 
the result being “a single creature of fused male and female body parts”:246  
The gods heard her prayer. For their two bodies, joined together as they were, 
were merged in one, with one face and form for both. As when one grafts a 
twig on some tree, he sees the branches grow one, and with common life 
come to maturity, so were these two bodies knit in close embrace: they were 
no longer two, nor such as to be called, one, woman, and one, man. They 
seemed neither, and yet both.247 
                                                                                                                     
 241 Id.; accord id. at 2641 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“For millennia, marriage was 
inextricably linked to the one thing that only an opposite-sex couple can do: procreate.”).  
 242 See id. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The premises supporting this concept of 
marriage are so fundamental that they rarely require articulation. The human race must 
procreate to survive. Procreation occurs through sexual relations between a man and a 
woman.”). 
 243 See id. 
 244 A variation on this view is found in the majority opinion. See id. at 2594 (majority 
opinion) (“[Marriage’s] dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found 
alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just two persons.”); id. at 2608 (“In forming a 
marital union, two people become something greater than once they were.”); see also id. at 
2599 (“Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and 
intimate to the degree of being sacred.” (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
486 (1965))). 
 245 Leah DeVun, The Jesus Hermaphrodite: Science and Sex Difference in Premodern 
Europe, 69 J. HIST. IDEAS 193, 193 (2008). Thanks to Karl Whittington for the introduction 
to DeVun’s work. Ruth Gilbert observes that “Ovid’s story of ‘Salmacis and 
Hermaphroditus’ provided a founding fable about the mutability of gender boundaries 
which was to be echoed throughout the art and literature of the Renaissance.” RUTH 
GILBERT, EARLY MODERN HERMAPHRODITES: SEX AND OTHER STORIES 57 (2002). 
 246 DeVun, supra note 245, at 193. 
 247 1 OVID, METAMORPHOSES bk. IV, at 205 (G.P. Goold ed., Frank Justus Miller 
trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. 2d ed. reprt. 1971) (c. 8 C.E.). The original reads:  
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So long as certain liberal, rationalist suppositions about bodily integrity being 
preserved during the sexual act are not too strictly maintained, and even if they 
are, the male-female couple in sexual union is readily seen as a hermaphroditic 
force.248 
The nature of the hermaphrodite being duality, there is a certain almost-
logic to the replication of the hermaphrodite in the two forms that it takes in 
the Chief Justice’s dissent. As man-woman, male-female, and sword-shield, 
the hermaphrodite pairs the dual forces of creation-destruction.249 For its own 
                                                                                                                     
vota suos habuere deos; nam mixta duorum corpora iunguntur, faciesque inducitur 
illis una. velut, si quis conducat cortice ramos, crescendo iungi pariterque adolescere 
cernit, sic ubi conplexu coierunt membra tenaci, nec duo sunt et forma duplex, nec 
femina dici nec puer ut possit, neutrumque et utrumque videntur. 
Id. at 204. Worth noting in this setting is that Hermes, Hermaphroditus’s father, is often 
represented as carrying a wand (see, for example, Giambolgna’s Mercury (c. 1580), a 
bronze statue housed in the Bargello Museum in Florence), while Aphrodite, 
Hermaphroditus’s mother, is often represented in a shell (see, for example, Sandro 
Botecelli’s The Birth of Venus (c. 1486), a painting in the Uffizi Gallery in Florence). 
Thanks to Courtney Cahill for the reminder about the representations of Hermes and 
Aphrodite and to Karl Whittington for the selection of the images. For a different myth of 
“man-woman,” see PLATO, Symposium, in PLATO, LYSIS, SYMPOSIUM, GORGIAS 73, 133–
45 (Jeffrey Henderson ed., W.R.M. Lamb trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1925) (c. 360 
B.C.E.). 
 248 The religious and spiritual dimensions of this two-in-one-flesh union ideal should 
be familiar. See Genesis 1:27 (King James) (“So God created man in his own image, in the 
image of God created he him; male and female created he them.”); DeVun, supra note 245, 
at 212 (referring to a “hermaphroditic adam and, by extension, a hermaphroditic creator,” 
while noting that this reading was “repeatedly denounced by Christian theologians,” the 
need for which “may indicate the persistence of such an interpretation”); id. (“The 
production of Eve from Adam’s rib may also have suggested the embodiment of the female 
within the male at the moment of creation . . . .”); see also Mark 10:8 (King James) 
(“[A]nd they twain shall be one flesh: so then they are no more twain, but one flesh.”). 
These ideas made their way into briefs filed in Obergefell, see, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae 
of Public Advocate of the U.S. et al. in Support of Respondents at 36, Obergefell, 135 
S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), though sometimes ostensibly stripped 
of their religious dimensions, see, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae 47 Scholars in Support of 
Respondents & Affirmance at 4, 7–8, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 
14-571, 14-574); Brief of Amici Curiae 100 Scholars of Marriage in Support of 
Respondents at 4–6, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574); 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Ryan T. Anderson, Ph.D. in Support of Respondents at 2, 4–5, 7–8, 
11, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574); supra note 244. 
For a study critically engaging the idea of “one-flesh union” from a liberal direction, see 
NICHOLAS C. BAMFORTH & DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, PATRIARCHAL RELIGION, SEXUALITY, 
AND GENDER 228–78 (2008). 
 249 Cf. Sigmund Freud, Analysis Terminable and Interminable (1937) (“[O]ur two 
primal instincts, Eros and destructiveness, the first of which endeavors to combine what 
exists into ever greater unities, while the second endeavors to dissolve those combinations 
and to destroy the structures to which they have given rise.”), reprinted in 23 THE 
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rhetorical purposes, the dissent cleaves these contrasting energies and drives 
them into different—and opposing—hermaphroditic forms.250 Thus, one 
hermaphrodite, reflected in heterosexual coital union, and coitus in cross-sex 
marriage above all, is in the affirmative, an elemental force of creativity. 
Generative, this hermaphrodite is the ordinary biological condition for human 
procreation, hence biological, hence social, life, without which “neither 
civilization nor progress” would exist.251 By contrast, the other hermaphrodite 
found in the dissent, represented by Obergefell, is in the negative, an elemental 
force of destruction. Degenerative, this hermaphrodite’s male-female 
combination turns not inward toward rebirth but outward, monstrously, toward 
the nullification of the social life and social worlds that its coital twin has 
formed through eons of concerted effort, threatening to release forces whose 
operation can throw social, including legal and political life, headlong past 
constitutional disruption into chaos, anomie, violence, social disorder, war of 
all against all, the likes of which have not been seen on U.S. soil since the 
Civil War.252 
Curiously, while the Chief Justice’s dissent noticeably figures Obergefell-
the-hermaphrodite as a destructive force, its dangers, as reflected by the 
dissent, are not exhausted by its negative powers. It is true that the dissent is 
concerned to the level of a trauma with how Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite 
unmakes heterosexual men as both heterosexuals and as men, but another look 
at the opinion indicates that the trauma heterosexual men endure—of being 
unmade in terms of their sexuality and their gender—is both widened and 
deepened by what Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite does with these men after 
they have been stripped of their heterosexuality and manhood through 
castration and forced sex. 
To see what that larger reconstruction project looks like, and who (or 
what) Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite makes heterosexual men into after their 
                                                                                                                     
STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD, supra 
note 31, at 209, 246. 
 250 These forms have histories. For aspects of them, in which “[t]he androgynous ideal 
suggested a harmonious transcendence of the sexed body,” while “many dreams of divine 
androgyny were also shadowed by the phantom of monstrous hermaphroditism,” see 
GILBERT, supra note 245, at 19–20. More on “monstrous hermaphroditism” is in id. at 19–
25. 
 251 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2614 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Maynard v. 
Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)); see also id. at 2601 (majority opinion) (quoting Maynard, 
125 U.S. at 211).  
 252 On the monstrousness of Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite as hermaphrodite, consider 
supra note 250. See also, e.g., LORRAINE DASTON & KATHARINE PARK, WONDERS AND THE 
ORDER OF NATURE: 1150–1750, at 173–214 (1998); GREENBERG, INTERSEXUALITY AND 
THE LAW, supra note 239, at 11 (quoting CHRISTOPHER J. DEWHURST & RONALD R. 
GORDON, THE INTERSEXUAL DISORDERS, at vii (1969)); KATHLEEN P. LONG, 
HERMAPHRODITES IN RENAISSANCE EUROPE 19–27, 215–35 (2006); Lorraine Daston & 
Katharine Park, The Hermaphrodite and the Orders of Nature: Sexual Ambiguity in Early 
Modern France, 1 GLQ 419, 423 (1995). 
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de-heterosexualization and their un-manning, it is useful to recognize that, in 
keeping with ages-old stories of the hermaphrodite as possessed of alchemical 
powers of “metamorphoses” or “transmutation,” when the dissent discusses 
heterosexual coital union, it credits it with the “natural” consequences of 
procreation: the children born of this union are born in their parents’ image.253 
Translated from biological into phantasmatic terms, the dissent thus 
figuratively maps the hermaphrodite’s creative powers as involving the powers 
of not merely sexual reproduction but self-reproduction. If so, when 
Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite’s sexuality expresses itself as the sexual 
mastery of heterosexual men, these men are the hermaphrodite’s reproductive 
putty who, once undone as who they once were, may be remade into 
hermaphrodites themselves. 
The larger stakes of this transformation come into view through an 
apprehension of the multiple and complex subject positions available to 
Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite as it sexually masters heterosexual men. Recall, 
to start, the Chief Justice’s dissent’s own normative hermaphroditic figure: the 
union of male and female in heterosexual union.254 Contemplating this 
conjunction, Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite may be imagined to occupy a 
heterosexulized subject position when it sexually masters heterosexual men. 
This position could be inflected by an emphasis on the hermaphroditic male 
who engages (as, say, the heterosexual men in the Obergefell majority do) in a 
mastery of heterosexual male brothers in a way that is readily figured as an act 
of erotic treason, which, if inexplicable in other ways, may draw into doubt the 
sexual identity of its perpetrator.255 Doing this, the heterosexualized subject 
position of sexual mastery that Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite works is just as 
easily shifted to an emphasis on the hermaphroditic female, an upstream 
version of what the dissent sees heterosexual men becoming when they, 
sexually mastered, are stripped of their heterosexual manhood.256 
Other possibilities must be noted. Homosexuality having long been 
considered a kind of hermaphroditism of the psyche or the soul, Obergefell-
the-hermaphrodite’s sexual mastery of heterosexual men is readily 
accomplished from a homosexualized subject position.257 This 
                                                                                                                     
 253 The language of “metamorphoses” and “transmutation” is from DeVun, supra note 
245, at 194. For the relevant underlying discussion in the dissent, see Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2612–13 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 254 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612–13 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 255 Leah DeVun draws attention to the views of the author of De Secretis Mulierum 
who believed “that while a hermaphrodite participates in both male and female natures, he 
should always be called ‘male’ simply because the male is the worthier sex.” DeVun, supra 
note 245, at 197 (citing PSEUDO-ALBERTUS MAGNUS, WOMEN’S SECRETS: A TRANSLATION 
OF PSEUDO-ALBERTUS MAGNUS’S DE SECRETIS MULIERUM WITH COMMENTARIES 116 
(Helen Rodnite Lemay ed. & trans., 1992)). 
 256 See supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text. 
 257 On homosexuality as psychic, or actually “psychical,” hermaphroditism, see, for 
example, FREUD, THREE ESSAYS, supra note 26, at 141–45. On homosexuality as 
“hermaphrodism of the soul,” see 1 FOUCAULT, supra note 123, at 43. 
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homosexualized subject position could obviously be that of the male 
homosexual (whose male-male erotic attractions directed at heterosexual men, 
as the apotheoses of manhood, may manifest through what Leo Bersani has 
called a “love of the cock,”258 expressed through castration or forced sodomy). 
Or this homosexualized subject position could be held by Obergefell-the-
hermaphrodite as a lesbian woman (who, consistent with certain conventional 
myths, might like, if not to be made love to by heterosexual men, then anyway 
to castrate or sodomize them, making them into lady-loved women).259 
These binary sexuality and gender subject positions are also subject to 
being combined in ways that appropriate elements of each, indeed all of them, 
in which case it would not exactly be a homosexual or a heterosexual 
Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite who masters heterosexual men, but a bisexual 
Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite that does.260 In this case, Obergefell-the-
hermaphrodite’s bisexuality could be, but need not be, in the form of either a 
bisexual male or a bisexual female. Alternatively, it could be in the form of a 
bi-sexualized and bi-gendered man-woman who castrates and forcibly 
sodomizes heterosexual men with the bodily appurtenances that are available 
to it. 
These prospects bring still others into view. To the extent that Obergefell-
the-hermaphrodite operates sexually to master heterosexual men in a bi-
sexualized and bi-gendered modality, it might be thought of not as an 
individual but rather as a multiple Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite that does 
what the dissent dreams is being done to heterosexual men. In this sense, the 
emphasis would be on the plural, the poly, form—the “they”—that the 
hermaphrodite can take on and in its nature is . . . or are.261 And if the 
                                                                                                                     
 258 BERSANI, HOMOS, supra note 18, at 103. In the present setting, it is worth observing 
a bit of the context for Bersani’s use of the expression: 
If it is time to sing the praise of the penis once again, it is not only because a 
fundamental reason for a gay man’s willingness to identify his desires as homosexual 
is love of the cock (an acknowledgment profoundly incorrect and especially unpopular 
with many of our feminist allies), but also because it was perhaps in early play with 
that much-shamed organ that we learned about the rhythms of power, and we were or 
should have been initiated into the biological connection between male sexuality and 
surrender or passivity—a connection that men have been remarkably successful in 
persuading women to consider nonexistent. 
Id. 
 259 Judith Butler speaks of “the phallic lesbian as potentially castrating” in JUDITH 
BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF “SEX” 55 (Routledge 
Classics ed. 2011). See also RENÉE C. HOOGLAND, Basic Instinct: The Lesbian Spectre as 
Castrating Agent, in LESBIAN CONFIGURATIONS 24 (Columbia Univ. Press 1997). 
 260 Terms like “ambisexual,” “omnisexual,” “pansexual,” or “polysexual” might be as 
or more aptly used in this setting. See infra note 263. “Bisexual” is relied on at this 
moment in the text because of its present-day familiarity. 
 261 This may provide an unexpected angle of vision on the Chief Justice’s dissent’s 
discussion of polygamy. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2621–22 (2015) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Thanks to Kyle Serrott for the association. 
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recursive nature of the Chief Justice’s dissent’s dreams about sexual mastery is 
recalled,262 it is easily imagined that and how Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite 
could occupy all of these various subject positions—including the positions as 
multiply constituted subjects—in different combinations, some of them or all 
of them at once, when sexually lording itself over heterosexual men. And if all 
these sexual and gender combinations may be in play at the same time, the 
dualistic nature of the hermaphrodite suggests it might also be the case that 
none of them would be.263 In that circumstance, Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite 
would best be understood as representing forces that rise above, without being 
at all reducible to, present-day conventions of sexuality and gender.  
There are various things that this final prospect could mean. Perhaps the 
most accessible way to think about them is to imagine that Obergefell-the-
hermaphrodite’s sexual mastery of heterosexual men drives against the 
formation and security of heterosexual male sexualized and gendered egos, 
returning the objects of its sexual predations to what, in a psycho-sexual sense, 
is an infantile state of sexuality and gender. On this view, Obergefell-the-
hermaphrodite’s sexual mastery of heterosexual men would ultimately entail 
their transmutation into sexual subjects—hermaphrodites—who are 
polymorphously, even polymorphingly, perverse.264 Their sexuality and 
gender identities may in this sense be thought of as having been fully queered: 
post-identitarian, post-sexuality, and post-gender in their forms, forms in 
which sexuality and gender identifications, as well as sexuality- and gender-
based eroticism, press away from their conventional associations with sex and 
desire while moving toward what Michael Foucault referred to as “bodies and 
pleasures,” in ways that are wildly fluid, sprightly, trickstery, and intensely 
perverse.265 
                                                                                                                     
 262 See supra Part III.F. 
 263 As Leah DeVun observes, “hermaphrodites were a source of confusion and even 
suspicion to their contemporaries, necessitating their division into binary gender categories 
of male and female, and conveying the extent to which neitherness and bothness had the 
potential to threaten social and natural norms.” DeVun, supra note 245, at 198. Along a 
wholly different track, writing about the idea of “polysexuality,” Francois Peraldi observes 
that the term “points toward the ‘real of sex’ which still lies untouched, unthought of, but 
[is] perhaps alluded to by Freud when he suggested that libido had no gender.” Francois 
Peraldi, Introduction to POLYSEXUALITY (Francois Peraldi ed., Thomas Gora et al. trans., 
1981).  
 264 If so, this may shed a distinctive light on some of the traditional opposition to 
extending federal anti-sex-discrimination protections to gender nonconforming individuals 
discussed, among other places, in Julie A. Greenberg, What Do Scalia and Thomas Really 
Think About Sex? Title VII and Gender Nonconformity Discrimination: Protection for 
Transsexuals, Intersexuals, Gays and Lesbians, 24 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 149 (2002). It 
certainly illuminates the observation that “[t]he sex-gender binary in Western society, 
particularly American society, is itself an act of violence upon human diversity.” Stone, 
supra note 239, at 357.  
 265 The language of “bodies and pleasures” is from 1 FOUCAULT, supra note 123, at 
157. Guy Hocquenhem gives voice to a version of the sensibility this way:  
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The thought that Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite’s sexual mastery of 
heterosexual men may make children out of them, reproducing them as infant-
like in their erotic compositions, casts into relief two of the dissent’s deep 
identifications.266 The dissent’s persistent identifications with the heterosexual 
men who suffer Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite’s sexual predations sit in a 
beautiful relation to its identifications with the children, including the infants, 
whom the coital hermaphrodite—the male-female heterosexual sexual union—
creates. It is not for nothing that when the dissent refers to these children, 
they—like the formerly heterosexual men whom Obergefell-the-
hermaphrodite has rendered infant-like—have neither sexual nor gender 
                                                                                                                     
Wanting the fundamental freedom to enter into these revolutionary practices 
entails our escaping from the limits of our own “self.” We must turn the “subject” 
within ourselves upside-down; escape from the sedentary, from the “civilized state” 
and cross the spaces of a limitless body; live in the willful mobility beyond sexuality, 
beyond the territory and repertory of normality. . . .  
. . . . 
What we want, what we desire is to kick in the façade over sexuality and its 
representations so that we might discover just what our living body is. 
. . . . 
We want to be able to exercise each of our vital functions experiencing their full 
complement of pleasure. 
. . . .  
We want to be rid of sexual segregation. We want to be rid of the categories of 
man and woman, gay and straight, possessor and possessed, greater and lesser, master 
and slave. We want instead to be transsexual, autonomous, mobile and multiple 
human beings with varying differences who can interchange desires, gratifications, 
ecstasies, and tender emotions without referring back to tables of surplus value or 
power structures that aren’t already in the rules of the game. 
Guy Hockenghem [sic], To Destroy Sexuality, in POLYSEXUALITY, supra note 263, at 260, 
261–64. Practically tracing some of the relationship between polymorphous perversity and 
early what-would-now-be-known-as “queer” activism, Terry Evans observes, with DENNIS 
ALTMAN, HOMOSEXUAL OPPRESSION AND LIBERATION (Penguin Books 1973) (1971) in 
mind, that: “Altman argues that a sexually liberated society would be based on a belief in a 
neo-Freudian polymorphous perversity where sexual identities would become obsolete and 
the nuclear family would be one of many ways in which social and community life would 
be organised.” Terry Evans, Bisexuality: Negotiating Lives Between Two Cultures, 3 J. 
BISEXUALITY 91, 98 (2003). Producing and writing within a different tradition, Andrea 
Dworkin expressed not wholly dissimilar dreams: “If human beings are multisexed, then 
all forms of sexual interaction which are directly rooted in the multisexual nature of people 
must be part of the fabric of human life, accepted into the lexicon of human possibility, 
integrated into the forms of human community.” DWORKIN, supra note 115, at 183.  
 266 As an aside, this may be tallied as one point at which this reading of the Chief 
Justice’s dissent may be thought to coincide with a certain return to Jerome Frank’s 
psychoanalytic jurisprudence, and, as Charles Barzun describes it, its “most controversial 
aspect”: its view “that the longing for legal certainty stems from an unconscious desire in 
judges and laypeople to maintain the sense of security that a person’s father provides in 
childhood.” Charles L. Barzun, Jerome Frank and the Modern Mind, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 
1127, 1130 (2010); see also, e.g., FRANK, supra note 16, at 18, 235. 
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identifications.267 Their sexualities and their genders are held totally in 
abeyance. This is consistent with the sense, from aught that appears in the 
dissent, that these children are in the tender, formative moments of their 
development. Indeed, it is their developmental needs that constitute the basis 
for affirming marriage as the union of one man to one woman as husband and 
wife: Marriage, on this view, is the means by which children are to be 
provided stable, supportive, and nurturing environments in which to grow 
up.268 It is marriage that gives them the blessings of parents and a family life 
at a time when they are weak, vulnerable, and largely, if not entirely, 
defenseless against the world, hence in need of, and in their innocence 
deserving of, the protections that heterosexual marriage—and also the 
dissent—provides them. If the needs of children are central to the dissent’s 
historical and traditional account of the purposes of marriage, at no moment 
may children be more vulnerable in their basic needs than as infants, when 
they are wholly dependent upon their parents for everything. 
The cross-tabbed identifications of the Chief Justice’s dissent with 
heterosexual men and with the offspring of heterosexual sexual union are best 
read in light of one another. They are not disparate conceptual points, but 
through the dissent’s fantasy structure are linked in what may be thought of as 
a relation of cause and effect. Reconstructed, their relation looks like this: 
Obergefell, a hermaphroditic force, as Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite, which 
sexually dominates heterosexual men by means of castration and forced 
sodomy, strips them of their heterosexuality and their manhood while 
transmuting them into hermaphrodites with infant-like erotic dispositions. In 
psychologized terms, the psychic disorganization of heterosexual men and 
their reorganization in a more or less permanently disorganized state of 
infantile eroticism is a sign—a very powerful sign, perhaps the most powerful 
sign yet—of the trauma that the dissent’s own sexual fantasies have hurled it 
into. 
Out of this constellation of points emerge some possible explanations for 
certain cultural-discursive puzzles that have seemed mysterious to many for a 
long time—puzzles that surface in the dissent in ways that give clues to their 
possible resolution. How could allowing same-sex marriage be a threat to 
heterosexual marriage and to the children born from it?269 Once marriage 
equality is imagined as phantasmatically achieved by the sexual mastery of 
heterosexual men, who are both castrated and forcibly sodomized in the 
process, a process that thus de-heterosexualizes and unmans them, how could 
                                                                                                                     
 267 For references to “child” or “children” without any discernible sexual or gender 
identification, see Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2613–14, 2619–20, 2622, 2626 
(2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 268 Id. at 2613. 
 269 A variation on the puzzle is noted and engaged by Obergefell as without 
“foundation.” Id. at 2606–07. Elsewhere, “the assertion that straight people will no longer 
marry because gay people do” has once again recently been dismissed as “ludicrous.” 
Seidman, supra note 12, at 141.  
1104 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 77:5 
they possibly fulfill their husbandly duties? How could these ruined non-
heterosexual non-men sexually perform their spousal obligations and father 
children? Indeed, if marriage equality reflects the de-heterosexualization and 
unmanning of heterosexual men in a way that constitutes a trauma that 
positively transforms them into an infantile, erotic state, how could they 
themselves, cooing and ah-ah-ing in their somatic pleasures, possibly 
undertake to perform what, consistent with the historical and traditional 
definition of marriage and marital intimacy, is an act of male-identified 
dominance? To the extent that erstwhile heterosexual men begin to 
reconstitute themselves as heterosexuals and as men, Obergefell-the-
hermaphrodite is waiting, standing guard, ready to re-slay them through its 
sexual predations, which, if they do not exactly aim to lock heterosexual men 
into weak and vulnerable sexual conditions, do anyway intend to keep them 
psychologically organized, really: disorganized, this way. But whatever the 
precise mechanisms, within the operation of the dissent’s fantasies of 
hermaphroditic sexual predation, if marriage equality entails the sexual 
domination of heterosexual men, it must be the end of marriage, and of 
children, who will thus never come into being through male-dominated 
heterosexual coitus, and who are, symbolically anyway, themselves thus 
destroyed. No wonder that all this can manifest, as the dissent does, in 
apocalyptic tones. What Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite promises is not only 
the end of heterosexual men themselves, but also in consequence, the orderly 
function of a male-dominant heterosexuality. This, in turn, promises the end of 
marriage, of children, and—by extension—the collapse of social life and the 
social world, including its institutions, including the Constitution, including 
the Court, that have been built upon it. Everything is to be reconfigured within 
the context of a new sexuality and gender order that Obergefell-the-
hermaphrodite—with its domination not just of the Constitution, of 
heterosexual men, but of all recorded and maybe even unrecorded world 
history—is to bring about.270  
Read this way, Chief Justice Roberts’s Obergefell dissent reverberates 
with, while uncannily echoing aspects of, one of Freud’s most famous 
studies—a study, as it happens, of infantile neuroses popularly referred to as 
the “Wolf Man” case.271 In this case, famously, Freud’s patient, the Wolf Man, 
bears witness as an infant boy to what Freud refers to as a “primal scene” in 
which the infant’s parents are engaged in “a coitus a tergo [from behind], three 
times repeated.”272 The boy, who both does and who does not understand what 
                                                                                                                     
 270 This line of vision underscores some of the potential stakes of the important work 
on intersexuality and marriage equality under law that has already been undertaken. See, 
e.g., GREENBERG, INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW, supra note 239, at 53–64; Terry S. 
Kogan, Transsexuals, Intersexuals, and Same-Sex Marriage, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 371, 402–
14 (2004). 
 271 Freud, Wolf Man, supra note 1.  
 272 Id. at 36–39 (alteration in original) (offering a description of the scene that the Wolf 
Man boy bears witness to). The boy’s age is “established as being about one and a half 
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is happening between his parents, is traumatized by the sight, which 
subsequently shapes his conscious heterosexual and unconscious homosexual 
sexual lives.273 On the unconscious side of the ledger, the primal scene 
inspires fantasies of homosexualized castration and violent sodomy at his 
father’s hands, fantasies of homosexuality that have detectable gender 
components: the young boy being “used by his father like a woman—like his 
mother in the primal scene.”274 Seeing and understanding his parents’ 
conjunction, and complexly identifying and disidentifying with the sexuality 
that he sees taking place, the boy experiences his parents’ male-female union 
in that moment as the basis for his own traumatic negation.275 He—an infant—
is irrelevant, non-existent to his parents who are, in that moment, lost in sex 
more ferarum, translated: in the manner of beasts.276 At some point in this 
experience, the infant boy is so overwhelmed by the scene unfolding before 
                                                                                                                     
years.” Id. at 36. But see id. at n.1. Reference to the scene as the “primal scene” in its 
“earliest published use” is in id. at 39 & n.1. On the coitus being both “a tergo” and thrice 
repeated, see id. at 37 & n.5. A vital clarification is in Freud:  
I should myself be glad to know whether the primal scene in my present patient’s case 
was a phantasy or a real experience; but, taking other similar cases into account, I 
must admit that the answer to this question is not in fact a matter of very great 
importance. These scenes of observing parental intercourse, of being seduced in 
childhood, and of being threatened with castration are unquestionably an inherited 
endowment, a phylogenetic heritage, but they may just as easily be acquired by 
personal experience.  
Id. at 97. As Freud elsewhere observes: “It is also a matter of indifference in this 
connection whether we choose to regard it as a primal scene or as a primal phantasy.” Id. at 
120 n.1 (emphasis omitted); see also, e.g., id. at 39, 48–60, 67 n.1, 80–81, 95, 103 n.1, 121 
n.1. The context within which Freud ventures his methodological “indifference” to the 
materiality of the primal scene may help make the remark more intelligible, but it is, 
finally, only one point of view, and a not unproblematic one at that. See MASSON, supra 
note 203, at xvii; K.R. Eissler, Comments on Erroneous Interpretations of Freud’s 
Seduction Theory, 41 J. AM. PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS’N 571, 574–82 (1993); supra note 203. 
 273 On the Wolf Man boy’s understanding, and some of what Freud means by it, 
including the difficulties with the notion, see Freud, Wolf Man, supra note 1, at 37–39, 37 
n.6, 45 n.1, 120 & n.1, 121 n.1. The traumatic effects of the primal scene, subject to 
clarifications and qualifications, see, for example, id. at 43–45, are noted in id. at 39 et seq. 
On the primal scene’s influences on the boy’s subsequent sexual development, see, for 
example, id. at 40–47, 55–58, 63–65, 70–71, 78, 109. 
 274 Id. at 64; see also, e.g., id. at 41–47. An element of incest is thus attendant upon 
this homosexual fantasy—not, it should be noted, the only indication of incestuous 
relations in the case. See, e.g., id. at 19–21. An exploration of the incest taboo that explores 
and weaves some of these themes together in different ways is in Courtney Megan Cahill, 
Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical 
Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 
1543 (2005). 
 275 The notion of the infant’s experience of a traumatic negation in this sentence and 
the next is a re-reading of the elements of Freud’s account.  
 276 The use of “more ferarum” and its slightly different translation as “in the fashion of 
animals” are in Freud, Wolf Man, supra note 1, at 41; see also id. at 57. 
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him that he finally undertakes to “interrupt[] his parents’ intercourse.”277 He 
accomplishes this “by passing a stool.”278 The release of his bowels—a sign of 
his own erotic excitement—gives the boy “an excuse for screaming.”279 The 
screaming brings the sexual scene to a halt.280 
Beyond the ways in which Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite, this male-
female conjunction, like the male-female union in the Wolf Man study, 
produces a trauma that sends the dissent to an infantile psychic space, and 
beyond the dissent’s fantasies of castration and forced sodomy, which include 
the pleasures of homosexuality and femininity that ring inside the Chief 
Justice’s dissent’s account—even beyond all this, there is a sense in which 
Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite’s sexual predations become at some point 
obviously too much for the dissent to bear. And so it is that the dissent delivers 
itself as an emotional eruption, its writing, its pulse, at times so impassioned 
and fevered it can only be heard as a kind of screaming. The desired effect of 
this vocalization, of course, is to get what Obergefell-the-hermaphrodite is 
doing to stop. Tragically, unlike the primal scene recounted by Freud, in which 
the infant boy’s screaming brings his parents’ coitus to a halt, the Chief 
Justice’s dissent’s protestations fall on deaf ears. Obergefell stays its course. 
The dissent’s fantasy-nightmare of heterosexual men being subjected to a 
force of hermaphroditic sexual domination, its own primal sexual scene, 
ceaselessly goes on. 
Here, then, is an account of the dissent’s very plainly troubled sense that 
Obergefell produces a stunning—and shocking—experience of a disorienting 
and dizzying immediacy, an experience of “the heady days of the here and 
now.”281 It also explains the dissent’s equally plainly troubled sense that the 
advent of Obergefell draws with it the end of an ages-old, known, and largely 
settled, if also a hierarchical, world of sexuality and gender. The abrupt 
negation of this world has suddenly been replaced with a world in which new 
forms of sexuality and gender, frighteningly complex, are ascendant.282 
                                                                                                                     
 277 Id. at 80–81. Freud indicates the generality of this method of interrupting “sexual 
intercourse between parents” based on other cases that he encountered. Id. at 59. 
 278 Id. at 80. 
 279 Freud maintains that “there can be no question of how we are to regard” the boy’s 
passing a stool: “It is a sign of a state of excitement of the anal zone (in the widest 
sense). . . . The fact that our little boy passed a stool as a sign of his sexual excitement is to 
be regarded as a characteristic of his congenital sexual constitution.” Id. at 81. That the act 
“gave [the boy] an excuse for screaming” is indicated by id. at 80. Freud’s assessment 
continues with the confident observation that “a grown-up man in the same circumstances 
would feel an erection.” Id. at 81. 
 280 This is the implication of the “interruption” of the intercourse. See id. at 37–38, 80. 
 281 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2623 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 282 Justice Alito’s Obergefell dissent expresses its concerns with Obergefell in a 
different fashion, marshaling imagery indicating an inversion of homosexuality’s 
traditional “closet.” Now emptied of its erstwhile inhabitants, the closet that Obergefell 
constructs is apparently to be populated by “those who oppose same-sex marriage” as a 
function of their “rights of conscience.” See id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. (“I 
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Obergefell thus represents the traumatically felt loss of an old rationalizing 
sexual and gender order, certainly for heterosexual men, some of whom—as 
reflected by the Chief Justice’s dissent—are such novitiates that their own 
profound sense of sexuality-based and gender-based vulnerability erupts in 
infant-like screaming. “No!” to these new ways of life, of being, of living, 
with their new configurations and ways of identifying oneself or themselves in 
sexuality and gender terms, as well as in friendship and in the intimate and 
loving relationships that Obergefell portends. The toppling of an old 
constitutional, cultural, and symbolic order in which heterosexual men were—
or anyway, felt—secure in their place atop a male-dominant hierarchy, a perch 
from which they ruled over women, over children, and homosexuals, over the 
institutions of private and public life, including family, democracy, and the 
State, has somehow been brought about, and by, no less, an opinion written by 
a (heterosexual) man and joined by (presumably) heterosexual women and a 
man, who govern an institution that is supposed to preserve—not radically 
change—the social order. This is destruction, this is chaos, sexuality and 
gender and the forms of power that they reflect circulating more complexly 
and contingently than anything that traditional marriage and the laws built up 
around it have ever supposed. Or allowed. 
Against this, there is more than defiance in the question that the Chief 
Justice’s dissent insistently asks of the majority opinion in the case, 
challenging its decision to upend what is seen as millennia of well-settled 
history and tradition: “Just who do we think we are?”283 This plainly defiant 
and very angry question also has a detectably sad and tragic ring to it, a ring of 
crying disorientation, as though after Obergefell, the dissent no longer knows 
what its place or identity is.284 Outside the dissent’s own perspective, it is hard 
to recognize its anguish and not feel something by way of response. How is 
someone steeped in the old ways to know who or what one is when straight 
men are no longer straight men, when straight is gay, when heterosexual 
procreative sex is the same as sodomitical relations, when sodomy is the basis 
for marital intimacy, when marriage is not-marriage, when freedom is 
domination, when liberty is war—when, in short, up is down. Perhaps as bad 
as anything else, particularly for the Supreme Court, how is someone who is 
steeped in the old ways that the Constitution has long protected to know who 
or what one is when the Constitution is not the Constitution anymore? 
It is very easy in the age of Obergefell to figure the dissent’s dream-like 
tally of the majority opinion in normative and highly critical terms, critical 
here being meant in an entirely negative sense. Far more challenging, if also 
                                                                                                                     
assume that those who cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in the 
recesses of their homes . . . .”). If true, it is certainly a reminder, to borrow from Justice 
Scalia’s dissent, of their “impotence” in the face of what Obergefell achieves. Id. at 2631 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 138–46 and accompanying text. 
 283 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 284 Toni Massaro describes this question as “bristling with indignation.” Massaro, 
supra note 3, at 339.  
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more illuminating, is to apprehend how the dissent’s plainly pained and 
traumatized reactions to Obergefell are, finally, reflections of psychological 
sensibilities that, especially in their lack of rationality and proportion, reflect 
larger cultural fantasies that, like it, view Obergefell as a sun-bright sign of the 
decline and fall of American civilization. This, of course, could easily be the 
very fall that Justice Scalia’s separate dissent seems to have in mind and 
senses must come to pass as a result of the “o’erweening pride” demonstrated 
by the Court’s opinion in the case for daring to upend history and tradition 
while lifting the Court, Ruler-like, over everything that was known, lived, and 
experienced before, to rule all that it now surveys without any warrant in the 
Constitution or the Court’s precedents.285 But in agony—think of any of the 
great passions—there can also be great beauty. 
Understanding the Chief Justice’s dissent’s rhetoric to reflect wild and 
fevered dreaming that, being pure fantasy, is wholly unreal, it is nevertheless 
the case that in fantasies hard truths may be found.286 In this case, and in this 
sense, the Chief Justice’s dissent’s dreaming is exactly right: The meaning of 
heterosexual manhood, indeed, the meanings of sexuality and gender, are not 
at all the same after Obergefell as they were before it. No one who lives under 
its rule, no one who lives under the Constitution it constructs, can be 
unchanged by this decision. It is much easier to condemn the Chief Justice’s 
dissent than to take the challenge of its dreaming seriously, and marveling at 
it, to ask—as everyone ought to—the very question that the dissent directs to 
the Court, while inviting its audience to consider: “Just who do we think we 
are?”287 
                                                                                                                     
 285 See supra text accompanying notes 144–46. 
 286 As Herbert Marcuse puts it: “Uncompromising adherence to the strict truth value of 
imagination comprehends reality more fully.” MARCUSE, supra note 18, at 149. Or, as 
André Breton more dreamily remarks: “Imagination alone offers me some intimation of 
what can be . . . .” ANDRÉ BRETON, MANIFESTOES OF SURREALISM 5 (Richard Seaver & 
Helen R. Lane trans., Univ. of Mich. Press 1969) (1962).  
 287 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
